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Abstract. Term-generic logic (TGL) is a first-order logic parameterized
with terms defined axiomatically (rather than constructively), by requir-
ing them to only provide generic notions of free variable and substitution
satisfying reasonable properties. TGL has a complete Gentzen system
generalizing that of first-order logic. A certain fragment of TGL, called
Horn2, possesses a much simpler Gentzen system, similar to traditional
typing derivation systems of λ-calculi. Horn2 appears to be sufficient for
defining a whole plethora of λ-calculi as theories inside the logic. Within
intuitionistic TGL, a Horn2 specification of a calculus is likely to be
adequate by default. A bit of extra effort shows adequacy w.r.t. classic
TGL as well, endowing the calculus with a complete loose semantics.
1 Introduction
First-order logic (FOL) does not allow variables to be bound in terms (but only
in formulae, via quantifiers), thus providing a straightforward notion of substi-
tution in terms. On the other hand, most calculi that are used in the domain of
programming languages, and not only, are crucially based on the notion of bind-
ing of variables in terms: terms “export” only a subset of their variables, the free
ones, that can be substituted. Because of their complex formulation for terms,
these calculi cannot be naturally defined as FOL theories. Consequently, they
need to define their own models and deduction rules, and to state their own
theorems of completeness, not always easy to prove. In other words, they are
presented as entirely new logics, as opposed to theories in an existing logic, thus
incurring all the drawbacks (and boredom) of repeating definitions and proofs
following generic, well-understood patterns, but facing new “details”.
In this paper we define term-generic first-order logic, or simply term-generic
logic (TGL), as a first-order logic parameterized by any terms that come with
abstract notions of free variable and substitution. More precisely, in TGL terms
are elements in a generic set Term (including a subset Var whose elements
are called variables) that comes with functions FV : Term → Pf (Var) and
Subst : Term × TermVar → Term for free variables and substitution, respec-
tively, satisfying some expected properties. TGL models provide interpretations
of terms that satisfy, again, some reasonable properties. We show that TGL
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admits a complete Gentzen-like deduction system, which is syntactically very
similar to that of FOL; its proof of completeness modifies the classic proof of
completeness for FOL to use the generic notions of term, free variables and
substitution.
Because of not committing to any particular definition of term, TGL can be
instantiated to different types of terms, such as standard FOL terms or different
categories of (typed or untyped) λ-terms. When instantiated to standard FOL
terms, TGL becomes, as expected, precisely FOL. However, when instantiated to
more complex terms, e.g., the terms of λ-calculus, TGL becomes a logic where
a particular calculus is a particular theory. For example, the TGL axiom for
typing abstractions in simply-typed λ-calculus can be
(∀x. x : t⇒ X : t′)⇒ (λx : t.X) : t→ t′
where x and t, t′ denote data and type variables, respectively, X denotes an arbi-
trary data term,⇒ is the logical implication, and→ is the arrow type construct
(binary operator on types). The above is an axiom-scheme, parameterized by any
choice of variables x, t, t′ and term X (and, as customary, each of its instances is
implicitly assumed universally quantified over all its free variables). The colons
in x : t and X : t′ and the outermost colon in (λx : t.X) : t → t′ refer to a
binary relation symbol in TGL, while the colon in λx : t.X is part of the term
syntax. The term X may contain the free variable x, which is bound by ∀ in the
lefthand side of the outermost implication, and by λ in the righthand side. Both
these capturings of x from X are intended – in fact, the migration of x between
the two scopes is at the heart of the intended typing mechanism: x is an actual,
but arbitrary input to the function described by X in the former case, and a
formal parameter in the latter; the type t → t′ is assigned to the abstraction
λx : t.X by “experimenting” with arbitrary x’s of type t and “observing” if the
result has type t′. (Using the same notation for actual as for formal parameters
of functional expressions is well-established mathematical practice.)
A possible instance of the above axiom-scheme, taking, e.g., λy : t′′. y x as X
and spelling out all the universal quantifications, is
∀t, t′, t′′. (∀x. x : t⇒ (λy : t′′. y x) : t′)⇒ (λx : t. λy : t′′. y x) : t→ t′,
which implies in TGL, instantiating t′′ with t→ t′′′ and t′ with (t→ t′′′)→ t′′′,
∀t, t′′′. (∀x. x : t⇒ (λy : t→ t′′′. y x) : (t→ t′′′)→ t′′′)⇒
(λx : t. λy : t→ t′′′. y x) : t→ (t→ t′′′)→ t′′′.
Moreover, we can prove in TGL, using again the above axiom-scheme and an-
other axiom for application, that the hypothesis (i.e., the lefthand side of the
outermost ⇒) in the latter sentence is true for all t′, t′′′, hence we obtain a TGL
derivation of ∀t, t′′′. (λx : t. λy : t→ t′′′. y x) : t→ (t→ t′′′)→ t′′′.
A specification of a calculus in TGL brings a meaningful complete semantics
for that calculus, because the axioms are stated about some models, the content
of the axioms making the models “desirable”. Indeed, TGL models are initially
“blank”, in that they are only required to interpret the terms consistently with
substitution – it is the axioms that customize the models. For instance, the
previously discussed description of x as an “actual, but arbitrary parameter”
is not merely an informal idea to help the intuition, but a mathematical fact
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within the TGL semantics: when “escaped” from the scope of λ into the scope
of ∀, x indeed denotes an actual, but arbitrary inhabitant of a desirable model.
Even though the completeness (being equivalent to semi-decidability) of a
fragment of a logic (whose syntax is decidable) follows from the completeness
of the richer logic, there are good reasons to develop complete proof systems
for certain particular sublogics as well. Besides a better understanding and self-
containment of the sublogic, one important reason is the granularity of proofs.
Indeed, proofs of goals in the sublogic that use the proof-system of the larger
logic may be rather long and “junkish” and may look artificial in the context
of the sublogic. For example, equational logic admits a very intuitive complete
proof system [6], that simply “replaces equals by equals”, thus avoiding the more
intricate first-order proofs. An important goal of this paper is to also investigate
conditions under which sublogics of TGL admit specialized coarse-granularity
proof systems.
It appears that a certain fragment of TGL, that we call Horn2, is sufficient
for calculi-specification purposes. Horn2 consists of TGL sentences of the form
∀y.(∀x.∧ni=1ai(x, y)⇒ bi(x, y))⇒ c(y)
with ai, bi, c atomic formulae (x and y denote tuples of variables), i.e., gener-
alized Horn implications whose conditions are themselves (single-hypothesis)1
Horn implications. We show that, under a reasonable restriction that we call
amenability, a Horn2 theory admits a complete Gentzen system that “imple-
ments” each Horn2 formula as above into a deduction rule of the form
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Γ . c(T )
where T is a tuple of terms substituting y and z is a fresh tuple of variables substi-
tuting x. The (multiple-formulae antecedent, single-formula succedent) structure
of this system follows the style of intuitionistic logic, and indeed we show that
it specializes the Gentzen system of the intuitionistic version of TGL. Thus we
obtain for the Horn2 fragment an intuitionistic proof system which is complete
w.r.t. classical models! Moreover, this “lower-level” Gentzen system, extracted
from the higher-level notation used in the Horn2 theory, recovers the original
calculus itself (bringing what in syntactic encoding frameworks is usually re-
ferred to as adequacy of the representation). For instance, the Horn2 deduction
rule corresponding to the aforementioned typing axiom for typed λ-calculus is
precisely the familiar context-based typing rule for abstractions:
Γ, z :T . Z : T ′
Γ . (λz :T.Z) : T → T ′ [z fresh for Γ ]
By substitution, x from the typing axiom became a fresh z in the deductive
system, the variables t, t′ became arbitrary terms T, T ′, and X became a term Z
such that the positions in which x occurred in X are the same as the positions in
which z now occurs in Z (because the term X and the positioning of x in X were
arbitrary in the typing axiom, it follows that the term Z and the positioning of
1 Single hypothesis, in the sense that each ai(x, y) has to be an atomic formula, as
opposed to being a conjunction of atomic formulae.
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z in Z are also arbitrary in the resulted deduction rule). This transformation is
prescribed uniformly, i.e., calculus-independently, for any Horn2 theory.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
classic TGL (syntax, models, institutional structure, Gentzen system and com-
pleteness theorem) and intuitionistic TGL. Section 3 discusses the Horn2 frag-
ment and its specialized Gentzen systems, whose completeness “prepares” the
logic for future adequacy results. Section 4 illustrates the TGL adequate by de-
fault specification style for λ-calculi, taking System F as a working example.
Section 5 discusses related work and draws conclusions. The appendix contains
more details regarding the addressed topics (Sections A, B, and [C,D] giving
details about the topics of Sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively), a model-theoretic
comparison between TGL-based models and ad hoc models (Section E), and
proofs of the stated facts, including those from the appendix (Section F).
2 Term-Generic First-Order Logic
We introduce a generic notion of first-order term, axiomatized by means of free
variables and substitution, purposely not committing to any concrete syntax for
terms. Then we show our first novel result in this paper, namely a development
of first-order logic that does not depend on the syntax of terms, but only on
the properties of substitution. We first develop the logic in an unsorted form and
without equality, and later sketch equality and order-sorted extensions, as well
as an intuitionistic variant.
Definition 1. Let Var be a countably infinite set of variables. A term syntax
over Var consists of the following data:
(a) A (countably infinite) set Term such that Var ⊆ Term, whose ele-
ments are called terms;
(b) A mapping FV :Term→ Pf (Var) (where Pf means “the set of finite
sets of”); the elements of FV(T ) are called free variables, or simply
variables, of T ;
(c) A mapping Subst : Term× TermVar → Term, called substitution.
These are subject to the following requirements (where x ranges over variables,
T, T ′ over terms, and θ, θ′ over maps in TermVar):
(1) Subst(x, θ) = θ(x);
(2) Subst(T,Var ↪→ Term) = T ;
(3) If θFV (T )= θ′FV (T ), then Subst(T, θ) = Subst(T, θ′);2
(4) Subst(Subst(T, θ), θ′) = Subst(T, θ; θ′), where θ; θ′ : Var → Term is
defined by (θ; θ′)(y) = Subst(θ(y), θ′);
(5) FV (x) = {x};
(6) FV (Subst(T, θ)) =
⋃{FV (θ(x)) :x ∈ FV (T )}.
Note that we assume the notion of term coming together with a notion of substi-
tution which is composable (condition (4) above). In general, for a syntax with
bindings, composability of substitution does not hold for raw terms, but only for
α-equivalence classes – therefore, in the concrete instances of our logic to calculi
2 Here and later, if f : U → V and U ′ ⊆ U , fU′ denotes the restriction of f to U ′.
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with bindings, TGL terms will be α-equivalence classes of what are usually called
(raw) “terms” in these calculi. Conditions (1)-(6) from Definition 1 are natural
(and well-known) properties of substitution holding for virtually all notions of
terms with static binding (modulo α-equivalence).
For distinct variables x1, . . . , xn, we write [T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn] for the function
Var → Term that maps xi to Ti for i = 1, n and all the other variables to
themselves, and T [T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn] for Subst(T, [T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn]).
Definition 2.A term-generic language consists of a term syntax (Term,FV,Subst)
over a set Var and an at most countable ranked set Π = (Πn)n∈IN , of rela-
tion symbols. A TGL model for a language as above is a triple of the form
(A, (AT )T∈Term, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn), where:
(a) A is a set, called the carrier set.
(b) For each T ∈ Term, AT is a mapping AVar → A such that the following hold
for all x ∈ Var, T ∈ Term, ρ, ρ′ ∈ AVar, and θ ∈ TermVar:
— (b.i) Ax(ρ) = ρ(x);
— (b.ii) If ρFV(T )= ρ′FV(T ), then AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′);
— (b.iii) ASubst(T, θ)(ρ) = AT (Aθ(ρ)), where Aθ : AVar → AVar is defined by
Aθ(ρ)(y) = Aθ(y)(ρ).
(c) For each n ∈ IN and pi ∈ Πn, A(n,pi) is an n-ary relation on A.
Thus, unlike in classic FOL models where the interpretation of terms is built
from operations, in TGL models the interpretation of terms is assumed (in the
style of Henkin models). It turns out that condition (b.ii) is redundant (follows
from the other conditions and Definition 1 – see Appendix F.1 for a proof)3 –
we keep it though as part of the definition of a model for the sake of symmetry
with Definition 1.
In what follows, we let x, xi, y, u, v, etc., range over variables, T, Ti, T ′, etc.,
over terms, θ, θ′, etc., over maps in TermVar , ρ, ρ′, etc., over valuations in AVar ,
and pi, pi′, etc., over relation symbols. Sometimes we simply write Term for term
syntaxes (Term,FV ,Subst) and (Term,Π) for term-generic languages.
Formulae are defined as usual, starting from atomic formulae pi(T1, . . . , Tn)
and applying connectives ∧,⇒ and quantifier ∀. (Other connectives and quan-
tifiers may of course be also considered, but we omit them since they shall not
be needed for our specifications in this paper.) For each formula ϕ, the set
Aϕ ⊆ AVar , of valuations that make ϕ true in A, is defined recursively on the
structure of formulae as follows: ρ ∈ Api(T1,...,Tn) iff (AT1(ρ), . . . , ATn(ρ)) ∈ Api;
ρ ∈ Aϕ⇒ψ iff ρ ∈ Aϕ implies ρ ∈ Aψ; ρ ∈ Aϕ∧ψ iff ρ ∈ Aϕ and ρ ∈ Aψ;
ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ iff ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A. If ρ ∈ Aϕ we say that A satisfies
ϕ under valuation ρ and write A |=ρ ϕ. If Aϕ = AVar we say that A satisfies
ϕ and write A |= ϕ. Given a set of formulae Γ , A |= Γ means A |= ϕ for all
ϕ ∈ Γ . Above, and from now on, we let ϕ,ψ, χ range over arbitrary formulae and
A over arbitrary models (sometimes, when we want to distinguish models from
their carrier set A,B, we write A,B for the models). For formulae, the notions of
free variables, α-equivalence, and substitution are the natural ones, defined simi-
larly to the case of FOL, but on top of our generic terms rather than FOL terms.
3 We are indebted to one of the referees for bringing this to our attention.
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For substitution in formulae we adopt notational conventions similar to the ones
about substitution in terms, e.g., ϕ[T/x]. Note that TGL is a logic generic only
w.r.t. terms - formulae are “concrete” first-order formulae built over generic
terms, with a “concrete” (and not generic) notion of α-equivalence, standardly
defined using the bindings from quantifiers, which preserves satisfaction and the
free variables and is compatible with substitution and the language constructs.
Hereafter we identify formulae modulo α-equivalence. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be a
tuple of variables and J = {y1, . . . , ym} a set of variables. Then Vars(x) denotes
the set {x1, . . . , xn}, ∀x. ϕ denotes ∀x1 . . .∀xn.ϕ, and ∀J. ϕ denotes ∀y1 . . .∀ym.ϕ
(the latter notation making an (immaterial for our purposes) choice of a total
ordering on J). A sentence is a formula with no free variables. The universal
closure of a formula ϕ is the sentence ∀FV (ϕ). ϕ. (See Appendix A.1 for more
details.)
The inclusion of an emphasized equality symbol in our logic, interpreted in
all models as equality, yields TGL with equality. Many-sorted and order-sorted
variants of TGL (in the style of [16]) can also be straightforwardly obtained,
by extending Definition 1 to term syntaxes involving multiple sorts (syntactic
categories) and Definition 2 to models having as carriers sort-indexed sets (see
Appendix A.2 and A.3 for details). For example, in the case of order-sorted TGL,
a poset (S,<) of sorts is fixed and carriers of models are families of sets (As)s∈S
such that s < s′ implies As ⊆ As′ for all s, s′ ∈ S. All the concepts and results
about TGL in this paper, including completeness of various proof systems for
various fragments of the logic, can be easily (but admittedly tediously) extended
to the many-sorted and order-sorted cases.
FOL. As expected, classic FOL is an instance of TGL. Indeed, let (Var , Σ,Π)
be a classic first-order language, where Σ = (Σn)n∈IN and Π = (Πn)n∈IN are
ranked sets of operation and relation symbols. Let Term be the term syntax
consisting of ordinary first-order terms over Σ and Var with FV : Term →
Pf (Var) giving all the variables in each term and Subst : Term × TermVar →
Term the usual substitution on FOL terms. Define a term-generic language as
(Term,Π). A classic FOL model (A, (Aσ)σ∈Σ , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) yields a TGL
model (A, (AT )T∈Term , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) by defining the meaning of terms as
derived operations. Conversely, a TGLmodel (A, (AT )T∈Term , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn)
yields an FOLmodel by definingAσ : An → A asAσ(a1, . . . , an) = Aσ(x1,...,xn)(ρ),
where x1, . . . , xn are distinct variables and ρ is a valuation that maps each xi
to ai. The two model mappings are mutually inverse and preserve satisfaction.
Thus, for this particular choice of terms, TGL yields FOL.
A Formula-Typed Logic (an “Extremely-Typed” λ-Calculus). FOL is a
simple instance of TGL. However, TGL terms may be arbitrarily exotic. Besides
terms of λ-calculi (discussed in Section 4), one may also have terms that inter-
fere with formulae in non-trivial ways, where, e.g., terms may abstract variables
having formulae as types (thinking of types as sets defined by comprehension).
Let (Var , Σ,Π) be a classic first-order language and:
Term ::= Var | Σ(Term, . . . ,Term) | Term Term | λVar :Fmla.Term
Fmla ::= Π(Term, . . . ,Term) | Fmla ⇒ Fmla | Fmla ∧ Fmla | ∀Var .Fmla,
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with the natural restrictions w.r.t. the rank of operations/relations. Free vari-
ables and substitution are as expected, making terms up to α-equivalence a TGL
term syntax. Moreover, although formulae and terms were defined mutually re-
cursively, the former are still nothing but first-order formulae over terms, hence
fall under TGL. Does the interpretation of formulae inside terms match their
first-order interpretation at the top level? The answer is “no, unless axioms
require it” (remember that TGL models are blank, but customizable). Here,
postulating (∀x. (ϕ⇔ ψ) ∧ (ϕ⇒ T = T ′))⇒ λx :ϕ.T = λx :ψ.T ′ does the job.
The TGL institution. Next we submit TGL to a standard well-behaving test
for a logical system, organizing it as an institution [15]. By doing so, we present
TGL terms and models in a more structural light, and, more importantly, create
a framework for λ-calculi with different flavors to cohabitate with each other
and with classic FOL under different signatures and axioms, but within the same
logic, connected through the railway system of signature morphisms.
Let Var be a fixed set of variables. The signatures are term-generic languages
(Term,Π) over Var . The (Term,Π)- sentences, models and satisfaction relation
were already defined for TGL. Given θ : Var → Term, we write θ for the map
T 7→ Subst(T, θ). Moreover, for any model (A, (AT )T∈Term , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn)
and map ρ : Var → A, we write ρA for the map T 7→ AT (ρ). A model can
be alternatively presented as a tuple A = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) where the
A(n,pi)’s are relations as before and ·A : AV ar → ATerm is such that ρA◦(Var ↪→
Term) = ρ, [ρA(T ) = ρ′
A
(T ) whenever ρ FV (T )= ρ′ FV (T )], and ρA ◦ θ =
ρA ◦ θA. A model homomorphism between A = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) and
B = (B, ·B , (B(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) is a map h : A → B that commutes with the
relations in the usual way and has the property that h ◦ ρA = h ◦ ρB for all
ρ ∈ AV ar. (Note the structural similarity between the conditions defining the
three concepts of term syntax, model and model homomorphism, which allows
one to easily see that (Term, · , (Term(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) is a model for any choice
of relations Term(n,pi) and that (Term, · , (∅)pi∈Π) is freely generated by Var .)
A signature morphism between (Term,Π) and (Term ′,Π ′) is a pair (u, v)
with v = (vn : Πn → Π ′n)n∈IN and u : Term → Term ′ such that u ◦ (Var ↪→
Term) = (Var ↪→ Term ′), FV (u(T )) = FV (T ) for all T ∈ Term and u ◦ θ =
u ◦ θ′ ◦ u (where · ′ is the map Term ′ → Term ′ associated to the term syntax
Term ′) for all θ : Var → Term. (Intuition for the last condition on signature
morphism: say we have concrete terms, like the ones of FOL or λ-calculus, θ
maps x to S and all other variables to themselves (thus θ(T ) = T [S/x] for all
terms T ), and u maps each T to the term T [g/f ] obtained by replacing an op-
eration symbol f with an operation symbol g of the same arity; then one has
T [S/x][g/f ] = T [g/f ][S[g/f ]/x], i.e., (u ◦ θ)(T ) = (u ◦ θ′ ◦ u)(T ), for all terms
T .) To any signature morphism (u, v), we associate:
- A translation map between the sentences of (Term,Π) and (Term ′,Π ′), that
replaces the terms and relation symbols with their images through u and v.





[Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅]
Γ . ∆,ϕ Γ, ψ . ∆
Γ,ϕ⇒ ψ . ∆ (Left⇒)
Γ, ϕ . ∆,ψ
Γ . ∆,ϕ⇒ ψ (Right⇒)
Γ, ϕ, ψ . ∆
Γ,ϕ ∧ ψ . ∆ (Left∧)
Γ . ∆,ϕ Γ . ∆,ψ
Γ . ∆,ϕ ∧ ψ (Right∧)
Γ,∀x.ϕ, ϕ[T/x] . ∆





Fig. 1. Gentzen System G
and (Term,Π): On objects, it maps any (Term ′,Π ′)-model A′ = (A′, ·A′ ,
(A′(n,pi′))n∈IN,pi′∈Π′n) to the model A = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) where A = A′,
A(n,pi) = A′(n,vn(pi)) and ·A = ρ 7→ ρA
′ ◦ u. On morphisms, it maps a function
representing a model homomorphism to the same function regarded as an homo-
morphism between the reduct models. (Details and pictures in Appendix A.4.)
Theorem 1. TGL as organized above forms an institution that extends conser-
vatively the institution of FOL.
TGL Gentzen System and Completeness. The axiomatic properties of
the generic notions of free variable and substitution in TGL provide enough
infrastructure to obtain generic versions of classic FOL results. We are interested
in a completeness theorem here (but other model-theoretic results could be also
generalized). We shall use a generalization of the cut-free system in [12].
We fix a term-generic language (Term,Π). A sequent is a pair written Γ . ∆,
with antecedent Γ and succedent∆ (at most) countable sets of formulae, assumed
to have finite support, in that FV (Γ ) and FV (∆) are finite, where FV (Γ ) =⋃
ϕ∈Γ FV (ϕ) (and likewise for ∆). (In standard Gentzen systems for FOL, Γ
and ∆ are typically assumed finite, which of course implies finite support.) The
sequent Γ . ∆ is called tautological, written |= Γ . ∆, if ⋂ϕ∈Γ Aϕ ⊆ ⋃ψ∈∆Aψ
for all models A; it is called E-tautological (where E is a set of sentences), written
E |= (Γ . ∆), if A |= E implies ⋂ϕ∈Γ Aϕ ⊆ ⋃ψ∈∆Aψ for all models A. If Γ = ∅,
we write E |= ∆ instead of E |= (Γ . ∆).
We consider the Gentzen system, say G, given by the rule schemes in Figure
1, meant to deduce TGL tautological sequents (we write Γ, ϕ instead of Γ ∪{ϕ}).
Note that these rules make sense in our generic framework, since concrete syntax
of terms is not required; all that is needed here are abstract notions of term and
substitution. We write `G Γ . ∆ to mean that Γ . ∆ is deducible in G. Similar
notation will be used for the other proof systems hereafter.
Theorem 2. G is sound and complete for TGL.
Intuitionistic Term-Generic Logic (ITGL). It has the same syntax as TGL,
and its Gentzen system GI is obtained by modifying G so that the succedents
in sequents are no longer sets of formulae, but single formulae, as follows: (1) ∆
is deleted from all the Right rules and is replaced by a single formula χ in (Ax)
and in all the Left rules except for (Left⇒). (2) The rule (Left⇒) is replaced by
Γ . ϕ Γ, ψ . χ
Γ, ϕ⇒ ψ . χ (Appendix A.5 gives more details.)
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3 The Horn2 Fragment of Term-Generic Logic
We next consider a fragment of TGL, called Horn2 because it only allows formu-
lae which are universally quantified implications whose conditions are themselves
universally quantified implications of atomic formulae. A whole plethora of λ-
calculi can be specified by Horn2 formulae (see Section 4 and Appendix C). As
shown in the sequel, we can associate uniformly to these specifications complete
intuitionistic proof systems that turn out to coincide with the originals.
In what follows, x denotes variable tuples (x1, . . . , xn), T term tuples
(T1, . . . , Tn), and, for a formula ϕ, ϕ(x) indicates that ϕ has all its free vari-
ables among {x1, . . . , xn}, with ϕ(T ) then denoting ϕ[T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn]. Since
variables are particular terms, given y = (y1, . . . , yn), we may use the notation
ϕ(y) with two different meanings, with disambiguation coming from the context:
either to indicate that ϕ has its variables among {y1, . . . , yn}, case in which ϕ(y)
is the same as ϕ, or to denote the formula obtained from ϕ(x) by substituting
the variables x with y. (Thus, e.g., in the property (∗) below, ai(x, y) is the same
as ai, where in addition we have indicated that the free variables of ai are among
Vars(x, y) (where (x, y) is the concatenation of the tuples x and y). Later, given
the tuples z and T of appropriate lengths, ai(z, T ) denotes the formula obtained
from ai by substituting the variables of x correspondingly with those of z and
the variables of y correspondingly with the terms of T .) For convenience, we
assume the logic also contains > (meaning “true”) as an atomic formula.






(ai(x, y)⇒ bi(x, y))
)
⇒ c(y) (∗)
where ai, bi, c are atomic formulae and we assume Vars(x)∩Vars(y) = ∅. We call
these Horn2 sentences (sometimes we shall refer to them as Horn2 formulae,
not forgetting though that they have no free variables). When one of the above
ai’s is > we write only bi(x, y) instead of ai(x, y) ⇒ bi(x, y), and when all the
ai’s are > we call the sentence (∗) extensional [32]; if, in addition, x has length
0, we obtain a Horn sentence (that is, a universal closure of a Horn formula).
When all bi’s are > or n = 0, the whole sentence (∗) becomes ∀y. c(y). A theory
E is called Horn2, extensional, or Horn if it consists of such sentences.
Fix a term-generic language and a Horn2 theory (i.e., specification) E over
this language. In what follows, we focus on Horn sequents, i.e., sequents Γ . d
with Γ finite set of atomic formulae and d atomic formula, which can be de-
duced from E. Only Horn consequences are usually relevant for λ-calculi, and,
moreover, the other more syntactically complicated consequences can be deduced




[d ∈ Γ ]
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
Γ . c(T )
(Inst-e)
In the rule (Inst-e) above (the “instance of e” rule), e is a sentence in E of the
form (∗) (thus ai, bi, c are the atomic formulae that build e), T is a tuple of
terms with the same length as y, and z is a fresh tuple of variables with the
same length as x (where “fresh” (without further attributes) means, as usual,
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“fresh for everything in that context”, namely: for Γ , the ai’s, the bi’s, c and T ).
Thus (Inst-e) is a rule (more precisely, a rule-scheme) parameterized not only by
e, but also by z and T as above (and by Γ , too). (More details in Appendix B.)
A first result is that KE deduces all intuitionistic Horn consequences of E:
Theorem 3. `GI (E ∪ Γ ) . d iff `KE Γ . d for all Horn sequents Γ . d.
Now consider the following family of rules (Drop) =
(Drop-(e, a))e,a, parameterized by formulae e ∈ E
of the form (∗) and by atomic formulae a such
that a is one of the ai’s (for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}):
Γ, a(z, T ) . d
Γ . d
(Drop-(e, a))
(T is a tuple of terms of the same length as y and z a tuple of variables of the
same length as x fresh for d (where y and x are the ones referred in (∗)).)
From the point of view of forward proofs, (Drop) effectively drops a(z, T ).
More interesting than the actual usage of (Drop) is its admissibility in a system.
In a specification of a type system for a λ-calculus, a(z, T ) will typically have the
form z :T , and closure of the system under a(z, T ) will be a condensing lemma
[4]: the assumption z :T is useless provided z is not in the succedent.
Next are our main results of this section, exploring closure under (Drop). The
first gives a sufficient criterion ensuring completeness of KE w.r.t. TGL models.
The second gives a stronger fully syntactic criterion.
Theorem 4. Assume that:
-(i) If ai is not >, then Vars(x)∩FV(ai) 6= ∅, for all formulae e ∈ E of the form
(∗) and all i ∈ 1, n.
-(ii) (Drop) is admissible in KE.
Then `KE Γ . d iff E |= (Γ . d) for all Horn sequents Γ . d.
Theorem 5. Assume that all e in E of the form (∗) satisfy the following for all
i ∈ 1, n:
-(i) If ai is not >, then Vars(x) ∩ FV(ai) 6= ∅.
-(ii) Vars(y) ∩ FV(bi) ⊆ FV(c).
Then (Drop) is admissible in KE, hence the conclusion of Theorem 4 holds.
Definition 3. We call a Horn2 theory E:
- amenable, if it satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 4;
- syntax-amenable, if it satisfies hypothesis (i) of Theorem 4 (same as hypothesis
(i) of Theorem 5);
- strongly syntax-amenable, if it satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 5.
(Thus strong syntax-amenability implies amenability.)
If E is a Horn theory, Theorems 4, 5 yield the completeness result for a well-
known Hilbert system of Horn logic. More generally, amenability, hence com-
pleteness, holds trivially for extensional theories, since they have no (Drop) rules.
Thus classic TGL has, with respect to amenable theories and Horn conse-
quences, the same deductive power as intuitionistic TGL. This fact will prove
useful for adequacy results and completeness of the TGL models for various cal-
culi. Because these calculi are traditionally specified following an intuitionistic
pattern, an amenable Horn2 specification E of a calculus will recover, in the
system KE , the represented calculus itself – we discuss this phenomenon next.
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4 Specifying calculi in Term-Generic Logic
This section illustrates the TGL λ-calculi specification style. Our running ex-
ample4 is the typing system and reduction of System F, an impredicative poly-
morphic typed λ-calculus introduced independently in [13] and [31]. Its syntax
modulo α-equivalence clearly forms a two-sorted TGL term syntax. The sorts
are type and data, and we write TVar for Var type (ranged over by t, t′) and DVar
for Vardata (ranged over by x, y), as well as TTerm for Termtype (ranged over
by T, T ′) and DTerm for Termdata (ranged over by X,Y ). Here is the gram-
mar for (the raw terms out of which, by factoring to the standard notion of
α-equivalence, one obtains) the terms:
T ::= t | T → T ′ | Π t. T
X ::= x | λx : T.X | X Y | λ t.X | X T
A typing context Γ is a finite set {x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn} (written x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn
for brevity), where the xi’s are data variables, the Ti’s are type terms, and no
data variable appears twice. The typing system for System F, denoted TSF, de-
riving sequents Γ . X : T , is the following:
·
Γ . x :T
(SF-InVar)
[(x :T ) ∈ Γ ]
Γ, x :T . X : T ′
Γ . (λx :T.X) : T → T ′
(SF-Abs)
[x fresh for Γ ]
Γ . X : T → T ′ , Γ . Y : T
Γ . X Y : T ′
(SF-App)
Γ . X : T
Γ . (λt.X) : Πt.T
(SF-T-Abs)
[t fresh for Γ ]
Γ . X : Πt.T
Γ . X T ′ : T [T ′/t]
(SF-T-App)
We specify TSF as a Horn2 theory by identifying the implicit universal quantifi-
cations and implications involved in the original system. For example, we read
(SF-Abs) as: if one can type X to T ′ uniformly on x assuming x has type T , i.e.,
for all x of type T , then λx :T.X receives type T → T ′. But this is Horn2! (T
and T ′ above are not involved in any bindings relevant here, hence we can use
TGL variables instead.) Below is the whole theory, denoted T SF , in a term-
generic language over the indicated term syntax and having the infixed relation
symbol “:” with arity data × type. (The colons denoting this relation, although
related with, should not be confounded with the colons used as part of the term
syntax – our poly-semantic usage of “:” mirrors the usage in the original system
TSF.)
(∀x. x : t⇒ X : t′)
⇒ (λx : t.X) : t→ t′ (Abs)
x : t→ t′ ∧ y : t⇒ (x y) : t′ (App)
(∀t.X : T )
⇒ (λt.X) : (Πt. T ) (T-Abs)
x : (Πt. T )⇒ (x t) : T (T-App)
(Abs), (T-Abs) and (T-App) are axiom-schemes, parameterized by arbitrary
terms X,T . In (Abs), a presumptive occurrence of x in the leftmost X is in the
scope of the universal quantifier, and in the rightmost X in the scope of the λ-
abstraction; similarly for t versus X and t versus T in (T-Abs). This migration of
the variables x and t between scopes may look surprising at first – note however
4 Many other examples can be found in Appendix C.
11
that the same situation appears in the corresponding rules ((SF-Abs) and (SF-T-
Abs)) from the familiar system TSF. Thus, in (SF-Abs), any occurrence of x in
the termX from the succedent of the conclusion sequent Γ . (λx :T.X) : T → T ′
is in the scope of the λ-abstraction, while the same occurrence of x in X when
part of the antecedent of the hypothesis sequent Γ, x : T . X : T ′ is not in the
scope of any binder (or, more precisely, is in the scope of the implicit outer
binder of the sequent).
Both in the original system and in our Horn2 specification, the assumption
that T,X, etc. are terms modulo α-equivalence is consistent with their usage in
combination with binding constructs, since, for example, the syntactic operator
(λ : . ) : DVar × TTerm × DTerm → DTerm is well defined on α-equivalence
classes. Note that a concrete Horn2 specification cannot be stated solely in
terms of the logic’s constructs (as is the case of representations in a fixed logic,
like HOL) simply because TGL does not specify the term syntax, but assumes
it. Consequently, our examples of specifications employ, at the meta-level, con-
structs like the above (λ : . ), not “purely TGL”. (This paper does not discuss
how to define and represent term syntaxes conveniently, but how to represent
the structure of a calculus on top of a given term syntax – see also Section 5.)
One should think of the above Horn2 axioms semantically, as referring to
items called data and types that inhabit TGL models – hence our terminology,
which distinguishes between data terms and variables on the one hand and type
terms and variables on the other (compare this with the more standard terminol-
ogy distinguishing between terms and types from purely syntactic presentations
of λ-calculi). As usual, focussing on the semantics allows one to state the desired
properties without worrying about syntactic details such as typing contexts and
side-conditions; all such lower-level details can nevertheless become available
when one “descends” into the deductive system of TGL.
What is the formal relationship between the original typing system TSF and
the Horn2 theory T SF? TSF is precisely KT SF from Section 3, the Gentzen
system associated to a Horn2 theory in a uniform way. (Namely, referring to the
notations of Section 3: (SF-InVar) is (Axiom), (SF-Abs) is (Inst-Abs), (SF-T-
Abs) is (Inst-T-Abs), (SF-App) is (Inst-App), and (SF-T-App) is (Inst-T-App))
Therefore, not only that T SF specifies TSF, but also TSF implements T SF
as its specialized deductive system. Consequently, the following adequacy result
w.r.t. intuitionistic TGL is built in the representation (via Theorem 3):
Proposition 1. Let x1, . . . , xn be distinct data variables, X data term and
T, T1, . . . , Tn type terms. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) `TSF x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn . X : T .
(b) `KT SF x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn . X : T .
(c) `GI T SF , x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn . X : T .
In order to obtain adequacy w.r.t. classic TGL as well, we further need to notice:
Lemma 1. T SF satisfies (a many-sorted version of) strong syntax-amenability.
and then invoke Theorem 5, obtaining:
Proposition 2. Let x1, . . . , xn be distinct data variables, X data term and
T, T1, . . . , Tn type terms. Then the following are equivalent:
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(a) `TSF x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn . X : T .
(b) T SF |= (x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn . X : T ).
Next, we consider the following standard Hilbert system for reduction in System
F [13, 31] (obtained from the one for the untyped λ-calculus [5] by ignoring the
type annotations), denoted RSF:
·
(λx :T. Y )X  Y [X/x] (SF-β)
·
(λt. Y )T  Y [T/t] (SF-T-β)
X  X ′
λx :T.X  λx :T.X ′ (SF-ξ)
X  X ′
λt.X  λt.X ′ (SF-T-ξ)
X  X ′
X Y  X ′ Y (SF-AppL)
Y  Y ′
X Y  X Y ′ (SF-AppR)
X  X ′
X T  X ′ T (SF-T-App)
Our Horn2 specification, denoted RSF , uses relation  of arity data × data.
(λx : t. Y )x Y (β)
(λt. Y )t Y (T-β)
(∀x.X  X ′)⇒ λx : t.X  λx : t.X ′ (ξ)
(∀t.X  X ′)⇒ λt.X  λt.X ′ (T-ξ)
x x′ ⇒ x y  x′ y (AppL)
y  y′ ⇒ x y  x y′ (AppR)
x x′ ⇒ x t x′ t (T-App)
Particularly interesting are our axioms for β-reduction. In (β), we employ the
same variable x to indicate both the formal parameter of the functional expres-
sion λx : t. Y and its actual parameter (the occurrence of x on the right of the
application from the left side of  ). Indeed, in the latter case, as well as in any
presumptive occurrences in the rightmost Y , x is exposed to the environment,
hence denotes an (arbitrary) actual value in a model.
Again, KRSF is the same as RSF (modulo a standard identification of Hilbert
systems with simple Gentzen systems where antecedents remain unchanged).
Moreover, RSF is an extensional theory, hence trivially amenable, hence both
intuitionistically and classically adequate:
Proposition 3. Let X and Y be data terms. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) `RSF X  Y .
(b) `GI RSF . X  Y .
(c) RSF |= X  Y .
One can readily see that, since the relation symbols of ST F and RSF are
distinct, putting these theories together preserves adequacy – in other words,
Propositions 1 and 2 remain true after replacing SFT with SFT ∪ RSF and
Proposition 3 remains true after replacing RSF with SFT ∪ RSF . In the
union language, we can express relevant properties such as type preservation:
∀x, y, t. x : t ∧ x  y ⇒ y : t. The proof of such properties requires reasoning
about the calculus, hence transcends the realm of adequate representations. To
handle them, TGL needs to be extended with inductive proof schemes, such as:
ϕ(x) ∧ ϕ(y)⇒ ϕ(x y) ((∀x. ϕ(X))⇒ ϕ(λx : t.X))X∈DTerm
∀x. ϕ(x) (Inductdata)
The problem of meta-reasoning in a framework where object-level calculi are rep-
resented without explicitly encoding free variables and substitution (currently
still open in frameworks such as HOAS) is not addressed in this paper, but is
left as important future work.
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Intuitionistic TGL adequacy (Proposition 1) holds immediately (for the same
reason as for System F) for all calculi specified in Appendix C. Classic TGL
adequacy, on the other hand, while trivial for System F (in the context of our a
priori proof theory), is not so in other calculi, where strong syntax-amenability
does not hold, but only syntax amenability does, and closure under (Drop), while
intuitive, is not obvious to prove. Fortunately however, for most of these calculi
this property coincides with a known result called the condensing lemma (see
[4]): in a typing context Γ . U : V , an assumption x : T from Γ with x fresh
for U and V may be dropped without losing provability. Note that, via the
propositions-as-types correspondence, representing adequately type systems in
TGL also implies representing adequately proof systems for structural logics.
Sometimes a calculus does not come with a reduction relation, but with an
equational theory. (Notably, a standard formulation of untyped λ-calculus [5] is
equational.) For these situations, a version of TGL with equality seems a more
elegant choice, but adequacy proofs along our lines seem to require more effort,
since the TGL equality axioms raise problems regarding amenability (not to
mention that type preservation needs to be proved beforehand for the calculus).
Alternatively, one may provide semantic proofs for adequacy, taking advantage
of the equivalence between the TGL models and some ad hoc models for which
the calculus is known to be complete (see Appendix E for this approach).
5 Concluding Remarks
Summing up the contribution of this paper:
(1) We showed that the development of first-order logic is largely orthogonal to
the particular syntax of terms by defining a logic, TGL, that considers terms as
“black-boxes” exporting substitution and free variables and requires models to
represent terms consistently. TGL forms an institution, hence allows in principle
for well-structured logical specifications.
(2) TGL provides a convenient notation and intuition for defining λ-calculi, that
encourages a semantic specification style. We developed some proof theory to
support this specification style. Intuitionistic TGL allows immediately adequate
specifications, while for classic TGL adequacy, if provable, endows the specified
calculus with a default complete semantics.
The idea of developing first-order logic on top of an abstract term syntax, as
well as our proof-theoretic results that prepare the logic in advance for adequate
representations of λ-calculi, seem new.5 We separate the discussion of related
work into two (non-disjoint) topics.
One concerns semantics. The semantics that TGL offers to the specified cal-
culi for free falls into the category of loose, or logical semantics. Examples of loose
semantics for λ-calculi include: (so called) “syntactic” models for untyped λ-
calculus, Henkin models for simply-typed λ-calculus, Kripke-style models for re-
cursive types, and Girard’s qualitative domains and Bruce-Meyer-Mitchell mod-
els for System F, not to mention all their categorical variants. The monographs
5 But see below the related work on HOAS and categorical models of syntax.
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[5, 17, 26] contain extensive presentations of these and many other loose seman-
tics for various calculi. For a particular calculus defined as a TGL theory, the
attached TGL semantics has all the advantages, but, naturally, also all the draw-
backs, of loose semantics. It was not the concern of this paper to advocate for
a loose or for a fixed-model semantics, especially because we believe that there
is no absolute answer. What we consider to be a particularly appealing aspect
of TGL semantics though is its uniform, calculus-independent nature. (We ar-
gue in Appendix E, with untyped λ-calculus and System F as witnesses, that
the “general-purpose” TGL semantics of a calculus tends to be equivalent to
the set-theoretic “domain-specific” one whose completeness theorem is typically
worked out separately with substantial mathematical effort in the literature.)
The other topic concerns existing specification frameworks in the literature:
- Purely first-order encodings, such as combinatory logic [5], de Bruijn-style
representations [8], and the calculus with explicit substitution [1]. Part of the
motivation of TGL was to avoid the degree of awkwardness and auxiliary proof
or execution overhead of such encodings.
- Higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS) [28, 18, 21]. This approach encodes
(in a binding-preserving fashion) object-level terms into terms of a fixed meta
logic (usually HOL or another type theory) – consequently, the interpretation of
the object syntax into presumptive models of the meta logic would be indirect,
filtered through the encoding. To the contrary, TGL is a parameterized logic,
and gets instantiated to various calculi by importing the original term syntax as
is and relating models to this syntax directly through valuations. Moreover, usu-
ally model-theoretic considerations are not the concern of HOAS, which aims at
proof-theoretic adequacy alone, a property that so far seemed to require an intu-
itionistic meta logic; here we also developed for TGL a technique for establishing
adequacy within a classic logic.
Yet, TGL representations have important similarities with HOAS encodings
in variants of HOL (in the style of, e.g., [21]). For instance, our axiom-scheme
(Abs) from the Horn2 theory T SF may be in such an encoding ∀X. (∀x. x :
t ⇒ X(x) : t′) ⇒ Lam(X) : (t → t′), where X : data −→ data is a second-
order variable and Lam : (data −→ data) −→ data is a third-order constant.
A HOAS encoding has typically two parts, each requiring its own adequacy
result: one deals with representing the syntax of terms, and one with representing
the deductive mechanism. Because TGL does not provide a representation of
syntax (but assumes one already), some of our axioms, namely those changing
variable scopes, such as (Abs), are (still) axiom-schemes, just like the rules of
the original calculus are rule-schemes; to the contrary, the above HOAS axiom
would be a single statement. On the other hand, for the same reason (of not
dealing with term syntax representation), we were able to discuss the second
part, of representing the deductive mechanism, generically, for any term syntax,
and have created a theoretical framework where adequacy for the deductive
mechanisms requires minimal proof effort. ”Pasting” various solutions offered by
HOAS to representing terms into the TGL framework for representing deduction
could allow a HOAS setting to benefit from our theorems in Section 3, as well as
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allow a HOAS representation of an effective-syntax fragment of TGL to bypass
the need of axiom-schemes in specifications.
Categorical models of syntax in the style of [11, 19] also fall within HOAS.
Typing contexts are explicitly modeled as possible worlds, types becoming
presheaves. The presheaf structure of λ-terms from [19] and the substitution
algebras from [11] are roughly equivalent to our term syntaxes (whose presheaf
structure would come, just like in the concrete cases, from classifying terms by
their sets of free variables). The model theory of the these categorical settings fol-
lows a different approach than ours though – they require the models to support
substitution within themselves and between each other (hence to be inhabited
by syntactic items such as (abstract) terms and variables), while we require the
models to allow valuations from a fixed term model.
- Nominal logic (NL) [30]. It stands somewhere in between purely first-order
encodings and HOAS, as it captures object-level bindings, but not substitution,
by corresponding meta-level mechanisms. The NL terms with bindings form term
syntaxes in our sense. Like in the categorical approaches mentioned above and
unlike TGL models, NL models are inhabited by abstract syntactic objects (hav-
ing, e.g., free names that can be swapped/permuted) rather than constituting
“pure” FOL-like semantics.
- Explicitly closed families of functionals (ECFFs) [2] (a.k.a. binding algebras
[34]). In the tradition of HOL a la Church, all bindings are reduced there to
functional abstraction. Their terms form term syntaxes in our sense, and ECFFs
are particular cases of TGL models.
- Binding logic (BL) [10]. It is a first-order logic defined on top of a general
notion of syntax with binding, allowing bindings in both operations and atomic
predicates. BL models reflect the bindings functionally (similarly to [2], [34]).
While BL terms form TGL term syntaxes, it appears that the class of BL models
is strictly embedded in that of TGL models for TGL terms syntax instantiated
to a BL language of terms.
- Hereditary Harrop Formulae (HHF). For the FOL and HOL instances of
TGL, Horn2 formulae are particular cases of such formulae, advocated in [24]
for logic programming. Our proof-theoretic results from Section 3 seem Horn2-
specific, a generalization to HHF not being apparent.
- In the general realm of logical and algebraic specifications, a salient frame-
work is that of institutions [15, 9]. Like TGL, the notion of institution does not
represent logical systems by encoding them, but by becoming instantiated to
them. Since we showed that TGL is itself an institution,6 our work in this paper
offers to the λ-calculi adequately specifiable in TGL institutional citizenship,
hence the algebraic arsenal of tools and techniques from institution theory [33].
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains the following:
- more details regarding the topics addressed in the main part of the paper;
- a model-theoretic comparison between TGL-based and ad-hoc models;
- proofs of the claims made in the paper.
Here is the structure of the appendix, by sections. Sections A and B give
more details about the topics from the main paper Sections 2 and 3, respectively.
Sections C and D give many examples of calculi specifications in TGL. Section
E compares the TGL-based models of untyped λ-calculus and the polymorphic
λ-calculus (a.k.a. System F) with the set-theoretical ad hoc models proposed for
these calculi in the literature, and concludes that they are essentially equivalent.
Section F gives proofs for the claims made in this paper, including those made
in the appendix.
A More technical details about the TGL structure,
extensions and variants
A.1 Substitution, free variables and α-equivalence in TGL
Lemma 2. Condition (b.ii) in Definition 2 (the definition of the notion of a
TGL model) is redundant.
Lemma 3. The following hold:
1. x 6∈ FV(T ) implies T [T ′/x] = T ;
2. y[T/x] = T if y = x and y[T/x] = y otherwise;
3. FV(T [T ′/x]) = FV(T ) \ {x} ∪ FV(T ′);
4. T [y/x][z/y] = T [z/x] if y 6∈ FV(T );
5. T [y/x][x/y] = T if y 6∈ FV(T ).
Definition 4. For each formula ϕ, the set FV(ϕ), of its free variables, is defined
recursively as follows:
– FV(pi(T1, . . . , Tn)) = FV(T1) ∪ . . . ∪ FV(Tn);
– FV(ϕ⇒ ψ) = FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ);
– FV(ϕ ∧ ψ) = FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ);
– FV(∀x.ϕ) = FV(ϕ) \ {x}.
Note that, since FV (T ) is finite for each term T , FV (ϕ) is also finite for each
formula ϕ. A sentence is a closed formula ϕ, i.e., one with FV (ϕ) = ∅. A theory,
or a specification, is a set of sentences.
Definition 5. Substitution of terms for variables in formulae, Subst : Fmla ×
TermVar → Fmla, is defined as follows:
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– Subst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn), θ) = pi(Subst(T1, θ), . . . ,Subst(Tn, θ));
– Subst(ϕ⇒ ψ, θ) = Subst(ϕ, θ)⇒ Subst(ψ, θ);
– Subst(ϕ ∧ ψ, θ) = Subst(ϕ, θ) ∧ Subst(ψ, θ);
– Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) = ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]), where z is the least variable7 not in
FV(ϕ) ∪⋃{θ(y) : y ∈ FV(ϕ)}.
Definition 6. α-equivalence of formulae, written ≡α, is defined to be the least
relation R ⊆ Fmla× Fmla satisfying:
– pi(T1, . . . , Tn) R pi(T1, . . . , Tn);
– ϕ ∧ ϕ′ R ψ ∧ ψ′ if ϕ R ψ and ϕ′ R ψ′;
– ∀x.ϕR ∀y.ψ if ϕ[z/x]Rψ[z/y] for some z 6∈FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ).
For the following proposition, recall the definitions, for a model A and two map-
pings θ, θ′ : Var → Term, of the composition θ; θ′ : Var → Term and of the
mapping Aθ : AVar → AVar :
– (θ; θ′)(x) = Subst(θ(x), θ′);
– Aθ(ρ)(x) = Aθ(x)(ρ).
Lemma 4. The following hold:
1. If ρFV(ϕ)= ρ′FV(ϕ), then ρ ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′ ∈ Aϕ;
2. ρ ∈ ASubst(ϕ, θ) iff Aθ(ρ) ∈ Aϕ;
3. ϕ ≡α ψ implies Aϕ = Aψ;
4. ϕ ≡α ψ implies FV(ϕ) = FV(ψ);
5. ≡α is an equivalence;
6. ϕ ≡α Subst(ϕ, 1Var);
7. y 6∈ FV(ϕ) implies ϕ[y/x][z/y] ≡α ϕ[z/x];
8. x 6∈ FV(ϕ) implies ϕ[T/x] ≡α ϕ;
9. ϕ ≡α ψ implies Subst(ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(ψ, θ);
10. θFV(ϕ)= θ′FV(ϕ) implies Subst(ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(ϕ, θ′);
11. Subst(ϕ, θ; θ′) ≡α Subst(Subst(ϕ, θ), θ′);
12. ϕ ∧ ψ ≡α ϕ′ ∧ ψ′, ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ϕ′.
Thus ≡α is an equivalence, preserves satisfaction and the free variables, and
is compatible with substitution and language constructs (points (5), (3), (4),
(9), (12) above). We are now able to identify formulae modulo α-equivalence –
the mappings FV , Subst, A and those that build formulae are well defined on
equivalence classes.
7 One may interpret “the least” as “having the least index”, where we assume an
indexing on the (countable) set of variables; we pick the least variable in order to
make a choice - any variable with the mentioned property would do.
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A.2 TGL with equality
A term-generic language with equality is a term-generic language with an em-
phasized binary relation symbol “=”, interpreted in all models as the equality
relation. All the other concepts (except for the proof-theoretic ones, discussed
next) remain the same.
For TGL with equality, we enrich G with the following equality rules obtaining
a Gentzen system G=:
Γ, T = T . ∆
Γ . ∆ (R)
Γ . ∆, T1 = T2 Γ, T2 = T1 . ∆
Γ . ∆ (S)
Γ . ∆, T1 = T2 Γ . ∆, T2 = T3 Γ, T1 = T3 . ∆
Γ . ∆ (T)
Γ . ∆, T1 = T ′1 . . . Γ . ∆, Tn = T
′
n
Γ . ∆, pi(T1, . . . , Tn) Γ, pi(T ′1, . . . , T
′
n) . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Cmppi)
Γ . ∆, T1 = T2 Γ, T [T1/x] = T [T2/x] . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Sbs)
Consider the following set Eql of formulae called the equality axioms:
x = x (Refl)
x = y ⇒ y = x (Symm)
x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z (Trans)
(x1 = y1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn = yn∧
pi(x1, . . . , xn))⇒ pi(y1, . . . , yn) (Comppi)
x = y ⇒ T [x/z] = T [y/z] (Subst)
Since the equality rules can be simulated in the Gentzen G by adding Eql to
the antecedents of sequents, we obtain:
Theorem 2= G= is sound and complete for TGL with equality.
A.3 Many-Sorted and Order-Sorted TGL
The notions of a term syntax and term-generic languages have rather straight-
forward many-sorted and order-sorted generalizations. We next sketch an order-
sorted version of TGL, which also covers the many-sorted case. Order-sorted
TGL generalizes order-sorted equational logic [16].
Let S = (S,<) be a fixed poset (with < strict). Elements of S are called sorts,
and < is called the subsort relation. We assume that any two sorts s, s′ having
a common subsort (i.e., a sort s′′ with s′′ < s and s′′ < s′), also have a greatest
common subsort, denoted s∧ s′. An S-sorted set is a family of sets A = (As)s∈S
such that As ⊆ As′ whenever s < s′. Let All(A) denote the set
⋃
s∈S As. We call
A unambiguous if As ∩As′ = As∧s′ if s = s′ or s and s′ have a common subsort,
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and As ∩ As′ = ∅ otherwise. Note that an unambiguous S-sorted set A can be
recovered from All(A) and the relation “has sort” between elements of All(A)
and S. Let A = (As)s∈S and B = (Bs)s∈S be two S-sorted sets. A is included in
B, written A ⊆ B, if As ⊆ Bs for all s ∈ S. An S-sorted mapping between A and
B is a family of mappings (hs : As → Bs)s∈S such that hs is a restriction and
corestriction of hs′ whenever s < s′. Let Map(A,B) denote the set of S-sorted
mappings between A and B. For convenience, we define the intersection of an
S-sorted set A = (As)s∈S and an (unsorted) set D as A ∩D = (As ∩D)s∈S .
Let Var be an unambiguous, sortwise countably infinite S-sorted set of vari-
ables. An S-sorted term syntax over Var consists of the following data:
(a) An unambiguous, sortwise countably infinite S-sorted set Term such
that Var ⊆ Term;
(b) A mapping FV :All(Term)→ Pf (All(Var));
(c) A mapping Subst : All(Term) × All(Term)All(Var) → All(Term)
such that, for each s ∈ S, T ∈ Terms and θ ∈ All(Term)All(Var),
Subst(T, θ) ∈ Terms,
subject to the following requirements (where x, T, T ′, θ, θ′ denote arbitrary vari-
ables, terms, and maps in All(Term)All(Var), respectively):
(1) Subst(x, θ) = θ(x);
(2) Subst(T, 1All(Var)) = T ;
(3) If θFV (T )= θ′FV (T ), then Subst(T, θ) = Subst(T ′, θ);
(4) Subst(Subst(T, θ), θ′) = Subst(T, θ; θ′), where for each x ∈ Var ,
(θ; θ′)(x) is, by definition, Subst(θ(x), θ′);
(5) FV (x) = {x};
(6) FV (Subst(T, θ)) =
⋃{FV (θ(x)) :x ∈ FV (T )}.
An S-sorted term-generic language consists of the following: an unambiguous,
sortwise countably infinite S-sorted set Var ; an S-sorted term syntax Term over
Var ; a countable S∗-ranked set Π = (Πw)w∈S∗ , of relation symbols. A TGL
model is a triple (A, (AT )T∈Term , (Api)pi∈Π), such that:
(a) A is an S-sorted set;
(b) For each pi ∈ Πs1...sn , Api ⊆ As1 × . . .×Asn ;
(c) For each T ∈ All(Term), AT is a mapping Map(Var , A)→ All(A) such that
whenever T ∈ Terms, AT (ρ) ∈ As for all ρ ∈ Map(Var , A) and:
(i) If x ∈ Vars, then Ax(ρ) = ρs(x);
(ii) ASubst(T, θ)(ρ) = AT (Aθ(ρ)), where for each θ ∈ All(Term)All(Var), Aθ :
Map(Var , A) → Map(Var , A) is defined by Aθ(ρ)s(x) = Aθ(x)(ρ) if x ∈
Vars;
(iii) For each ρ, ρ′ ∈ Map(Var , A) such that ρMap(Var ,A)∩FV (T )= ρ′Map(Var ,A)∩FV (T ),
it holds that AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′).
First-order formulae on top of the order-sorted terms and their satisfaction by
the order-sorted models are defined as usual, similarly to the unsorted case.
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A.4 TGL as an institutional extension of FOL
In what follows, SET denotes the category of sets and functions, CAT the hyper-
category of categories and functors, and CAT op its dual. For a category C, |C|
denotes its class of objects.
An institution [15] consists of:
1. A category Sign, whose objects are called signatures.
2. A functor Sen : Sign → Set, providing for each signature Σ a set whose
elements are called (Σ-)sentences.
3. A functor Mod : Sign → Catop, providing for each signature Σ a cat-
egory whose objects are called (Σ-)models and whose arrows are called
(Σ-)morphisms.
4. A relation |=Σ ⊆ |Mod(Σ)| × Sen(Σ) for each Σ ∈ |Sign|, called (Σ-) satis-
faction, such that for each morphism ϕ : Σ → Σ′ in Sign, the satisfaction
condition
M ′ |=Σ′ Sen(ϕ)(e) iff Mod(ϕ)(M ′) |=Σ e
holds for all M ′ ∈ |Mod(Σ′)| and e ∈ Sen(Σ).
We shall employ the following very strong notion of conservative extension of
institutions: Let I = (Sign,Sen,Mod, |=) and I ′ = (Sign′,Sen′,Mod′, |=′) be two
institutions. A conservative extension of I to I ′ is a a triple (H,α, β) such that:
- H : Sign→ Sign′ is a functor injective on both objects and morphisms.
- α = (αΣ)Σ∈|Sign| : Sen ⇒ Sen′ ◦ H is a natural transformation with all
components αΣ bijective.
- β = (βΣ)Σ∈|Sign| : Mod ′ ◦ H ⇒ Mod is a natural transformation with all
components βΣ isomorphisms of categories.
- The following satisfaction condition:
A |=Σ ϕ iff βΣ(A) |=H(Σ) αΣ(ϕ),
holds for all Σ ∈ |Sign|, A ∈ |Mod(Σ)|, and ϕ ∈ Sen(Σ).
The above is a particular case of institution representation [35], and is also a
sub-institution in the sense of [23]. (Note that Mod has CAT op as its domain, so
its components βΣ are functors Mod ′(Σ)→ Mod(H(Σ)).) There has been some
debate in the literature regarding the more natural directions of the arrows for
sentence and model maps in institution morphisms. In our case, since we deal
with bijections and isomorphisms of categories, these distinctions vanish.
For the rest of this subsection, we assume a fixed countably infinite set Var
of variables.
The institution of TGL. Given a term syntax (Term,FV ,Subst)) over Var
and θ : TermV ar, we write θ for the map T 7→ Subst(T, θ). Since θ 7→ (T 7→
Subst(T, θ)) is just a curried representation of Subst, we equivalently present the
term syntax as a triple (Term,FV , · )) with FV as before and · : TermV ar →
TermTerm, where (1)-(6) from Definition 1 are rewritten as:
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-(TS1) θ ◦ (Var ↪→ Term) = θ for all θ ∈ TermV ar;
-(TS2) Var ↪→ Term = 1Term;
-(TS3) If θ FV (T )= θ′ FV (T ), then θ(T ) = θ(T ′) for all θ ∈ TermV ar and
T, T ′ ∈ Term;
-(TS4) θ′ ◦ θ = θ′ ◦ θ for all θ ∈ TermV ar and θ′ ∈ TermV ar;
-(TS5) FV (x) = {x} for all x ∈ Var ;
-(TS6) FV (θ(T )) =
⋃{FV (θ(x)) : x ∈ FV (T )} for all T ∈ Term and θ ∈
TermV ar.
(Note that the map · is reminiscent of the free extension map from universal
algebra.)
Let ((Term,FV , · ),Π) be a term-generic language. For any ((Term,FV , · ),Π)-
model (A, (AT )T∈Term , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) and map ρ : Var → A, we write θ
A
for the map T 7→ AT (ρ). Again since this is only a matter of function currying, a
model can be alternatively presented as a tuple A = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn)
where the Api’s are relations as before and ·A : AV ar → ATerm such that:
-(M1) ρA ◦ (Var ↪→ Term) = ρ for all ρ ∈ AV ar;
-(M2) ρ FV (T )= ρ′ FV (T ) implies ρA(T ) = ρ′
A
(T ) for all T ∈ Term and
ρ ∈ AV ar;
-(M3) ρA ◦ θ = ρA ◦ θA for all θ ∈ TermV ar and ρ ∈ AV ar.
We also let Fmla((Term,FV , · ),Π) denote the set of TGL formulae for the
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We define the institution of (classic, unsorted) term-generic logic, ITGL = (Sign,Sen,Mod, |=),
as follows.
- Sign, the category of signatures, has:
— as objects, term-generic languages ((Term,FV , · ),Π) over Var ;
— as morphisms between ((Term,FV , · ),Π) and ((Term ′,FV ′, · ′),Π ′), pairs
(u, v) with v = (vn : Πn → Π ′n)n∈IN and u : Term → Term such that:
—–(SM1) u ◦ (Var ↪→ Term) = (Var ↪→ Term);
—–(SM2) FV (u(T )) = FV (T ) for all T ∈ Term;
—–(SM3) u ◦ θ = u ◦ θ′ ◦ u for all θ : Var → Term;
morphism composition is functional composition of the components.
(Intuition for the condition (SM3): say we have concrete terms, like the ones of
FOL or λ-calculus, θ maps x to S and all other variables to themselves (thus
θ(K) = K[S/x] for all termsK), and umaps eachK to the termK[g/f ] obtained
by replacing an operation symbol f with an operation symbol g of the same arity;
then one has K[S/x][g/f ] = K[g/f ][S[g/f ]/x], i.e., (u ◦ θ)(K) = (u ◦ θ′ ◦ u)(K),
for all terms K.)
- The sentence functor Sen : Sign→ SET is defined:
— on objects, by
Sen((Term,FV, · ),Π) = {ϕ ∈ Fmla((Term,FV, · ),Π). FV (ϕ) = ∅};
— on morphisms, by: let (u, v) : ((Term,FV, · ),Π)→ ((Term′, FV ′, · ′),Π ′);
—– we first define Fmla(u, v) : Fmla((Term,FV, · ),Π)→ Fmla((Term′, FV ′, · ′),Π ′)
by structural recursion on formulae
——- Fmla(u, v)(pi(T1, . . . , Tn)) = (v(n, pi))(v(T1), . . . , v(Tn));
——- Fmla(u, v)(ϕ ∧ ψ) = Fmla(u, v)(ϕ) ∧ Fmla(u, v)(ψ);
——- Fmla(u, v)(ϕ⇒ψ) = Fmla(u, v)(ϕ)⇒Fmla(u, v)(ψ);
——- Fmla(u, v)(∀x. ϕ) = ∀x.Fmla(u, v)(ϕ).
—– now, we note that Fmla(u, v) preserves the free variables and therefore
maps sentences to sentences; we define Sen(u, v) as the restriction of Fmla(u, v)
to Sen((Term,FV, · ),Π)→ Sen((Term′, FV ′, · ′),Π ′).
- The model functor Mod : Sign→ CAT is defined:
— on objects, by setting Mod((Term,FV, · ),Π) as the following category:
—– the objects are the TGL models for the language ((Term,FV, · ),Π);
—– morphisms between A = (A, ·A, (Api)pi∈Π) and B = (B, ·B , (Bpi)pi∈Π) are
the maps h : A→ B such that:
——- (MM1) h ◦ ρA = h ◦ ρB for all ρ : Var → A;
——- (MM2) (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A(n,pi) implies (h(a1), . . . , h(an)) ∈ B(n,pi) for all
n ∈ IN , pi ∈ Πn and a1, . . . , an ∈ A;
morphism composition is function composition;
— on morphisms, by: let (u, v) : ((Term,FV, · ),Π) → ((Term′, FV ′, · ′),Π ′);
then Mod(u, v) : Mod((Term′, FV ′, · ′),Π ′) → Mod((Term,FV, · ),Π) is the
functor defined as follows:
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——on objects:Mod(u, v)(A′, ·A′ , (A′(n,pi′))n∈IN,pi′∈Π′n) = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn),
where:
——– A = A′;
——– ρ ·A = ρA′ ◦ u for all ρ ∈ AV ar;
——– A(n,pi) = A′(n,vn(pi)) for all n ∈ IN and pi ∈ Πn.
—— on morphisms: let h : A′ → B′; then Mod(u, v)(h) : Mod(A′)→ Mod(B′) is
taken to be h.
- The satisfaction relations (one for each signature) between models and sen-
tences was already defined.
Theorem 1. TGL as organized above forms an institution that extends conser-
vatively the institution of FOL.
A.5 Intuitionistic Term-Generic Logic (ITGL)




[χ 6∈ Γ ]
Γ . ϕ Γ, ψ . χ
Γ, ϕ⇒ ψ . χ (Left⇒)
Γ, ϕ . ψ
Γ . ϕ⇒ ψ (Right⇒)
Γ, ϕ, ψ . χ
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ . χ (Left∧)
Γ . ϕ Γ . ψ
Γ . ϕ ∧ ψ (Right∧)
Γ,∀x.ϕ, ϕ[T/x] . χ





The system GI=, for ITGL with equality, extends GI with the following
intuitionistic equality rules:
·
Γ . T = T (R)
Γ . T1 = T2
Γ . T2 = T1
(S)
Γ . T1 = T2 Γ . T2 = T3
Γ . T1 = T3
(T)
Γ . T1 = T ′1 . . . Γ . Tn = T
′
n ,
Γ . pi(T1, . . . , Tn)




Γ . T1 = T2
Γ . T [T1/x] = T [T2/x]
(Sbs)
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B More details about Horn2






(ai(x, y)⇒ bi(x, y))
)
⇒ c(y) (∗)
where ai, bi, c are atomic formulae, and x and y are tuples of variables such that
the following properties hold:
- Vars(x) ∩Vars(y) = ∅.
- FV (c) ⊆ Vars(y) (hence the notation c(y) for c).
- FV (ai) ∪ FV (bi) ⊆ Vars(x) ∪Vars(y) (hence the notations ai(x, y) for ai and
bi(x, y) for bi) for all i ∈ 1, n.
Also, recall our convention to omit, for any i ∈ 1, n, the formula ai from (∗)
whenever it is equal to >, thus writing the inner i-implication as simply bi(x, y).
Extensional sentences are, by definition, those having ai equal > for all i ∈ 1, n,









The terminology “extensional sentence”, taken from [32], is justified by the λ-
calculus extensionality axiom, which has this shape.
Horn sentences are, by definition, extensional sentences for which, in addi-
tion, the tuple x is empty, making FV (bi) ⊆ Vars(y) (allowing us to write bi(y),
instead of bi(x, y), for bi) for all i ∈ 1, n and making the quantification over x








meaning that a Horn sentence in our sense is really just the universal closure of
a Horn formula.
Moreover, recall that a Horn sequent has the form Γ . d with Γ finite set
of atomic formulae and d atomic formula. We also define a generalized Horn
sequent to be a sequent Γ . ∆ with Γ and ∆ finite sets of atomic formulae.
For the rest of this section, we fix a Horn2 theory E.
B.1 Specialized systems for classic TGL
In this subsection, sequents will have the form Γ . ∆ with Γ and∆ finite-support
sets of formulae. (Remember that “finite support” means FV (Γ ),FV (∆) finite.)
Some rules shall restrict the succedents ∆ to be singletons though. Recall that
we use Γ d as a short notation for Γ ∪{d}. We may also identify a singleton {d}
with the element d, writing, for instance, Γ . d instead of Γ . {d}.
Consider the following preliminary Gentzen system G′E specialized for gener-
alized Horn sequents:
·
Γ . ∆ if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ (Axiom)
Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆, bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n Γ, c(T ) . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Inst’-e)
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In the rule (Inst’-e) above (the (primed) “instance of e” rule):
- e is a sentence in E of the form (∗) (thus ai, bi, c are the atomic formulae that
build e);
- T is a tuple of terms with the same length as y;
- z is a fresh tuple of variables with the same length as x.
“Fresh” without further qualification means “fresh for everything in that
context” (here, “fresh for Γ,∆, the ai’s, the bi’s, c, and T”). The same convention
will be applied hereafter. (Of course, freshness has the usual meaning: a variable
being fresh for a term or formula means not belonging to the set of its free
variables; a variable being fresh for another variable means being distinct from
it; a variable being fresh for a tuple of items means being fresh for all these
items.)
Here as well as in the other similar rules that we shall consider, we implicitly
assume that if ai is >, then we do not add it to Γ , and if bi is >, we do not add
the sequent Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆, bi(z, T ) to the hypotheses. Moreover, notice that if
n = 0, the rule has only one hypothesis, Γc(T ) . ∆.
Lemma 5. `G (E ∪ Γ ) . ∆ iff `G′E Γ . ∆ for all generalized Horn sequents
Γ . ∆.
The rule (Inst’-e) can be split into a simpler instance rule (Inst-e) and a rule
(Cut), as discussed below. Let G0E denote the system consisting of the following
rules:
·
Γ . ∆ if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ (Axiom)
Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆, bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
Γ . ∆, c(T )
(Inst-e)
Γ . ∆, d Γ, d . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Cut)
The items in the rule (Inst-e) above (the “instance of e” rule) are subject to the
same requirements as in (Inst-e’), namely: e is a sentence in E of the form (∗)
(thus ai, bi, c are the atomic formulae that build e), T is a tuple of terms with
the same length as y, and z is a fresh tuple of variables with the same length as
x.
Lemma 6. `G′E Γ . ∆ iff `G0E Γ . ∆ for all generalized Horn sequents Γ . ∆.
Rules like the above (Cut) are usually undesirable for many reasons, among which
their non-syntax-driven character due to the appearance of the interpolant d “out
of nowhere”. For us, (Cut) is undesirable because it increases the succedent of the
sequents, thus not allowing one to focus, without losing provability, on sequents
with singleton antecedents in a “thin”, intuitionistic Gentzen system. Can (Cut)
be eliminated from G0E for any theory E? The answer is negative, as shown by
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the following standard non-intuitionistic counterexample: E = {e1, e2} where e1
is (a⇒ b)⇒ c and e2 is a⇒ c for a, b, c distinct atomic formulae with no free
variables (e.g., propositional atoms). Then ∅ . c is provable in G0E , by
·
a . a, b
(Axiom)






∅ . c (Cut)
(Note that indeed c is a (classic) semantic consequence of E.) On the other hand,
G0E without (Cut) cannot prove ∅ . c, since the only backwards reduction of the
goal ∅ . c would be to a . b, which is irreducible.
However, a certain class of theories E (namely, the amenable ones) allow for
the elimination of (Cut), as shown below.
Let GE be G0E without (Cut), and G1E be G0E with (Cut) replaced by the rule
(Simple-Cut) introduced below. More precisely, GE consists of the following rules:
·
Γ . ∆ if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ (Axiom)
Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆, bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
Γ . ∆, c(T )
(Inst-e)
and G1E consists of the following rules:
·
Γ . ∆ if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ (Axiom)
Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆, bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
Γ . ∆, c(T )
(Inst-e)
Γ . d Γ, d . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Simple-Cut)
Lemma 7. `GE Γ . ∆ iff `G1E Γ . ∆ for all generalized Horn sequents Γ . ∆
(i.e., (Simple-Cut) can be eliminated from G1E).
Now consider the following family of rules (Drop) = ((Drop-(e, a)))(e,a):
Γ, a(z, T ) . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Drop-(e, a))
where e is a sentence in E of the form (∗), a(x, y) is one of the ai’s of e, T is
a tuple of terms of the same length as y, and z is a tuple of variables of the
same length as x fresh for ∆. We shall prove that the simpler-to-check closure
of GE under the (Drop-(e, a)) rules ensures its closure under (Cut), hence allows
for elimination of the latter rule from G0E .
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Lemma 8. Assume that (Drop) is admissible in GE and let Γ,∆1,∆2 be finite
sets of atomic formulae. If `GE Γ . (∆1 ∪∆2), then either `GE Γ . ∆1 or `GE
Γ . ∆2.
Lemma 9. (Drop) admissible in GE implies (Cut) admissible in GE. (In other
words, (Drop) admissible in GE implies GE (deductively) equivalent to G0E.)
B.2 Specialized systems for intuitionistic TGL
In this subsection, sequents will have the form Γ . d with Γ finite-support set of
formulae and d formula. Via the identification of singletons {d} with elements
d, sequents Γ . d can be viewed as particular cases of sequents Γ . ∆ as in B.1
– this is the reason why we use the same notations for the rules in our follow-
ing intuitionistic Gentzen systems which are restrictions to singleton-succedent
sequents of rules discussed in B.1, namely (Axiom), (Inst-e), (Simple-Cut) and
(Drop). (Note however that intuitionistic (Simple-Cut) is not a restriction of
classic (Cut), and intuitionistic (Inst”-e) is not a restriction of classic (Inst’-e).)
We shall use the following convention:
Whenever we mention the name of a rule in the context of a classic
system, we refer to its classic version (for generalized Horn sequents),
and whenever we mention the name of a rule in the context of an
intuitionistic system, we refer to its intuitionistic version (for Horn
sequents).
Consider the following E-specialized Gentzen system K′′E :
·
Γ . d
if d ∈ Γ (Axiom)
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n Γ, c(T ) . d
Γ . d
(Inst”-e)
In the rule (Inst”-e) above, e is a sentence in E of the form (∗) (thus ai, bi, c are
the atomic formulae that build e), T is a tuple of terms with the same length as
y, and z is a fresh tuple of variables with the same length as x.
Lemma 10. `GI (E ∪ Γ ) . d iff `K′′E Γ . d for all Horn sequents Γ ` d.
Let K1E be the system:
·
Γ . d
if d ∈ Γ (Axiom)
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
Γ . c(T )
(Inst-e)
Γ . d Γ, d . c
Γ . c (Simple-Cut)
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Let KE be K1E without (Simple-Cut), namely:
·
Γ . d
if d ∈ Γ (Axiom)
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
Γ . c(T )
(Inst-e)
In the latter two systems, the rule (Inst-e) is subject to the same requirements
as the rule (Inst”-e) of K′′E , namely: e is a sentence in E of the form (∗) (thus
ai, bi, c are the atomic formulae that build e), T is a tuple of terms with the
same length as y, and z is a fresh tuple of variables with the same length as x.
Lemma 11. Let Γ . d be a Horn sequent. Then:
(a) `K′′E Γ . d implies `K1E Γ . d.
(b) `K1E Γ . d implies `KE Γ . d.
Lemma 12. `KE Γ . d iff `K1E Γ . d for all Horn sequents Γ . d (i.e., (Simple-
Cut) can be eliminated from K1E).
Theorem 3. `GI (E ∪ Γ ) . d iff `KE Γ . d for all Horn sequents Γ ` d.
B.3 The relationship between KE and GE
Below is the “thin” version of (Drop):
Γ, a(z, T ) . d
Γ . d
(Drop-(e, a))
where e is a sentence in E of the form (∗), a(x, y) is one of the ai’s of e, T is a
tuple of terms of the same length as y, and z is a tuple of variables of the same
length as x fresh for d.
Lemma 13. (Drop) admissible in KE implies (Drop) admissible in GE.
Lemma 14. Assume that, if ai is not >, then Vars(x) ∩ FV(ai) 6= ∅, for all
formulae e ∈ E of the form (∗) and all i ∈ 1, n. Then `KE Γ . d iff `GE Γ . d
for all Horn sequents Γ . d.
B.4 Completeness of intuitionistic systems for classic models
Finally, we are ready to state our main result relating intuitionistic deduction
with classical models.
Theorem 4. Assume that:
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-(i) If ai is not >, then Vars(x)∩FV(ai) 6= ∅, for all formulae e ∈ E of the form
(∗) and all i ∈ 1, n.
-(ii) (Drop) is admissible in KE.
Then the following are equivalent for all Horn sequents Γ . d:
(a) `KE Γ . d.
(b) `GE Γ . d.
(c) E |= (Γ . d).
(d) `GI (E ∪ Γ ) . d.
(e) `G (E ∪ Γ ) . d.
Theorem 5. Assume that all formulae e in E of the form (∗) have the following
properties for all i ∈ 1, n:
-(i) If ai is not >, then Vars(x) ∩ FV(ai) 6= ∅.
-(ii) Vars(y) ∩ FV(bi) ⊆ FV(c).
Then (Drop) is admissible in KE, hence the conclusion of Theorem 4 holds.
Since typed λ-calculi tend to require many-sorted TGL languages, it is useful to
state here the following
Many-sorted version of Theorem 5. Let G be the set of all sorts s for which
there exists e ∈ E of the form (∗) such that x contains a variable of sort s, and
let VarG denote the set of all variables having the sort in G. Assume that all
formulae e in E of the form (∗) have the following properties for all i ∈ 1, n:
-(i) If ai is not >, then Vars(x) ∩ FV(ai) 6= ∅.
-(ii) FV(bi) ∩Vars(y) ∩VarG ⊆ FV(c).
Then (Drop) is admissible in GE, hence the conclusion of Theorem 4 holds.
Theorem 4 extends seamlessly to cope with equality, since the equality rules
are the instances of (i.e., the (Inst) rules associated to) the Horn2 (actually,
Horn) theory Eql from Subsection A.2. Let G=E and K=E be the systems G(E∪Eql)
and K(E∪Eql), regarded over the language with equality. We obtain the following
immediate consequence of Theorem 4:
Theorem 4=. Assume that:
-(i) If ai is not >, then Vars(x)∩FV(ai) 6= ∅, for all formulae e ∈ E of the form
(∗) and all i ∈ 1, n.
-(ii) (Drop) is admissible in K=E.
Then the following are equivalent for all Horn sequents Γ . d:
(a) `K=E Γ . d.
(b) `G=E Γ . d.
(c) E |== (Γ . d) (I.e., Γ . d is E-tautological for TGL with equality.)
(d) `GI= (E ∪ Γ ) . d.
(e) `G= (E ∪ Γ ) . d.
Unfortunately, the equality axioms (Trans) and (Comp) do not pass the strong
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syntax-amenability test, and therefore in the case of equality one needs to employ
more ad hoc techniques for proving amenability.
If E is a Horn theory, KE is the well-known Hilbert system for Horn (and in
particular, equational) logic: indeed, the antecedent being fixed in deductions, it
can be omitted and thus the Gentzen system becomes a Hilbert system, writing
a
b
for Γ . a
Γ . b
and keeping an implicit account for the effect of the (Axiom) rule,
as any Hilbert system does. Thus, interestingly, we obtained a derivation of the
completeness result for the Horn logic w.r.t. to its simple Hilbert system from
the one of FOL w.r.t. its more involved Gentzen system. More generally, if E
is an extensional theory, then there are no (Drop-(e, a)) rules, hence E is also
trivially amenable, making KE complete.
C More calculi specifications
Most of the calculi specified below were taken from [29, 26, 17]. ML-style poly-
morphism was introduced in [25], and Edinburgh LF in [18]. For a presentation
of generalized type systems, see [4]. For the illative λ-calculus, see [5]. The linear
λ-calculus appears naturally in connection with the proof theory for linear logic
[14].
Unlike in Section 4 where we used colons both inside the term syntax (as in
λx : t.X) and for indicating the typing relation (a binary relation in TGL), in
the following specifications we shall employ a less suggestive, but also less am-
biguous notation for the latter, writing typeOf or kindOf instead of “:”. Another
convention that we shall take for the sake of readability is to enclose the axioms
referring to typing or kinding in square brackets, while the others, referring to
other issues such as reduction or subtyping, in round brackets.
As a parsing convention, we assume, as customary, that unary binding op-
erators such as λ and ∀ bind as far as they can (i.e., as far as the parentheses
allow them to).
Untyped λ-Calculus (Uλ). An unsorted theory in Horn2, with one relation
symbol,  , of arity 2. Terms are α-equivalence classes over the syntax
Term ::= Var | Term Term | λVar .Term
The axioms are:
(∀x.X  Y )⇒ λx.X  λx.Y (ξ)
x x′ ⇒ x y  x′ y (AppL)
y  y′ ⇒ x y  x y′ (AppR)
(λx.X)x X (β)
λy. x y  x (η)
Remark.Our axiom (η) is a single sentence, and not an axiom scheme. The more
conventional form from λ-calculus, λx.Ex E (with side condition x 6∈ FV (E))
is recovered from our (η) by arbitrary (capture-free) substitutions.
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(Simply-)Typed λ-Calculus (Tλ). Two sorts: type and data. One relation
symbol typeOf , of arity data × type.
Var = (Var type ,Vardata) = (TVar ,DVar) and
Term = (Termtype ,Termdata) = (TTerm,DTerm), where:
TTerm ::= TVar | TTerm → TTerm
DTerm ::= DVar | DTerm DTerm | λDVar : TTerm.DTerm
Below, x, y, X,X ′, X ′′, Y, Y ′, Y ′′, Z, Z ′, Z ′′, t, t′, t′′ and T, T ′, T ′′ range over data
variables, data terms, type variables, and type terms, respectively. This conven-
tion will apply to all specifications extending this one. The axioms are:
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′))⇒ typeOf (λx : t.X, t→ t′) [Abs]
typeOf (x, t→ t′) ∧ typeOf (y, t)⇒ typeOf (x y, t′) [App]
x→ x′ ⇒ x y  x′ y (AppL)
y → y′ ⇒ x y  x y′ (AppR)
(∀x.X  Y )⇒ λx : t.X  λx : t.Y (ξ)
(λx : t.X)x X (β)
λy : t. x y  x (η)
Typed λ-Calculus with Recursion (Tλµ). Extends Tλ.
DTerm ::= . . . | µDVar : TTerm.DTerm
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t))⇒ typeOf (µx : t.X, t) [µ]
µx : t.X  X[µx : t.X/x] (µ)
Typed λ-Calculus with Subtyping (TλS). Extends Tλ. Adds a new relation
symbol ≤, of arity type × type.
typeOf (x, t) ∧ t ≤ t′ ⇒ typeOf (x, t′) [ST]
t ≤ t (Refl-ST)
t ≤ t′ ∧ t′ ≤ t′′ ⇒ t ≤ t′′ (Trans-ST)
t1 ≤ t2 ∧ t′1 ≤ t′2 ⇒ (t2 → t′1) ≤ (t1 → t′2) (Arr-ST)
Typed λ-Calculus with Isorecursive Types (TλµT). Extends Tλ.
TTerm ::= . . . | µTVar .TTerm
DTerm ::= . . . | fold〈TTerm〉DTerm | unfold〈TTerm〉DTerm
typeOf (x, T [(µt.T )/t])⇒ typeOf (fold〈µt.T 〉x, µt.T ) [Fold]
typeOf (x, µt.T )⇒ typeOf (unfold〈µt.T 〉x, T [(µt.T )/t]) [Unfold]
unfold〈µt.T 〉(fold〈µt.T 〉x) x (Inverse1)
fold〈µt.T 〉(unfold〈µt.T 〉x) x (Inverse2)
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Subtyping Isorecursive Types. Extends both TλµT and TλS.
(∀t, t′.t ≤ t′ ⇒ T ≤ T ′)⇒ µt.T ≤ µt′.T ′ (Amber)
Typed λ-Calculus with Type Operators and Binding (Tλω). Extends Tλ
without [Abs] (the latter axiom requiring modification). Adds a new sort, kind,
a new relation kindOf , of arity type × kind , and a new relation,  , of arity
type × type (for this relation, we use the same notation as for the one of arity
data × data).
Var = (Varkind ,Var type ,Vardata) = (KVar ,TVar ,DVar) and
Term = (Termkind ,Termtype ,Termdata) = (KTerm,TTerm,DTerm), where:
KTerm ::= ∗ | KVar | KTerm → KTerm
TTerm ::= . . . | λTVar : KTerm.TTerm
k, k′ range over kind variables.
(kindOf (t, ∗) ∧ (∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′)))
⇒ typeOf (λx : t.X, t→ t′) [Abs]
kindOf (t, ∗) ∧ kindOf (t′, ∗)⇒ kindOf (t→ t′, ∗) [K-Arr]
(∀t.kindOf (t, k)⇒ kindOf (T, k′))⇒ kindOf (λt :k.T, k → k′) [K-Abs]
kindOf (t, k → k′) ∧ kindOf (t′, k)⇒ kindOf (t t′, k′) [K-App]
t t′ ⇒ t t′′  t′ t′′ (K-AppL)
t t′ ⇒ t′′ t t′′ t′ (K-AppR)
(∀t. T → T ′)⇒ λt :k .T  λt :k .T ′ (Kξ)
(λt :k.T )t T (Kβ)
λt :k. t′ t t′ (Kη)
typeOf (x, t) ∧ t t′ ⇒ typeOf (x, t′) (Comp)
typeOf (x, t′) ∧ t t′ ⇒ typeOf (x, t) (CompRev)
Remark: Here we have a situation where typing and reduction interfere – the
rules (Comp) and (CompRev) ensure that (βη)-equivalent types get assigned
to the same data. (This is not type preservation, but a dual of this property
necessary to keep the typing system usable [4].)
ML-Style Polymorphic λ-calculus (MLλ). Extends Uλ; the imported sort
is called data. Adds two sorts: type and typeScheme, with type < typeScheme
(thus we have an order-sorted specification) and two relations: typeOf , of arity
data × typeScheme, and moreGeneral , of arity typeScheme × typeScheme.
Var = (Var typeScheme ,Var type , Vardata) = (TSVar ,TVar ,DVar),
with TVar ⊆ TSVar and
Term = (TermtypeScheme , Termtype ,Termdata) = (TSTerm,TTerm,DTerm),
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where:
TSTerm ::= TSVar | TTerm | Π TVar .TSTerm
TTerm ::= TVar | TTerm → TTerm
DTerm ::= . . . | let DVar = DTerm in DTerm
x, y / X range over data variables/terms, t, t′ / T over type variables/terms, and
s, s′, s′′ / S over type-scheme variables/terms.
typeOf (x, s) ∧moreGeneral(s′, s)⇒ typeOf (x, s′) [Inst]
(∀t.typeOf (x, S))⇒ typeOf (x,Πt.S) [Gen]
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′))⇒ typeOf (λx.X, t→ t′) [Abs]
typeOf (y, s) ∧ (∀x.typeOf (x, s)⇒ typeOf (X, t))
⇒ typeOf (let x = y in X, t) [Let]
typeOf (x, t→ t′) ∧ typeOf (y, t)⇒ typeOf (x y, t′) [App]
(let x = y in X) X[y/x] (Let)
moreGeneral(Πt.S, S) (MG1)
moreGeneral(s, s′) ∧moreGeneral(s′, s′′)⇒ moreGeneral(s, s′′) (MG2)
Remarks: (1) The rule [Inst] says that something having a more general type
than s′ also has the type s′. Here “more general” does not mean “greater” (as at
subtyping), but “more schematic”. For instance, λx.x has the polymorphic type
(i.e., type scheme) pit.t → t, and we have moreGeneral(pit.t → t,nat → nat);
thus λx.x also has the type nat → nat .
(2) The typing statement of the ”let” construct uses type scheme variables for
its “binding-expression” part, hence allows for the so-called let-polymorphism.
To illustrate this, assume that we also have the basic types bool and nat and the
if then else construct with the usual typing sentence
(typeOf (x, bool) ∧ typeOf (y, t) ∧ typeOf (z, t))⇒
typeOf (if x then y else z, t) [Cond]
Let us show, in a bottom-up fashion, that we can infer
typeOf (let f = λx.x in if f true then f 0 else 1,nat).
First, we can easily show typeOf (λx.x,Πt.t→ t). Then, using [Let], the desired
statement reduces to
typeOf (f,Πt.t→ t)⇒ typeOf (if f true then f 0 else 1,nat).
By [Cond] and the TGL logical rules, it would be sufficient that
typeOf (f,Πt.t)⇒ (typeOf (f true, bool) ∧ typeOf (f 0,nat)), i.e., by [Abs] and
typeOf (true, bool) and typeOf (0,
∫
), that
typeOf (f,Πt.t)⇒ (typeOf (f, bool → bool) ∧ typeOf (f,nat → nat)).
This last statement follows from [Inst].
(3) The relation of being more general is defined in a very simple fashion; the
rule (MG1) says that the type scheme Πt.S is more general than S with any
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particular choice for the type t appearing in S. Recall that the written formulae
are meant to express their universal closures, in particular are meant to be
universally quantified over t, hence any possible occurrence of t in the second S
of moreGeneral(Πt.S, S) is in the scope of an outer universal quantifier; this is
precisely what ”any particular choice” means. (See also the discussion in Section
4 on our β axiom.)
4) The typing rule [Gen] says that if we can associate the type (scheme) S to x
for any type t, then we can regard the type S of x as polymorphic in t.
The Edinburgh LF Calculus with Dependent Types (LF). Sorts kind ,
typeFamily , data, and four relations: typeOf , of arity data× typeFamily , kindOf ,
of arity typeFamily × kind , and two relations, both denoted  , of arities data ×
data and typeFamily × typeFamily .
Var = (Varkind ,Var typeFamily ,Vardata) = (KVar ,TFVar ,DVar) and
Term = (Termkind ,TermtypeFamily ,Termdata) = (KTerm,TFTerm,DTerm),
where:
KTerm ::= KVar | type | ΠDVar : TFTerm.KTerm
TFTerm ::= TFVar | ΠDVar : TFTerm.TFTerm
λDVar : TFTerm.TFTerm | TFTerm DTerm
DTerm ::= DVar | λDVar : TFTerm.DTerm | DTerm DTerm
x, x′, x′′, y, y′, y′′ and X,X ′, X ′′, Y, Y ′, Y ′′ range over data variables and terms,
t, t′, t′′ and T, T ′, T ′′ over type-family variables and terms, and k, k′, k′′ and
K,K ′,K ′′ over kind variables and terms.
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(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ kindOf (T, type))⇒ kindOf (Πx : t. T, type) [Π-T]
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ kindOf (T,K))⇒
kindOf (λx : t.T,Πx : t.K) [Abs-T]
typeOf (x, t) ∧ kindOf (t′,Πx : t.K)⇒ kindOf (t′ x,K) [App-T]
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X,T ))⇒
typeOf (λx : t.X,Πx : t. T ) [Abs-D]
typeOf (x, t) ∧ typeOf (y,Πx : t. T )⇒ typeOf (y x, T ) [App-D]
(∀x.T  T ′)⇒ Πx : t. T  Πx : t. T ′ (ΠR)
t→ t′ ⇒ Πx : t. T  Πx : t′. T [t′/t] (ΠL)
t t′ ⇒ t x t′ x (AppL-T)
x x′ ⇒ t x t x′ (AppR-T)
(∀x. T  T ′)⇒ λx : t.T  λx : t.T ′ (λR-T)
t→ t′ ⇒ λx : t.T  λx : t′.T [t′/t] (λL-T)
(λx : t.T )x T (β-T)
λx : t.t′x t′ (η-T)
x x′ ⇒ x y  x′ y (AppL-D)
y  y′ ⇒ x y  x y′ (AppR-D)
(∀x.X  X ′)⇒ λx : t.X  λx : t.X ′ (λR-D)
t→ t′ ⇒ λx : t.X  λx : t′.X[t′/t] (λL-D)
(λx : t.X)x X (β-D)
λx : t.y x y (η-D)
typeOf (x, t) ∧ t t′ ⇒ typeOf (x, t′) (Comp)
typeOf (x, t′) ∧ t t′ ⇒ typeOf (x, t) (CompRev)
Type:Type λ-Calculus (TTλ). Unsorted. One binary relation symbol, typeOf .
Term ::= Var | type | Term Term
λVar : Term.Term | ΠVar : Term.Term
x, t, t′, u range over variables, and X,T over terms. We write x,X to refer to
what should be considered as data, t, t′, T when types are meant, and u when
the variable denotes either data or types. (These conventions are taken only for
readability.)
38
typeOf (type, type) [T:T]
typeOf (t, type) ∧ (∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ typeOf (T, type))
⇒ typeOf (Πu : t.T, type) [Π]
typeOf (Πu : t.T, type) ∧ (∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ typeOf (X,T ))⇒
typeOf (λu : t.X,Πu : t.T ) [Abs]
(typeOf (Πu : t.T, type) ∧ typeOf (x,Πu : t.T )
∧typeOf (u, t))⇒ typeOf (xu, T ) [App]
(∀u.T  T ′)⇒ Πu : t.T  Πu : t.T ′ (ΠR)
t t′ ⇒ Πu : t.T  Πu : t′.T (ΠL)
(∀u.X  Y )⇒ λu : t.X  λu : t.Y (λR)
t t′ ⇒ λu : t.T  λu : t′.T [t′/t] (λL)
(λu : t.X)u X (β)
λu : t.x u x (η)
Generalized (Pure) Type Systems.
Assume we are given:
– a set Const , of constants, and a set B ⊆ Const , of brands;8
– a set A of pairs (c, b) with c ∈ Const and b ∈ B, called axioms;
– a set R of triples (b1, b2, b3) with b1, b2, b3 ∈ Type, called rules.
Unsorted theory. One relation, typeOf .
Term ::= Var | Const | Term Term
λVar : Term.Term | ΠVar : Term.Term
b, b1, b2, b3 range over brands, x, x′, x′′, y, y′, y′′, t, t′, t′′, u, u′, u′′ over variables,
and X,X ′, X ′′, Y, Y ′, Y ′′, T, T ′, T ′′ over terms. We write x,X to refer to what
should be considered as data, t, t′, T when types are meant, and u when the
variable denotes either data or types. (Again, these conventions are taken only
for readability.)
8 To avoid confusion with the TGL sorts, we have called ”brands” what the generalized
type systems call ”sorts”.
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typeOf (c, t), where (c, b) ∈ A [Axiom]
typeOf (t, b1) ∧ (∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ typeOf (T, b2))
⇒ typeOf (Πu : t.T, b3), where (b1, b2, b3) ∈ R [Π]
typeOf (Πu : t.T, b) ∧ (∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ typeOf (X,T ))⇒
typeOf (λu : t.X,Πu : t.T ) [Abs]
(typeOf (Πu : t.T, b) ∧ typeOf (x,Πu : t.T )
∧typeOf (u, t))⇒ typeOf (xu, T ) [App]
u u′ ⇒ uu′′  u′ u′′ (AppL)
u u′ ⇒ u′′ u u′′ u′ (AppR)
(∀u.X  X ′)⇒ λu :T.X  λu :T.X ′ (λR)
t t′ ⇒ λu : t.X  λu : t′.X[t′/t] (λL)
(∀u. T ′  T ′′)⇒ Πu :T.T ′  Πu :T.T ′′ (ΠR)
t t′ ⇒ Πu : t.T ′  Πu : t′.T ′ (ΠL)
(λu : t.T )u T (β)
typeOf (x, t) ∧ t t′ ⇒ typeOf (x, t′) (Comp)
typeOf (x, t′) ∧ t t′ ⇒ typeOf (x, t) (CompRev)
Illative and Linear λ-Calculi. These are versions of λ-calculi with λ-bound
terms restricted to respectively contain the bound variable (in the case of the
illative λ-calculi) and contain precisely one occurrence of the bound variable (in
the case of the linear λ-calculi). We can seamlessly capture these cases in TGL,
since illative and linear terms are closed under substitution and α-equivalence,
and thus the axioms of a term syntax hold for them as well. Recall that TGL
does not require terms to be specified by a context-free grammar or any other
particular way to define syntax, so a non-context-free term syntax is allowed. We
exemplify here with the illative and linear versions of the untyped λ-calculus:
Unsorted theories. Term ::= Var | Term Term | λVar .Term, where the for the
production Term ::= Var .Term we additionally require:
– that Var ∈ FV (Term), for the illative case;
– that Var appears precisely once free in Term, for the linear case.
The axioms of the specification, (ξ), (β), (AppL), (AppR), (η), look the same
as the ones for Uλ, but are subject to the extra requirement that all appearing
terms belong to our current term syntax, i.e., in (ξ) and (β),
– X and Y have x as a free variable, for the illative case;
– X and Y have precisely one free occurrence of x, for the linear case.
Remark: Sometimes the linear λ-calculus is taken to be the fragment of λ-
calculus given by a condition stronger than the above, namely, that each term
has precisely one occurrence of each of its free variables. Since this property is
not closed under substitution, this class of terms does not form a term syntax,
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and hence we cannot capture it in our framework. Interestingly, the version of
linear λ-calculus that is definable as a TGL theory seems to also be the one
favorable to HOAS (see [3]).
D Specifications of equational calculi
All the above calculi admit versions where reduction is replaced by some notion of
congruence/equality. In such cases, TGL with equality would be a more elegant
and compact choice, thanks to the built-in equality axioms that need not be
stated explicitly. However, for typed calculi, the built-in rules of compatibility
between relations and equality from TGL with equality obliges one, if aiming for
adequacy, to prove a type preservation property beforehand for the considered
calculus.
For example, TGL specifications for equational untyped λ-calculus and Sys-
tem F would be:
Untyped equational λ-Calculus (Uλ=). An unsorted theory in TGL with
equality, having no relations except equality. The terms are as before. The axioms
are:
(∀x.X = Y )⇒ λx.X = λx.Y (ξ)
(λx.X)x = X (β)
x = λy.x y (η)
Equational System F (SF) – theory over TGL with equality. Sorts type, data.
Relation symbol typeOf , of arity data × type. Variables and terms are as before:
Var = (Var type ,Vardata) = (TVar ,DVar) and
Term = (Termtype ,Termdata) = (TTerm,DTerm), where:
TTerm ::= TVar | TTerm → TTerm | Π TVar .TTerm
DTerm ::= DVar | DTerm DTerm | λDVar : TTerm.DTerm
DTerm TTerm | λTVar .DTerm
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′))⇒ typeOf (λx : t.X, t→ t′) [Abs]
typeOf (x, t→ t′) ∧ typeOf (y, t)⇒ typeOf (x y, t′) [App]
(∀t.typeOf (X,T ))⇒ typeOf (λt.X,Πt. T ) [T-Abs]
typeOf (x,Πt. T )⇒ typeOf (x t, T ) [T-App]
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ X = Y )⇒ λx : t.X = λx : t.Y (ξ)
typeOf ((λx : t.X)x, t′)⇒ (λx : t.X)x = X (β)
typeOf (λy : t.x y, t′)⇒ x = λy : t.x y (η)
(∀t.X = Y )⇒ λt.X = λt.Y (Tξ)
typeOf (λt.X, t′)⇒ (λt.X)t = X (Tβ)
typeOf (λt.x t, t′)⇒ x = λt.x t (Tη)
Thus, the typing axioms are the same as the ones in Section 4, and the axioms for
the equational theory reflect the ones in Section 4 for reduction, but make sure
that the terms in the equality (or, equivalently, the more complex one of the two)
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are well-typed – such caution is necessary in any interaction between equational
theories and types, as shown, e.g., in [26], where equalities for System F appear in
typing contexts and are conditioned by the typability of the participants. Axioms
of compatibility with application and of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity
need not be stated, since they are built in TGL with equality.
E Ad Hoc versus TGL Models for λ-Calculi
TGL provides models in a uniform manner to all its theories. We claim that this
“general-purpose” TGL semantics is as good/bad as “domain-specific” semantics
previously proposed for some of these calculi. Not only it yields a notion of
model for the particular calculus that makes deduction complete, but we claim
that this notion resembles closely the domain-specific, ad hoc ones (at least their
set-theoretical versions). We exemplify this here with the equational versions of
untyped λ-calculus and System F. For the former, the TGL semantics coincides
(up to a carrier-preserving bijection between classes of models) with its ad hoc,
set-theoretical semantics from [5]. For the latter, TGL provides a novel semantics,
that we shall show equivalent to the one given in [7]. (Here equivalence means the
existence of a bijection between elementary classes of models and will be brought
by back and forth mappings between the classes of models, which preserve and
reflect satisfaction; an equivalence brings an isomorphism between the skeletons
of two logics [27] - this situation is similar to the one of equivalence of categories
[20].)
E.1 Untyped λ-Calculus
We let Λ (instead of Term) denote the set of λ-terms over the countably infinite
set Var of variables, modulo α-equivalence (we shall use the same notations as
in [5]). In order to ease the presentation, we do not consider constants, but they
could have been considered as well without any further difficulties. (This will
be true for System F as well.) We recall from [5] some model-theoretic notions
developed around ULC. Let us call pre-structure a triple (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ(A)),
where A is a set, 〈 〉 is a binary operation on A (i.e., (A, 〈 〉) is an applicative
structure), and for each T ∈ Λ(A), AT : AVar → A, where Λ(A) denotes the set
of λ-terms with constants in A, modulo α-equivalence.
Given an equation T1 = T2 with T1, T2 λ-terms, one defines A |=λ T1 = T2 as
usual, by interpreting T1 = T2 as being implicitly universally quantified - that
is, by AT1(ρ) = AT2(ρ) for all ρ : Var → A. For pre-structures, we consider
the following properties (where a, b range over elements of A, x over variables,
T, T1, T2 over terms, ρ, ρ′ over valuations, i.e., elements of AVar ):
(P1) Ax(ρ) = ρ(x);
(P2) AT1T2(ρ) = AT1(ρ)〈AT2(ρ)〉;
(P3) If ρFV (T )= ρ′FV (T ), then AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′);
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(P4) If AT (ρ[x ← a]) = AT ′(ρ[x ← a]) for all a ∈ A, then Aλx.T (ρ) =
Aλx.T ′(ρ);
(P5) Aλx.T (ρ)〈a〉 = AT (ρ[x← a]);
(P6) If a〈c〉 = b〈c〉 for all c ∈ A, then a = b;
(P7) Aa(ρ) = a.
We next simplify the pre-structures slightly, by removing their redundant data
given by parameterized terms. A simple pre-structure is a triple (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ)
which satisfies all properties of a pre-structure, except (P7). Note that the dif-
ference between simple pre-structures and pre-structures is that only terms in
Λ, and not in Λ(A), are considered. Hence the notion of satisfaction, defined
for pre-structures only w.r.t. equations involving terms in Λ, also makes sense
for simple pre-structures. We shall only be interested in pre-structures verify-
ing at least (P1)-(P4). In this case, simple pre-structures and pre-structures are
essentially identical:
Lemma 15. The forgetful mapping (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ(A)) to (A,
〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ) is a bijection, preserving satisfaction and each of the properties
(P5),(P6), between pre-structures verifying (P1)-(P4) and (P7) and simple pre-
structures verifying (P1)-(P4).
This lemma allows us to work with the more amenable simple pre-structures,
which we henceforth call “pre-structures”, and forget about the more compli-
cated ones, as well as about property (P7).
A syntactical λ-model [5] (λ-model for short) is a pre-structure verifying (P1)-
(P5). A λ-model is extensional if it verifies (P6).
We now come to the representation of ULC in Horn2. Consider the term-
generic language (Var , Λ, ∅), whose models have therefore the form (A, (AT )T∈Λ).
Rather than considering only the TGL theory Uλ=, we prefer to play around
with more combinations of Horn2 formulae (among which Uλ= itself), in order
to allow a closer look at the relationship between the two types of models. We
shall work with the following Horn2 formulae and schemes of formulae:
(λx.T )T ′ = T [T ′/x] (β)
(λx.T )x = T (β′)
λx.T x = T, if x 6∈ FV (T ) (η)
λx.y x = y (η′)
(∀x.T1 = T2)⇒ λx.T1 = λx.T2 (ξ)
(∀x.T1 x = T2 x)⇒ T1 = T2, if x 6∈ FV (T ) (ext)
(∀x.y1x = y2x)⇒ y1 = y2 (ext ′)
Note that we do not use the same notations as in Appendix D. The axioms of
Uλ= are called there (β′), (ξ), and (η′), while here they are called (β′), (ξ), and
(η′).
Lemma 16. Each of the schemes of formulae (β), (η), (ext) is semantically
equivalent in TGL to its primed variant.
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This lemma points out that side-conditioned axiom schemes like (η) and (ext)
are not necessary in TGL, since they are expressible as single sentences, (η′) and
(ext ′).
We define a correspondence between pre-structures verifying (P1)-(P4) and
TGL models satisfying ξ as follows:
– Each pre-structure verifying (P1)-(P4) L = (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ) is mapped to
a TGL model L# = (A, (AT )T∈Λ);
– Each TGL model M = (A, (AT )T∈Λ) satisfying (ξ) is mapped to a pre-
structure M$ = (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ), where 〈 〉 is defined by a〈b〉 = Axy(ρ),
with ρ taking x to a and y to b.
Proposition 4. The above two mappings are well defined and mutually inverse.
Moreover, they preserve satisfaction and they can be restricted and corestricted
to:
(a) λ-models versus TGL models satisfying (ξ), (β) (i.e., models of Uλ= without
(η));
(b) extensional λ-models versus TGL models satisfying (ξ), (β), (η) (i.e., models
of Uλ=).
Considering the above satisfaction-preserving bijections, one could say that the
syntactic models coincide with the TGL models for the corresponding theories.
Adequacy is an immediate consequence of Proposition 4 together with the
completeness theorem for λ-calculus deduction for the syntactic models [5]. We
write `β for deduction in βλ-calculus and `βη for deduction in βηλ-calculus.
Corollary 1. The following hold for all terms T, T ′:
-(i) `β T = T ′ iff (ξ) ∪ (β) |= (∅ . T = T ′) in TGL with equality.
-(ii) `βη T = T ′ iff Uλ= |= (∅ . T = T ′) in TGL with equality.
We thus obtained a model-theoretic proof of adequacy. Adequacy could also be
obtained proof-theoretically from Theorem 4, given that both (ξ)∪ (β) and Uλ=
are extensional theories, hence trivially amenable.
E.2 System F
We shall relate the typing, equational system and models of System F with the
deduction and models of the Horn2 theory SF from Section D.
Recall the typing system TSF from Section 4. We relate System F and
the Horn2 theory SF first w.r.t. typing. For each typing context Γ = {x1 :
T1, . . . , xn :Tn}, we let Γ# be the TGL formula typeOf (x1, T1)∧. . .∧typeOf (xn, Tn).
Proposition 5. For all typing judgements Γ . X : T , it holds that
`SF Γ . X : T iff SF |= (Γ# . typeOf(X,T )).
44
A Henkin model H for System F [7, 26] is a tuple
(T ,F ,→,Π, Itype , (Domτ )τ∈T , (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T , (Appf )f∈F , I),
together with a pair
((HT )T∈TTerm , (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a) →: T × T → T ,
(b) Π : F → T ,
(c) F ⊆ T T ,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) Appτ,σ : Domτ→σ → DomσDomτ for each τ, σ ∈ T ,
(f) Appf : DomΠf →
∏
τ∈T Domf(τ) for each f ∈ F ,
(g) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(h) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × (
⋃Dom)DVar : for all x : T ′ ∈ Γ, δ(x) ∈
DomHT ′ (γ)} →
⋃Dom for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj with `SF Γ . X : T , such that
the following hold:
(1) Each of Appτ,σ and Appf is injective;
(2) (τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ])) ∈ F for each T, t, γ;
(3) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar ;
(4) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(5) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(6) HΠt.T (γ) = Π(τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ]));
(7) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x);
(8) HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) = AppHT ′ (γ),HT (γ)(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ))(HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(9) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) = Appτ 7→HT ′ (γ[t←τ ])(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ))(HT (γ));
(10) HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ) ∈ DomHT (γ)→HT ′ (γ) and, for each d ∈ DomHT (γ),
AppHT (γ),HT ′ (γ)(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ))(d) = HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(11)HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ) ∈ DomΠ(τ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])) and, for each τ ∈ T , Appτ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])
(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ))(τ) = HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
Above, Tj denotes the set of typing judgements and
⋃Dom denotes⋃τ∈T Domf(τ);
tj ranges over typing judgements, σ, τ and d, d′ over elements of T and ⋃Dom,
γ and δ over maps in T TVar and (⋃Dom)DVar; τ 7→ HT (γ[t ← τ ]) denotes the
function mapping each τ to HT (γ[t ← τ ]). We use slightly different notations
than [26]; also, we include interpretations of types and well-typed terms HT and
Htj as part of the structure, while [26] equivalently asks that such interpretations
exist and then proves them unique.
Satisfaction by Henkin models H of well-typed equations Γ . X = Y : T
(with `SF Γ . X : T and `SF Γ . X : T ) is defined by H |=SF Γ . X = Y : T
iff HΓ .X:T = HΓ .Y :T .
To avoid technical details irrelevant here, we assume non-emptiness of types
(without such an assumption, the Henkin models are not complete for System F,
but only if one considers a richer language - see [26]). Next we define mappings
between System-F Henkin models and TGL models for SF . Given three sets
A,B,C, a mapping f : A × B → C is called extensional if for all a, a′ ∈ A, if
f(a, b) = f(a′, b) for all b ∈ B then a = a′. Below, the satisfaction relation for
1-,2-,3-,4-, and 5- Henkin models is defined similarly to that for Henkin models.
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The first transformations are:
– Consider each Appτ,σ not as an injective mapping Domτ→σ → DomσDomτ ,
but as an extensional mapping Domτ→σ ×Domτ → Domσ;
– Consider each Appf not as an injective mapping DomΠf →
∏
τ∈T Domf(τ),
but as an extensional mapping DomΠf × T →
⋃Dom such that for each
(d, τ) ∈ DomΠf × T , Appf (d, τ) ∈ Domf(t);
– Assume F consists only of mappings of the form τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ]) for some
T ∈ TTerm, t ∈ TVar and γ ∈ T TVar; only this kind of mappings are used
in the Henkin model definition, and thus in the definition of satisfaction;
– Assume all Domτ and Domσ, with τ 6= σ, mutually disjoint; this obviously
does not affect the satisfaction relation.
We thus obtain the following equivalent models for System F:
A 1-Henkin model H is a a tuple
(T ,F ,→,Π, Itype , (Domτ )τ∈T , (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T , (Appf )f∈F , I),
together with a pair
((HT )T∈TTerm , (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a) →: T × T → T ,
(b) Π : F → T ,
(c) F ⊆ T T , F = {τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ]) : T ∈ TTerm, t ∈ TVar , γ ∈ T TVar},
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) Appτ,σ : Domτ→σ ×Domτ → Domσ for each τ, σ ∈ T ,
(f) Appf : DomΠf × T →
⋃Dom for each f ∈ F ,
(g) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(h) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × (
⋃Dom)DVar : for all x : T ′ ∈ Γ, δ(x) ∈
DomHT ′ (γ)} →
⋃Dom for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj with `SF Γ . X : T ,
such that the following hold:
(1) Domτ ∩ Domσ = ∅ whenever τ 6= σ; dc ∈ DConst;
(2) Each of Appτ,σ and Appf is extensional, and Appf (d, τ) ∈ Domf(t) for all
(d, τ) ∈ DomΠf × T ;
(3) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar ;
(4) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(5) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(6) HΠt.T (γ) = Π(τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ]));
(7) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x)
(8) HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) = AppHT ′ (γ),HT (γ)(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ), HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(9) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) = Appτ 7→HT ′ (γ[t←τ ])(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ));
(10) HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ) ∈ DomHT (γ)→HT ′ (γ) and, for each d ∈ DomHT (γ),
AppHT (γ),HT ′ (γ)(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), d) = HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(11) HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ) ∈ DomΠ(τ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])) and, for each τ ∈ T ,
Appτ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ), τ) = HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
Lemma 17. Henkin and 1-Henkin models are equivalent, in that there exists a
satisfaction- preserving and reflecting surjection &1 between the class of Henkin
46
models and that of 1-Henkin models. That is to say: for all Henkin models H
and well-typed equation Γ . X = Y : T ,
H |= Γ . X = Y : T iff H&1 |= Γ . X = Y : T.
For the next modification we do not introduce a new model name. We simply
assume that the 1-Henkin models have the mappings Π and → injective. It is
conceptually straightforward that by taking this assumption we obtain equiva-
lent models. Indeed, any 1-Henkin model H with non-injective Π and → can
be transformed, without affecting the satisfaction relation, into one with injec-
tive Π and →, by tagging the results of these mappings applications with the
arguments.
We next simplify the 1-Henkin models by getting rid of their functional com-
ponent F . We base this simplification on the fact that, by the injectivity of Π,
we can replace the index f of App with HΠt.T (γ), where f ∈ F has the form
τ 7→ HT (γ[τ ← t]).
A 2-Henkin model H is a a tuple
(T ,→, Itype , (Domτ )τ∈T , (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T , (Appτ )τ∈T , I),
together with a pair
((HT )T∈TTerm , (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a) →: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(c) Appτ,σ : Domτ→σ ×Domτ → Domσ for each τ, σ ∈ T ,
(d) AppHΠt.T (γ) : DomHΠt.T (γ) × T →
⋃Dom for each γ, t, T ,
(e) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(f) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × (
⋃Dom)DVar : for all x : T ′ ∈ Γ, δ(x) ∈
DomHT ′ (γ)} →
⋃Dom for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj with `SF Γ . X : T ,
such that the following hold:
(1) Domτ ∩ Domσ = ∅ whenever τ 6= σ;
(2) Each of Appτ,σ and AppHΠt.T (γ) is extensional, and
AppHΠt.T (γ)(d, τ) ∈ DomHT (γ[t←τ ]) for each t, T, γ and (d, τ) ∈ DomHΠt.T (γ)×T ;
(3) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar ;
(4) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(5) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(6) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x)
(7) HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) =
AppHT ′ (γ),HT (γ)(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ), HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(8) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) = AppHΠt.T ′ (γ)(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ));
(9) HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ) ∈ DomHT (γ)→HT ′ (γ) and, for each d ∈ DomHT (γ),
AppHT (γ),HT ′ (γ)(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), d) = HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(10) HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ) ∈ DomHΠt.T (γ) and, for each τ ∈ T ,
AppHΠt.T (γ)(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ), τ) = HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
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Lemma 18. 1-Henkin and 2-Henkin models are equivalent, in that there exist
two satisfaction- preserving and reflecting mappings &12 and &
2
1 between the two
classes of models.
Next we flatten the multi-typed domain Dom of 2-Henkin models. The flattening
is based on the following:
– The multi-typing of Dom can be viewed as a relation typeOf between data
and types;
– Due to the type-wise disjointness of the domain and the injectivity of →,
the families of mappings (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T and (Appτ )τ∈T can be replaced by
two mappings App :
⋃Dom×⋃Dom→ ⋃Dom and TApp : ⋃Dom×T →⋃Dom, with postulating the necessary typing restrictions; since App and
TApp will be total functions, we allow them to be applied outside the areas
designated (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T and (Appτ )τ∈T too, but this does not affect the
satisfaction relation.
A 3-Henkin model H is a a tuple (T ,D,→,App,TApp, Itype , I,
typeOf ) together with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm , (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a) →: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) App : D ×D → D,
(c) TApp : D × T → D,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) typeOf ⊆ D × T ,
(f) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(g) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × DDVar : for all x : T ′ ∈ Γ, typeOf (δ(x),
HT ′(γ))} → D for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj with `SF Γ . X : T ,
such that the following hold:
(1) {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, τ)} ∩ {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)} = ∅ whenever τ 6= σ;
(2) For each τ, σ, d, d′, if typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ) then typeOf (App(d, d′), σ);
(3) For each t, T, γ, τ, d, if typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ)) then
typeOf (TApp(d, τ), HT (γ[t← τ ]));
(4) For each τ, σ, App is (τ, σ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′ with typeOf (d, τ →
σ) and typeOf (d′, τ → σ), ifApp(d, d′′) = App(d′, d′′) for all d′′ with typeOf (d′′, τ)
then d = d′;
(5) For each T, t, γ, TApp isHΠt.T (γ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′ with typeOf (d, τ)
and typeOf (d′, τ), if TApp(d, σ) = TApp(d′, σ) for all σ, then d = d′;
(6) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar ;
(7) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(8) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(9) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x)
(10) HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) = App(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ), HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(11) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) = TApp(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ));
(12) typeOf (HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ)) and, for each d with typeOf (d, HT (γ)),
App(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), d) = HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(13) typeOf (HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ),HΠt.T (γ)) and, for each τ ∈ T , App(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ), τ) =
HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
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Lemma 19. 2-Henkin and 3-Henkin models are equivalent, in that there exist
two satisfaction- preserving and reflecting mappings &23 and &
3
2 between the two
classes of models.
We are now ready to eliminate typing judgements from the semantics. The fol-
lowing lemma shows that typing judgements are semantically redundant:
Lemma 20. Let H be a 3-Henkin model, γ : TVar → T and δ : DVar → D.
Then there for any two pairs (Γ, T ) and (Γ ′, T ′) such that ` Γ . X : T and
` Γ ′ . X : T ′ such that HΓ . X:T and HΓ ′ . X:T ′ are defined on (γ, δ), it holds
that HΓ . X:T (γ, δ) = HΓ ′ . X:T ′(γ, δ).
Based on this lemma and on the fact that satisfaction is not affected by allowing
interpretations of data terms that cannot type, we obtain some further equivalent
models:
A 4-Henkin model H is a a tuple (T ,D,→,App,TApp, Itype , I, typeOf ) together
with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm , (HX)X∈DTerm), where:
(a) →: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) App : D ×D → D,
(c) TApp : D × T → D,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) typeOf ⊆ D × T ,
(f) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(g) HX : T TVar ×DDVar → D for each X ∈ DTerm,
such that the following hold:
(1) {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, τ)} ∩ {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)} = ∅ whenever τ 6= σ;
(2) For each τ, σ, d, d′, if typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ), then typeOf (App(d, d′), σ);
(3) For each t, T, γ, τ and d with typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ)), it holds that
typeOf (TApp(d, τ), HT (γ[t← τ ]));
(4) For each τ, σ, App is (τ, σ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′ with typeOf (d, τ →
σ) and typeOf (d′, τ → σ), ifApp(d, d′′) = App(d′, d′′) for all d′′ with typeOf (d′′, τ)
then d = d′;
(5) For each T, t, γ, TApp isHΠt.T (γ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′ with typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ))
and typeOf (d′, τ), if TApp(d, σ) = TApp(d′, σ) for all σ, then d = d′;
(6) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar ;
(7) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(8) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(9) Hx(γ, δ) = δ(x)
(10) HXY (γ, δ) = App(HX(γ, δ), HY (γ, δ));
(11) HXT (γ, δ) = TApp(HΠt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ, δ));
(12) If typeOf (Hλx:T.X(γ, δ), HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ)) and
typeOf (d, HT (γ)), then App(Hλx:T.X(γ, δ), d) = HX(γ, δ[x← d]);
(13) if typeOf (Hλt.X(γ, δ),HΠt.T (γ)) then App(Hλt.X(γ, δ), τ) = HX(γ[t ←
τ ], δ).
In the definition of 4-Henkin models, HT has T TVar as its domain. If we were
49
to regard such models as two-sorted TGL models, we would need its domain to
be T TVar × DDVar, just like the one of HX . And indeed HT can be seen as a
function on the latter domain, constant in the second variable; this view of HT
is consistent with the properties of TGL models, since HT should depend solely
on the free variables of T , and there are no data variables occurring in a type
term. Thus 4-Henkin models are immediately equivalent to the following:
A 5-Henkin model H is a a tuple (T ,D,→,App,TApp, Itype , I, typeOf ) together
with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm , (HX)X∈DTerm), where:
(a) →: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) App : D ×D → D,
(c) TApp : D × T → D,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) typeOf ⊆ D × T ,
(f) HT : T TVar ×DDVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(g) HX : T TVar ×DDVar → D for each X ∈ DTerm,
such that the following hold:
(1) {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, τ)} ∩ {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)} = ∅ whenever τ 6= σ;
(2) For each τ, σ, d, d′, if typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ), then typeOf (App(d, d′), σ);
(3) For each t, T, γ, τ, δ and d with typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ, δ)), it holds that
typeOf (TApp(d, τ), HT (γ[t← τ ], δ));
(4) For each τ, σ, App is (τ, σ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′ with typeOf (d, τ →
σ) and typeOf (d′, τ → σ), ifApp(d, d′′) = App(d′, d′′) for all d′′ with typeOf (d′′, τ)
then d = d′;
(5) For each T, t, γ, δ, TApp is HΠt.T (γ, δ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′ with
typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ, δ)) and typeOf (d′, τ), if TApp(d, σ) = TApp(d′, σ) for all σ,
then d = d′;
(6) Ht(γ, δ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar ;
(7) Htc(γ, δ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(8) HT→T ′(γ, δ) = HT (γ, δ)→ HT ′(γ, δ);
(9) Hx(γ, δ) = δ(x)
(10) HXY (γ, δ) = App(HX(γ, δ), HY (γ, δ));
(11) HXT (γ, δ) = TApp(HΠt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ, δ));
(12) If typeOf (Hλx:T.X(γ, δ), HT (γ, δ)→ HT ′(γ, δ)) and
typeOf (d, HT (γ, δ)), then App(Hλx:T.X(γ, δ), d) = HX(γ, δ[x← d]);
(13) if typeOf (Hλt.X(γ, δ),HΠt.T (γ, δ)) then App(Hλt.X(γ, δ), τ) = HX(γ[t ←
τ ], δ).
It should be clear that 5-Henkin models are essentially two-sorted TGL models
satisfying SF , modulo a discussion similar to the one we had on untyped λ-
calculus. Note also that now we can eliminate the disjointness assumption (1),
as well as the injectivity assumption about →, since these would not affect the
satisfaction of TGL Horn clauses with conclusion referring to data, the only ones
that we are interested in. We have thus obtained that Henkin models of System
F are equivalent to the TGL models of SF .
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Henkin Models versus TGL Models, Compactly. Above we showed the relation-
ship between the Henkin and TGL semantics for System F by describing a multi-
step process that slowly made us view a model of the former as a model of the
later. While such a presentation has the advantage that it provides a convincing
argument for the equivalence of the two semantics (since each of its steps was
relatively simple), it might nevertheless lose sight of the resulting correspondence
between models. Next we provide the direct version of the correspondence, to-
gether with the lemmas asserting its correctness and together with a theorem
stating rigorously that the two semantics are equivalent (we state these results
without any proofs, as they just describe compactly the situation presented and
justified above).
Henkin to TGL: For each Henkin model H, we define a TGL model M = H#
as follows:
(a) Mtype = T ;
(b) Mdata =
⋃Dom;
(c) for each T ∈ TTerm, MT : Map(Var ,M) → Mtype is the mapping given
by MT (γ, δ) = HT (γ) (recall that Map(Var ,M) denotes the set of two-sorted
functions from Var = (TVar ,DVar) to M = (Mtype ,Mdata));
(d) for each X ∈ DExp, MX : Map(Var ,M) → Mdata is the mapping given by:
MX(γ, δ) = HΓ .X:T (γ, δ) if there exists Γ and T such that `SF Γ . X : T and
HΓ .X:T is defined on (γ, δ); otherwise we take an arbitrary value in
⋃Dom;
(e) (d, τ) ∈ BtypeOf iff d ∈ Domτ .
Roughly, H# is obtained from H by throwing types on the sort type and all data
of any type on sort data; the relation typeOf keeps the connection between well-
typed terms and types as in H. H# may also contain some additional “junk”,
of typeless (error) data.
Lemma 21. The mappings MX above are well-defined for all X ∈ DExp. More
specifically, for each γ, δ, HΓ .X:T (γ, δ) does not depend on the choice of Γ and
T , so long as `SF Γ . X : T and HΓ .X:T is defined on (γ, δ). Moreover, M is
indeed a TGL model and M |=TL SF .
TGL to Henkin: For each TGL model M satisfying SF , we define a Henkin
model H =M$ as follows:
(a) T =Mtype;
(b) F = {τ 7→MT (γ[t← τ ], δ) : γ, δ, T arbitrary};
(c) τ → σ =Mt→t′(γ, δ), where γ(t) = τ , γ(t′) = σ;
(d) ∀(f) =M(∀t)T (γ, δ), if f is τ 7→MT (γ[t← τ ], δ);
(e) Itype(tc) =Mtc(γ, δ) for some arbitrary (γ, δ);
(f) Domτ = {d ∈Mdata : (d, τ) ∈MtypeOf};
(g) Appτ,σ(d)(d′) =Mx y(γ, δ), where δ(x) = d, δ(y) = d′;
(h) Appf (d)(τ) =Mx t(γ, δ) where γ(t) = τ and δ(x) = d;
(i) I(dc) =Mdc(γ, δ) for some arbitrary (γ, δ);
(j) HT (γ) =MT (γ, δ) for some arbitrary δ;
(k) HΓ .X:T (γ, δ) = MX(γ, δ). Roughly, M$ classifies the well-typed data, on
types, according to the typeOf relation in M .
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Lemma 22. All the above mappings are well-defined, i.e.:
-Mt→t′(γ, δ) does not depend on the choice of γ, δ, so long as γ(t) = τ , γ(t′) = σ;
- if for some T, T ′, t, t′, γ, γ′, δ, δ′, the mappings τ 7→ MT (γ[t ← τ ], δ) and τ 7→
MT ′(γ[t← σ], δ) coincide, then M(∀t)T (γ, δ) =M(∀t′)T ′(γ′, δ′);
- Mtc(γ, δ) and Mtc(γ, δ) do not depend on the choice of γ, δ;
- Mx y(γ, δ) does not depend on the choice of γ, δ, so long as δ(x) = d, δ(y) = d′;
and if (d, τ → σ), (d′, τ) ∈MtypeOf, then (Mx y(γ, δ), σ) ∈MtypeOf;
- MT (γ, δ) does not depend on the choice of δ.
Moreover, H defined above is indeed a Henkin model.
Note that the mappings $ and # are actually the compositions of all the in-
termediate mappings between the different versions of Henkin models discussed
above.
Proposition 6. Assume `SF Γ . X :T and `SF Γ . Y :T . Then:
(1) H |=SF Γ . X = Y : T iff H# |=TL Γ# ⇒ X = Y ;
(2) M |=TL Γ# ⇒ X = Y iff M$ |=SF Γ . X = Y : T .
Summing up the situation described by Propositions 5 and 6:
1. The well-typed System-F terms are precisely the ones that denote typed
data (i.e., data items d such that there exists a type τ with typeOf (d, τ)) in
all models of SF ;
2. Henkin models correspond to models of SF , and vice versa;
3. A well-typed System-F equation is represented by a conditional equation in
TGL;
4. A well-typed equation is satisfied by a Henkin model iff it is satisfied by its
corresponding model of SF , and vice versa.
Via the completeness theorem from [7], we obtain the following:
Corollary 2. The SF (over TGL with equality) is adequate for both the typing
system and the equational theory of System F.
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F Proofs
Here we give proofs or proof sketches for the results stated in the paper (including
in the appendix).
F.1 Proofs of basic lemmas in TGL
Most of the results of this subsection are very expected. The reason why we
bother to state and prove rigorously these facts is for showing the skeptical
reader that our abstract axioms about generic terms and models are sufficient
for obtaining such expected FOL-like properties.
Lemma 2. Condition (b.ii) in Definition 2 (the definition of the notion of a
TGL model) is redundant.
Proof. Let T, ρ, ρ′ be such that ρ FV (T )= ρ′ FV (T ). We need to show that
AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′).
Enumerate Var as v0, v1, v2, . . . such that vi 6= vj if i 6= j and FV (T ) =
{v0, . . . , vn} (where n = card(FV (T )) − 1). We define Ω,Ω′ : Var → Var and
ρ0 : Var → A as follows: Fix i ∈ IN .
- If i ∈ 0, n, then θ(vi) = θ′(vi) = vi and ρ0(vi) = ρ(vi) (hence, also ρ0(vi) =
ρ′(vi)).
- If i 6∈ 0, n, then θ(vi) = v2∗i, θ′(vi) = v2∗i+1, and ρ0(vi) =
{
ρ(vi/2), if i is even;
ρ′(v(i−1)/2), if i is odd.
Let θ, θ′ : Var → Term be defined by θ = (Var ↪→ Term) ◦ Ω and θ′ =
(Var ↪→ Term) ◦Ω′.
For all x ∈ FV (T ), we have that x = vi for some i ∈ 0, n, hence Ω(x) =
Ω′(x), hence θ(x) = θ′(x). We thus proved
(I) θFV (T )= θ′FV (T ).
Fix x ∈ Var . We have two cases:
- x = vi for some i ∈ 0, n. Then, since
ρ0(Ω(vi)) = ρ0(vi) = ρ(vi) and ρ0(Ω′(vi)) = ρ0(vi) = ρ′(vi),
we obtain ρ0(Ω(x)) = ρ(x) and ρ0(Ω′(x)) = ρ′(x).
- x = vi for some i ∈ IN \ 0, n. Then, since
ρ0(Ω(vi)) = ρ0(v2∗i) = ρ(vi) and ρ0(Ω′(vi)) = ρ0(v2∗i+1) = ρ′(vi),
we obtain again ρ0(Ω(x)) = ρ(x) and ρ0(Ω′(x)) = ρ′(x).
We have thus proved
(II) ρ0 ◦Ω = ρ and ρ0 ◦Ω′ = ρ′.
Using condition (b.i) from Definition 2, we have, for all x ∈ Var ,
ρ0(Ω(x)) = AΩ(x)(ρ0) = Aθ(x)(ρ0), hence, we obtain
(III) ρ0 ◦Ω = Aθ(ρ0)
(remember that, by definition, Aθ(ρ0) is the map x 7→ Aθ(x)(ρ0)).
Similarly, we obtain
(III)’ ρ0 ◦Ω′ = Aθ′(ρ0).
We now have the following chain of equalities:
AT (ρ) = (by (II)) = AT (ρ0 ◦Ω) = (by (III)) = AT (Aθ(ρ0)) =
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(by Def. 2.(b.iii)) = ASubst(T, θ)(ρ0) = (by (I) and Def. 1.(3)) = ASubst(T, θ′)(ρ0) =
AT (Aθ′(ρ0)) = (by (III)’) = AT (ρ0 ◦Ω′) = (by (II)) = AT (ρ′).
We thus proved AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′), as desired. uunionsq
Lemma 3. The following hold:
(1) x 6∈ FV(T ) implies T [T ′/x] = T ;
(2) y[T/x] = T if y = x and y[T/x] = y otherwise;
(3) FV(T [T ′/x]) = FV(T ) \ {x} ∪ FV(T ′);
(4) T [y/x][z/y] = T [z/x] if y 6∈ FV(T );
(5) T [y/x][x/y] = T if y 6∈ FV(T ).
Proof. We shall tacitly use properties (1)-(6) in Definition 1.
(1) Assume x 6∈ FV (T ). Since [T ′/x]FV (T )= 1VarFV (T ), we obtain T [T ′/x] =
Subst(T, 1Var ) = T .
(2) If y = x then y[T/x] = Subst(x, [T/x]) = [T/x](x) = T . If y 6= x then
[T/x]FV (y)= 1VarFV (y), thus y[T/x] = Subst(y, 1Var ) = y.
(3) FV (T [T ′/x]) = FV (Subst(T, [T ′/x])) =⋃{FV ([T ′/x](y)) : y ∈ FV (T )} =⋃{FV ([T ′/x](x)) : x ∈ FV (T )} ∪ ⋃{FV ([T ′/x](y)) : y ∈ FV (T ), y 6= x} =
FV (T ′) ∪ (FV (T ) \ {x}).
Above, we also applied point (2) of the current proposition.
(4) We have that T [y/x][z/y] = Subst(Subst(T, [y/x]), [z/y]) = Subst(T, [y/x]; [z/y]).
Now, for each u ∈ Var , we have that:
([y/x]; [z/y])(u) = Subst([y/x](u), [z/y]) =
=
{
Subst(y, [z/y]) , if u = x
Subst(u, [z/y]) , if u 6= x =
=
 z, if u = xz, if u 6= x and u = y




z, if u = x or u = y
u, if u 6= x and u 6= y
Hence, since y 6∈ FV (T ), it follows that [y/x][z/y]FV (T )= [z/x]FV (T ), implying
Subst(T, [y/x]; [z/y]) = Subst(T, [z/x]).
(5) It follows by point (4), since Subst(T, [x/x]) = T . uunionsq
Lemma 4. The following hold:
(1) If ρFV(ϕ)= ρ′FV(ϕ), then ρ ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′ ∈ Aϕ;
(2) ρ ∈ ASubst(ϕ, θ) iff Aθ(ρ) ∈ Aϕ;
(3) ϕ ≡α ψ implies Aϕ = Aψ;
(4) ϕ ≡α ψ implies FV(ϕ) = FV(ψ);
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(5) ≡α is an equivalence;
(6) ϕ ≡α Subst(ϕ, 1Var);
(7) y 6∈ FV(ϕ) implies ϕ[y/x][z/y] ≡α ϕ[z/x];
(8) x 6∈ FV(ϕ) implies ϕ[T/x] ≡α ϕ;
(9) ϕ ≡α ψ implies Subst(ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(ψ, θ);
(10) θFV(ϕ)= θ′FV(ϕ) implies Subst(ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(ϕ, θ′);
(11) Subst(ϕ, θ; θ′) ≡α Subst(Subst(ϕ, θ), θ′);
(12) ϕ ≡α ϕ′ and ψ ≡α ψ′ implies: ϕ∧ψ ≡α ϕ′ ∧ψ′, ϕ⇒ ψ ≡α ϕ′ ⇒ ψ′,
∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ϕ′.
Proof. We shall tacitly use properties (1)-(6) in the definition of a term syntax
and properties (c).(i-iii) in the definition of models. All proofs, except the one of
point (12), will be performed by induction either on the structure of formulae, or
on the structure of ≡α; “(IH)” will stand for the “Induction Hypothesis”. Each
time, we shall skip the case of logical connectors ∧,⇒, since the induction step
is trivial for them.
We prove (1) and (2) by induction on the structure of ϕ.
(1) Base case. ρFV (T1,...,Tn)= ρ′FV (T1,...,Tn) implies
ρTi= ρ′Ti for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which implies
ATi(ρ) = ATi(ρ
′) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which implies that
ρ ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′ ∈ Aϕ.
Induction step. Assume ρFV (∀x.ϕ)= ρ′FV (∀x.ϕ). Then
ρFV (ϕ)\{x}= ρ′FV (ϕ)\{x}, hence for all a ∈ A, ρ[x← a]FV (ϕ)= ρ′[x← a]FV (ϕ).
By (IH), we get that for all a ∈ A, ρ[x← a] ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′[x← a] ∈ Aϕ, in partic-
ular that ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ iff ρ′ ∈ A∀x.ϕ.
(2) Base case. We have the following equivalencies:
ρ ∈ ASubst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn), θ) iff
ρ ∈ Api(Subst(T1, θ),...,Subst(Tn, θ)) iff
(ASubst(T1, θ)(ρ), . . . , ASubst(Tn, θ)(ρ)) ∈ Api iff
(AT1(Aθ(ρ)), . . . , ATn(Aθ(ρ))) ∈ Api iff
Aθ(ρ) ∈ Api(T1,...,Tn).
Induction step. We have the following equivalencies:
ρ ∈ Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) iff
ρ ∈ A∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) (where z is the least variable not in
FV (ϕ) ∪⋃{θ(y) : y ∈ FV (ϕ)})9 iff
ρ[z ← a] ∈ ASubst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) for all a ∈ A, iff (by (IH))
Aθ[x←z](ρ[z ← a]) ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff (as will be proved shortly)
Aθ(ρ)[x← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff
Aθ(ρ) ∈ A∀x.ϕ.
It remains to prove the promised equivalence. For it, it would suffice that
Aθ[x←z](ρ[z ← a])FV (ϕ)= Aθ(ρ)[x← a]FV (ϕ).
To prove the latter, let y ∈ FV (ϕ). Then
Aθ[x←z](ρ[x← a])(y) = Aθ[x←z](y)(ρ[x← a]) =
9 From now on, whenever we need to consider such a variable z, we just render it as




Aθ(y)(ρ[z ← a]), if x 6= y
Az(ρ[z ← a]), if x = y =
=
{
Aθ(y)(ρ[z ← a]), if x 6= y
a, if x = y.
On the other hand,
Aθ(ρ)[x← a](y) =
{
Aθ(y)(ρ), if x 6= y
a, if x = y.
Finally, we need to argue that ρ[z ← a]FV (θ(y))= ρFV (θ(y)) - this is true be-
cause, by the choice of z, z 6∈ FV (θ(y)).
Points (3)-(11) will be proved by induction on the structure of ≡α.
(3): Base case. Obvious, since here ≡α coincides with equality.
Induction step. Assume ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀y.ψ. Then ϕ[z/x] ≡α ψ[z/y] for some
z 6∈ FV (ϕ) ∪ FV (ψ). We have the following equivalencies:
ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ iff
ρ[x← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff (as will be proved shortly)
A[z/x](ρ[z ← a]) ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff (by point (2))
ρ[z ← a] ∈ Aϕ[z/x] for all a ∈ A, iff (by (IH))
ρ[z ← a] ∈ Aψ[z/x] for all a ∈ A, iff
ρ ∈ A∀x.ψ.
It remains to prove the promised equivalence. According to point (1), it
would suffice that ρ[x← a]FV (ϕ)= A[z/x](ρ[z ← a])FV (ϕ). To prove the latter,
let y ∈ FV (ϕ). Then
ρ[x← a](y) ={
a, if y = x
ρ(y), if y 6= x.
On the other hand,
A[z/x](ρ[z ← a])(y) = A[z/x](y)(ρ[z ← a]) =
=
{
Az(ρ[z ← a]), if y = x
Ay(ρ[z ← a]), if y 6= x =
=
{
a, if y = x
ρ[z ← a](y), if y 6= x.
And since z 6∈ FV (ϕ), ρ(y) = ρ[z ← a](y).
(4): Base case. Obvious, since here ≡α coincides with equality.
Induction step. Assume ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀y.ψ, i.e., that ϕ[z/x] ≡α ψ[z/y] for some
z 6∈ FV (ϕ)∪FV (ψ). By (IH), FV (ϕ[z/x]) = FV (ψ[y/z]), hence, by Proposition
3.(3), FV (ϕ) \ {x} ∪ {z} = FV (ψ) \ {x} ∪ {z}; because z 6∈ FV (ϕ) ∪ FV (ψ),
this implies FV (ϕ) \ {x} = FV (ψ) \ {x}, i.e., FV (∀x.ϕ) = FV (∀x.ψ).
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Points (5)-(11) shall be proved together. In the case of (5), we prove by
induction two properties - reflexivity and transitivity - since symmetry holds by
definition.
Base case.
(5) Reflexivity and transitivity follow from the corresponding properties of equal-
ity.
(6) Subst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn), 1Var ) = pi(Subst(T1, 1Var ), . . . ,
Subst(Tn, 1Var )) = pi(T1, . . . , Tn), and thus
Subst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn, 1Var ) ≡α pi(T1, . . . , Tn).
(7) and (8): Follow similarly to (6), but also using Proposition 3, points (4) and
(1), respectively.
(9) Obvious, since here ≡α is the equality.
(10) and (11): Follow similarly to (6), using properties (3) and (9) in the defini-
tion of a term syntax.
Induction step:
(5) For reflexivity, note that ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ϕ holds because, by (IH) for point (5),
ϕ[z/x] ≡α ϕ[z/x]. In order to prove transitivity, assume that ∀x1.ϕ1 ≡α ∀x2.ϕ2
and ∀x2.ϕ2 ≡α ∀x3.ϕ3. Then for some z 6∈ FV (ϕ1)∪FV (ϕ2) and z′ 6∈ FV (ϕ2)∪
FV (ϕ3), it holds that ϕ1[z/x1] ≡α ϕ2[z/x2] and ϕ2[z′/x2] ≡α ϕ3[z′/x3]. Let
z′′ 6∈ FV (ϕ1) ∪ FV (ϕ2) ∪ FV (ϕ3). Then, by (IH) for points (7) and (9), we
have the following chain of α-equivalencies: ϕ1[z′′/x1] ≡α ϕ1[z/x1][z′′/z] ≡α
ϕ2[z/x2][z′′/z] ≡α ϕ2[z′′/x1] ≡α . . . ≡α ϕ3[z′′/x3]. From this, by (IH) for
point (5), we get ϕ1[z′′/x1] ≡α ϕ3[z′′/x3]; thus we found the desired z′′ 6∈
FV (ϕ1) ∪ FV (ϕ3), yielding ∀x1.ϕ1 ≡α ∀x3.ϕ3.
(6) We need to prove that Subst(∀x.ϕ, 1Var ) ≡α ∀x.ϕ, i.e., that ∀z.ϕ[z/x]
≡α ∀x.ϕ with z as in the definition of substitution. Let z′ 6∈ FV (ϕ)∪FV (ϕ[z/x]),
or equivalently, z′ 6∈ FV (ϕ) ∪ {z}. Then, by (IH) for point (7), ϕ[z/x][z′/z] ≡α
ϕ[z′/x] and we are done.
(7) We need to prove that if y 6∈ FV (ϕ), then (∀u.ϕ)[y/x][z/y] ≡α (∀u.ϕ)[z/x],
i.e., ∀u′′.ϕ[u′/u][y/x][u′′/u][z/y] ≡α
∀u′′′.ϕ[u′′′/u][z/x], where u′, u′′, u′′′ are as in the definition of substitution for
each of the three cases. Let v 6∈ FV (ϕ) ∪ {u′, u′′, u′′′}. It would suffice that
ϕ[u′/u][y/x][u′′/u′][z/y][v/u′′]
≡α ϕ[u′′′/u][z/x]v/u′′′]; the latter is true by (IH) for point (11), since
[u′/u]; [y/x]; [u′′/u′]; [z/y]; [v/u′′] = [u′′′/u]; [z/x]; [v/u′′′].
(8) We need to show that if T 6∈ FV (∀u.ϕ), then (∀u.ϕ)[T/x] ≡α ∀u.ϕ, i.e., that
∀z.Subst(ϕ, [T/x][u← z]) ≡α ∀u.ϕ, where z is as in the definition of substitution.
Let z′ 6∈ FV (ϕ)∪{z}∪FV (T ). It would suffice that Subst(ϕ, [T/x][u← z])[z′/z] ≡α
ϕ[z′/u], i.e., by (IH) for point (11), that Subst(ϕ, [T/x][u← z]; [z′/z]) ≡α Subst(ϕ, [z′/u]).
The latter follows by (IH) for point (10), since [T/x][u← z′]FV (ϕ)= [z′/u]FV (ϕ).
(9) Assume ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀y.ψ, i.e., that ϕ[v/x] ≡α ψ[v/y] for some v 6∈ FV (ϕ) ∪
FV (ψ). In order to prove Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(∀y.ψ, θ), we take z, z′ as in the
definition of substitution and show that ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) ≡α ∀z′.Subst(ψ, θ[y ← z′]).
For proving the latter, using (IH) for point (11), we take z′′ 6∈ FV (ϕ) ∪ FV (ψ)
and show that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]; [z′′/z]) ≡α Subst(ψ, θ[y ← z′]; [z′′/z′]), i.e.,
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that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′′]) ≡α Subst(ψ, θ[y ← z′′]). Since [z′′/x]; θ[x ← z′′] =
θ[x ← z′′] and [z′′/y]; θ[y ← z′′] = θ[x ← z′′], we reduce the desired equiva-
lence to Subst(ϕ, [z′′/x]; θ[x← z′′]) ≡α
Subst(ψ, [z′′/y]; θ[y ← z′′]), and furthermore, by (IH) for point (11), to
Subst(ϕ[z′′/x], θ[x← z′′]) ≡α Subst(ψ[z′′/y], θ[y ← z′′]). Now, by (IH) for point
(7), we have that ϕ[z′′/x] ≡α ϕ[v/x][z′′/v] ≡α ψ[v/y][z′′/v] ≡α ψ[z′′/y]; more-
over, by (IH) for point (10), from
θ[x← z′′]FV (ϕ[z′′/x])= θFV (ϕ[z′′/x]), we get
Subst(ϕ[z′′/x], θ[x← z′′]) ≡α Subst(ϕ[z′′/x], θ) and similarly
Subst(ψ[z′′/y], θ[y ← z′′]) ≡α Subst(ψ[z′′/y], θ). Now by (IH) for point (5), we
reduce what we need to prove to Subst(ϕ[v/z], θ) = Subst(ϕ[v/y], θ), which holds
by (IH) for point (9).
(10) Assume θFV (∀x.ϕ)= θ′FV (∀x.ϕ). In order to prove that Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) ≡α
Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ′), note first that the variable z in the definition of substitution
is the same in the two cases, and we need to show ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) ≡α
∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ′[x← z]), i.e., by (IH) for point (11), that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]; [z′/z]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, θ′[x← z]; [z′/z]), i.e., that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]) ≡α Subst(ϕ, θ′[x← z′]).
The latter is true by (IH) for point (10), since θ[x← z′]FV (ϕ)= θ′[x← z′]FV (ϕ).
(11) In order to prove that Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ; θ′) ≡α
Subst(Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ), θ′), let z, z′, z′′ as in the definition of substitution (for each
of the three involved substitutions). We need to show that
∀z.Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z]) ≡α ∀z′′.Subst(Subst(ϕ[x← z′], θ), θ′[z′ ← z′′]), i.e., that
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z])[z′′′/z]] ≡α Subst(Subst(ϕ[x← z′], θ), θ′[z′ ← z′′])[z′′′/z′′],
where z′′′ 6∈ FV (ϕ)∪ {z, z′, z′′}. Indeed, using (IH) for point (11) and the fresh-
ness of z, z′, z′′, z′′′), we have the following chain of α-equivalencies and equalities:
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z])[z′′′/z] ≡α
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z]; [z′′′/z]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z′′′]) =
Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]; θ′[z′ ← z′′′]) =
Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]; θ′[z′ ← z′′]; [z′′′/z′′]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]; θ′[z′ ← z′′])[z′′′/z′′],
which by (IH) for point (5) yield the desired result.
(12): The cases of logical connectors are obvious. Assume now ϕ ≡α ϕ′. Then,
by point (9), ϕ[z/x] ≡α ϕ′[z/x] for any x and z, in particular ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ψ. uunionsq
F.2 The proof of TGL being an institutional extension of FOL
Theorem 1. I(TGL) is an institution that extends conservatively the institution
of FOL.
Proof. This proof uses concepts and notations introduced in Section A.4.
First part: We show that I(TGL) is an institution.
(I) We first show that Sign is a category. Given ((Term,FV, · ),Π), it is immedi-
ate that (1Term, (1pin)n∈IN ) acts as an identity morphism on ((Term,FV, · ),Π).
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To show that composition of two morphisms yields a morphism, consider two
signature morphisms
((Term,FV, · ),Π) (u,v)→ ((Term′, FV ′, · ′),Π ′) (u
′,v′)→ ((Term′′, FV ′′,−′′ ),Π ′′).
Since u ◦ u′ clearly satisfies (SM1) and (SM2), all we need to check is (SM3) for
it, namely (u′ ◦ u) ◦ θ = (u′ ◦ u) ◦ θ′′ ◦ (u′ ◦ u). We apply (MM2) for u, and then
for u′:
(u′ ◦ u) ◦ θ = u′ ◦ (u ◦ θ) = u′ ◦ (u ◦ θ′ ◦ u) = (u′ ◦ u ◦ θ′) ◦ u =
(u′ ◦ (u ◦ θ)′′ ◦ u′) ◦ u = (u′ ◦ u) ◦ θ′′ ◦ (u′ ◦ u).
(II) We note that Sen is a functor:
- Clearly Sen maps identity morphisms to identity functions.
- The fact that Sen commutes with composition means:
Sen(u′, v′)(Sen(u, v)(ϕ)) = Sen((u′, v′) ◦ (u, v))(ϕ)
for all composable morphisms (u, v) and (u′, v′) in Sign. One can actually show
the slightly more general fact
Fmla(u′, v′)(Fmla(u, v)(ϕ)) = Fmla((u′, v′) ◦ (u, v))(ϕ)
by an immediate induction on the structure of formulae, which we omit.
(III) We show that Mod is well-defined and that it is a functor.
(III.1) Let ((Term,FV , · ),Π) be a signature. We show thatMod((Term,FV , · ),Π)
is a category. It is immediate that identity functions act as identity morphisms.
Moreover, morphism composition, being function composition, is associative pro-
vided it is well-defined. To show it is well-defined, letA = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn),
B = (B, ·B , (B(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) and C = (C,−C , (C(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) be three
((Term,FV , · ),Π)-models and A g→ B h→ C two morphisms. That g ◦h satisfies
(MM2) is immediate; so we are left to check (MM1) for g ◦ h, which follows
applying (MM2) for g and then for h:
(h ◦ g) ◦ ρA = h ◦ (g ◦ ρA) = h ◦ g ◦ ρB = h ◦ (g ◦ ρ)C = (h ◦ g) ◦ ρC .
(III.2) Let ((Term ′,FV , · ′),Π ′) (u,v)→ ((Term,FV ,− ),Π) be a signature mor-
phism (note that we put the primed items at the left). We show that Mod(u, v)
is well-defined and that it is a functor.
(III.2.a) Let A = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) be a ((Term,FV , · ),Π)-model,
and let A′ = (A′, ·A′ , (A′(n,pi′))n∈IN,pi′∈Π′n) be Mod(u, v)(A); therefore A′ = A,
·A′ = ρ 7→ ρA ◦ u, and A′(n,pi′) = A(n,vn(pi′)) for all n ∈ IN and pi′ ∈ Π ′n. We
need to show that A′ is a ((Term ′,FV ′, · ′),Π ′)-model, i.e., verifies properties
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(M1)-(M3).
-(M1): Let ρ ∈ AV ar = A′V ar. We apply (SM1) and then (M1) for A:
ρA
′ ◦ (Var ↪→ Term ′) = (ρA ◦ u) ◦ (Var ↪→ Term ′) =
ρA ◦ (u ◦ (Var ↪→ Term ′)) = ρA ◦ (Var ↪→ Term) = ρ.
-(M2): Immediate, applying (SM2) and (M2) for A.
-(M3): Let ρ ∈ AV ar = A′V ar and θ′ ∈ Term ′V ar. Applying (SM3) and then
(M3) for A, we obtain:
ρA
′ ◦ θ′′ = (ρA ◦ u) ◦ θ′′ = ρA ◦ (u ◦ θ′′) =
ρA ◦ (u ◦ θ′ ◦ u) = (ρA ◦ u ◦ θ′) ◦ u =
ρA ◦ (u ◦ θ′)A ◦ u = ρA ◦ (u ◦ θ′)A
′
= (ρA ◦ u) ◦ θ′A
′
= ρA′ ◦ θ′A
′
.
(III.2.b) Let A = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) h→ B = (B, ·B , (B(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn)
be a morphism of ((Term,FV , · ),Π)-models, and letA′ = (A′, ·A′ , (A′(n,pi′))n∈IN,pi′∈Π′n)
be Mod(u, v)(A) and B′ = (B′, ·B′ , (B′(n,pi′))n∈IN,pi′∈Π′n) be Mod(u, v)(B); there-
fore A′ = A, ·A′ = ρ 7→ ρA ◦ u, A′(n,pi′) = A(n,vn(pi′)) for all n ∈ IN and pi′ ∈ Π ′n,
B′ = B, ·B′ = ρ 7→ ρB ◦ u, and B′(n,pi′) = B(n,vn(pi′)) for all n ∈ IN and pi′ ∈ Π ′n.
We need to show that h is also a morphism between A′ and B′. (MM2) is imme-
diate, so we only check (MM1) for h w.r.t. A′ and B′. Let ρ ∈ AVar = A′Var .
Using (MM2) for h w.r.t. A and B, we obtain:
h ◦ ρA′ = h ◦ (ρA ◦ u) = (h ◦ ρA) ◦ u = h ◦ ρB ◦ u = h ◦ ρB
′
.
(III.2.c) That Mod(u, v) is a functor, i.e., it maps identity morphisms to identity
morphisms and commutes with composition, is immediate.
(III.3) We show that Mod is a functor. Clearly it maps identity morphisms





(u′,v′)→ ((Term′,FV ′, · ′),Π ′) (u,v)→ ((Term,FV , · ),Π)
- Commutation on objects: since the desired property on the relational struc-
ture is obvious, we only check the property for the term structure: let A =
(A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) be a ((Term,FV, · ),Π)-model and ρ ∈ AV ar; then
what we need to check amounts to ρA ◦ (u ◦ u′) = (ρA ◦ u) ◦ u′, which is simply
associativity of function composition.
- Commutation on morphisms: immediate, since everything (namely Mod(u, v),
Mod(u′, v′) and Mod(u ◦ u′, v ◦ u′)) is an identity map on morphisms.
(IV)We show that the satisfaction condition holds. Let ((Term′,FV ′, · ′),Π ′) (u,v)→
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((Term,FV , · ),Π) be a signature morphism, ϕ′ a ((Term′,FV ′, · ′),Π ′)-sentence,
andA = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) a ((Term,FV , · ),Π)-model. Let ϕ = Sen(u, v)(ϕ′)
and let A′ = (A′, ·A′ , (A′(n,pi′))n∈IN,pi′∈Π′n) be Mod(u, v)(A); therefore A′ = A,
·A′ = ρ 7→ ρA ◦u, and A′(n,pi′) = A(n,vn(pi′)) for all n ∈ IN and pi′ ∈ Π ′n. We need
to prove:
A′ |= ϕ′ if and only if A |= ϕ .
Again we actually prove something a more general, involving formulae rather
than sentences – we assume that ϕ′ is a formula and ϕ = Fmla(u, v)(ϕ′) and
prove that A′ϕ′ = Aϕ by structural induction on ϕ
′.
- Base case: ϕ′ has the form pi′(T ′1, . . . , T
′
n), hence ϕ has the form (vn(pi
′))(u(T ′1), . . . , u(T
′
n)).
We have the equivalences: ρ ∈ Aϕ iff (ρA(u(T ′1)), . . . , ρA(u(T ′n))) ∈ A(n,vn(pi′)) iff
((ρ)A
′
(T ′1), . . . , (ρ)
A′(T ′n)) ∈ A′pi′) iff ρ ∈ A′ϕ′ .
- Inductive step: We only check for the quantifier ∀. Assume ϕ′ has the form
∀x.ψ′, hence ϕ′ has the form ∀x.ψ, where ψ = Mod(u, v)(ψ′). We have the
equivalences: ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ iff [ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A] iff (by the induction
hypothesis) [ρ[x← a] ∈ A′ϕ′ for all a ∈ A′ = A] iff ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ.
From now on, we shall refer to the components of I(TGL) using the TGL su-
perscript: (SignTGL,SenTGL,ModTGL, |=TGL).
Second part: We show that I(TGL) is a strongly conservative extension
of the institution of FOL.
But first let us recall the institution of (unsorted, classic) FOL [15], I(FOL),
so that we have some notation at hand.
- Sign, the category of signatures, has:
— as objects, first-order languages (F,Π), where F = (Fn)n∈IN and Π =
(Πn)n∈IN are ranked sets of function symbols and relation symbols, respectively;
— as morphisms between (F,Π) and (F ′,Π ′), pairs (u, v) with u = (un : Fn →
Fn)n∈IN and v = (vn : Πn → Π ′n)n∈IN .
- The sentence functor Sen : Sign→ SET is defined:
— On objects, by: Let (F,Π) be a signature.
—– First one defines the set Term(F ), of F -terms (with variables in Var) in-
ductively, as follows:
——- x ∈ Var implies x ∈ Term(F );
——- n ∈ IN , f ∈ Fn, T1, . . . , Tn ∈ Term(F ) implies f(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Term(F ).
—– Then one defines Fmla(F,Π), the set of (F,Π)-first-order formulae (with
variables in Var) inductively as follows:
——- n ∈ IN , pi ∈ Πn, T1, . . . , Tn ∈ Term(F ) implies pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Fmla(F,Π);
——- ϕ,ψ ∈ Fmla(F,Π) implies ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ⇒ψ ∈ Fmla(F,Π);
——- x ∈ Var and ϕ ∈ Fmla(F,Π) implies ∀x. ϕ ∈ Fmla(F,Π);
The (free) variables of terms FV (T ) and the free variables of formulae FV (ϕ)
are defined as usual.
——- Finally, one defines Sen(F,Π) = {ϕ ∈ Fmla(F,Π). FV (ϕ) = ∅}.
— On morphisms, by: let (u, v) : (F,Π)→ (F ′,Π ′);
—– One first defines Term(u) : Term(F ) → Term(F ′) by structural recursion
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on terms:
——- Term(u)(x) = x;
——- Term(u)(f(T1, . . . , Tn)) = (un(f))(Term(u)(T1), . . . ,Term(u)(Tn)).
—– Next, one defines Fmla(u, v) : Fmla(F,Π) → Fmla(F,Π) by structural re-
cursion on formulae:
—– Fmla(u, v)(pi(T1, . . . , Tn)) = (vn(pi))(Term(u)(T1), . . . ,Term(u)(Tn));
—– Fmla(u, v)(ϕ ∧ ψ) = Fmla(u, v)(ϕ) ∧ Fmla(u, v)(ψ);
—– Fmla(u, v)(ϕ⇒ψ) = Fmla(u, v)(ϕ)⇒Fmla(u, v)(ψ);
—– Fmla(u, v)(∀x. ϕ) = ∀x.Fmla(u, v)(ϕ);
—– Finally, one notices that Fmla(u, v) preserves free variables, and there-
fore one may take its restriction to Sen(F,Π) → Sen(F,Π); we call the latter
Sen(u, v).
- The model functor Mod : Sign→ CAT is defined:
— On objects, by setting Mod(F,Π) as the following category:
—– the objects are the first-order structures (A, (A(n,f))n∈IN,f∈Fn , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn),
where each A(n,f) is a function An → A and each A(n,pi) is an n-ary relation on
A.
—– morphisms between (A, (A(n,f))n∈IN,f∈Fn , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) and
(B, (B(n,f))n∈IN,f∈Fn , (B(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) are maps h : A→ B such that:
——- h(A(n,f)(a1, . . . , an)) = B(n,f)(h(a1), . . . , h(an)) for all n ∈ IN , f ∈ Fn
and a1, . . . , an ∈ A;
——- (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A(n,pi) implies (h(a1), . . . , h(an)) ∈ B(n,pi) for all n ∈ IN ,
pi ∈ Πn and a1, . . . , an ∈ A;
morphism composition is function composition;
— on morphisms, by: let (u, v) : (F,Π)→ (F ′,Π ′); thenMod(u, v) : Mod(F ′,Π ′)→
Mod(F,Π) is the functor defined as follows:
—— on objects: Mod(u, v)(A′, (A′(n,f ′))n∈IN,f ′∈F ′n , (A
′
(n,pi′))n∈IN,pi′∈Π′n) =
(A, (A(n,f))n∈IN,f∈Fn , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn), where:
——– A = A′;
——– A(n,f) = A′(n,un(f)) for all n ∈ IN and f ∈ Fn.
——– A(n,pi) = A′(n,vn(pi)) for all n ∈ IN and pi ∈ Πn.
—— on morphisms: let h : A′ → B′; then Mod(u, v)(h) : Mod(u, v)(A′) →
Mod(u, v)(B′) is taken to be h.
- The satisfaction relations (one for each signature) are the usual first-order
satisfaction.
We shall use the superscript FOL for items belonging to I(FOL), thus I(FOL)
= (SignFOL,SenFOL,ModFOL, |=FOL).
We now define the embedding of I(FOL) into I(TGL) to be the triple (H,α, β),
where:
- H : SignFOL → SignTGL is the functor defined as follows:
— On objects, by H(F,Π) = (Term(F ),FV , · ), where · maps any function
g : Var → Term(F ) to its unique extension g : Term → Term that commutes
with the operation symbols, i.e., g(f(T1, . . . , Tn)) = f(g(T1), . . . , g(Tn)) for all
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n ∈ IN , f ∈ Fn and T1, . . . , Tn ∈ Term (in other words, g is the free extension
of g).
— On morphisms, by we put H(u, v) = (Term(u), v) for all FOL signature mor-
phisms (u, v) : (F,Π)→ (F ′,Π ′).
- α = (α(F,P ) : Sen
FOL(F, P )→ SenTGL(H(F, P )))(F,P )∈|SignFOL|, where α(F,P )
is the identity function. Notice that indeed we have SenFOL(F, P ) = SenTGL(H(F, P )),
since TGL defines its formulae over generic terms just like FOL does over its
concrete terms.
- β = (β(F,P ) : Mod
FOL(F, P ) → ModTGL(H(F, P )))(F,P )∈|SignFOL|, where
β(F,P ) is the functor defined as follows:
— On objects: Let A = (A, (A(n,f))n∈IN,f∈Fn , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) be an (F, P )-
model in FOL. We put β(F,P )(A) = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn), where ·A maps
a function ρ : Var → A to its free extension ρA : Term → A.
— On morphisms: β(F,P )(h) = h.
Next we check the desired properties that make (H,α, β) a conservative exten-
sion. We shall spend very little time with the properties that are easy to check
or are well-known facts about FOL and universal algebra, so to highlight the
properties that are not so.
(I) About H.
(I.1) H is well-defined:
- On objects: we need to check that (Term(F ),FV , · ) is a term syntax. Prop-
erties (TS1)-(TS3) and (TS5)-(TS6) hold trivially, and (TS4) is a well-known
algebraic property of free extensions.
- On morphisms, we only need to check that Term(u) satisfies (M1)-(M3). Again
(M1) and (M2) are trivial, and (M3) is a (actually the same as before) well-known
property of free extensions.
(I.2) H is injective on objects and morphisms: Immediate.
(I.3) H is functorial (i.e., maps identities to identities and commutes with com-
position): Clearly Term((1Fn)n∈IN ) = 1Term. Now, let (F,Π)
(u,v)→ (F ′,Π ′) (u
′,v′)→
(F ′′,Π ′′). All we need to check is Term(u′) ◦ Term(u) = Term(u′ ◦ u), which
follows by an immediate structural induction on terms.
(II) About α. Clearly all its components are bijections. That it is also a natural
transformation amounts to the following property: for all FOL signature mor-
phisms (u, v) : (F,Π) → (F ′,Π ′), SenFOL(u, v) = SenTGL(Term(u), v), which
holds by construction.
(III) About β.
(III.1) Let (F, P ) be an FOL signature. We show that β(F,P ) is an isomorphism
of categories by defining an inverse for it, γ(F,P ) : Mod
TGL(Term(F ), P ) →
ModFOL(F, P ), as follows:
- On objects: γ(F,P )(A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) = (A, (A(n,f))n∈IN,f∈Fn , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn)
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where, for all n ∈ IN , f ∈ Fn and a1, . . . , an ∈ A, we put A(n,f)(a1, . . . , an) =
ρA(f(x1, . . . , xn)) for x1, . . . , xn distinct variables ρ ∈ AV ar is such that ρ(xi) =
ai for all i ∈ 1, n. We have to show that the definition of A(n,f) : An → A does not
depend on the choice of x1, . . . , xn and ρ. For this, let x′1, . . . , x
′
n and ρ
′ be a differ-
ent choice for these items. We need that ρA(f(x1, . . . , xn)) = ρ′
A
(f(x′1, . . . , x
′
n)).
This follows by letting θ = [x′1/x1, . . . , x
′
n/xn] and applying (M3) and then (M2):
ρ′
A








(f(x1, . . . , xn)) = ρA(f(x1, . . . , xn)).
(Above, (M2) is indeed applicable for ρ′
A ◦ θ and ρ w.r.t. f(x1, . . . , xn), because
the restriction of these two valuations to {x1, . . . , xn} are equal.)
- On morphisms: γ(F,Π)(h) = h. We need to show that if
h : A = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) → B = (B, ·B , (B(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) is a mor-
phism of TGL models, then it is also a morphism between the FOL models
γ(F,Π)(A) = (A, (A(n,f))n∈IN,f∈Fn , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn) and
γ(F,Π)(B) = (B, (B(n,f))n∈IN,f∈Fn , (B(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn). Since the FOL model-
morphism condition on relations is the same as for TGL, all we need to check
is the one on functions, namely h(Af (a1, . . . , an)) = Bf (h(a1), . . . , h(an)). For
this, let x1, . . . , xn be distinct variables and let ρ map each xi to ai. Then the
desired fact is precisely (h ◦ ρA)(f(x1, . . . , xn)) = (h ◦ ρB)(f(x1, . . . , xn)), which
is guaranteed by (MM1).
It is obvious that γ(F,Π) is a functor. Now we show that it is inverse to β(F,Π).
We only need to check this on objects (since on morphisms both functors are
identity functions).
- For an FOL model A = (A, (A(n,f))n∈IN,f∈Fn , (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn), showing that
γ(F,Π)(β(F,Π)(A)) = A amounts to showing that ρA(f(x1, . . . , xn)) = A(n,f)(a1, . . . , an),
for x1, . . . , xn distinct, ρ mapping each xi to ai, and ρA the free extension of ρ
– this is immediate from the properties of this free extension.
- For a TGLmodelA = (A, ·A, (A(n,pi))n∈IN,pi∈Πn), showing that γ(F,Π)(β(F,Π)(A)) =
A amounts to showing that the interpretation in a model of all terms is uniquely
determined by the interpretation of terms of the form f(x1, . . . , xn) with x1, . . . , xn
distinct, which follows immediately by induction on the structure of terms.
(IV) About the satisfaction condition. For an FOL signature (F,Π), an (F,Π)-
sentence ϕ and an (F,Π)-modelA, the conditionsA |=FOL ϕ and β(F,Π)(A) |=TGL
α(F,Π)(ϕ) are really the same, so there is nothing to prove. uunionsq
F.3 Interlude - some proof-theoretic concepts
We fix a generic first-order language (Term,Π). In what follows, we discuss
notions related to proof systems and proof trees. One should visualize the trees
as resembling “natural tress”, i.e., having a root below and the leaves above
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(as opposed to the “computer science trees”, which are usually imagined upside
down).
For our purposes, a (proof) rule will be a pair (N,K), where:
- N is a string called the name (or label) of the rule;
- K is a set of pairs (H,C), with H list of sequents called hypotheses and C a
sequent called conclusion.
A Gentzen system U is a set of rules. Given U , the set of its proof trees P
together with the mapping P 7→ conc(P ) assigning to each tree its conclusion
sequent (i.e., the sequent at its root), is inductively defined by the following
clauses:
- If P1, . . . , Pn are proof trees, C is a sequent and (N,K) is a rule in the Gentzen
system such that ((conc(P1), . . . , conc(Pn)), C) ∈ K, then N [C][P1, . . . , Pn] is a
tree and conc(N [C][P1, . . . , Pn]) = C.
PtrU denotes the set of proof trees in U . We let “·” denote the empty tuple
(i.e., empty list) of proof trees. Note that the base case above is provided by
P1, . . . , Pn being an empty list. If conc(P ) = C, we also say that P proves C.






denotes P , also indicating that C is the conclusion of P ;
- P1 . . . PnC (N) denotes the proof tree N [C][P1, . . . , Pn].







which indicates a proof tree with conclusion C and two immediate subtrees – P1
with conclusion C1 and P2 with conclusion C2 – such that the last applied rule
was (N) used for deducing C from C1 and C2.
We define the following measure, called size, on proof trees:




Note that size(N [C][·]) = 1
A rule (N,K) is sound if, for all (H,C) ∈ K, whenever all sequents in H are
tautological, C is tautological too. A sequent is provable in a Gentzen system if it
is the conclusion of a proof tree in that system. A Gentzen system is sound if all
its provable sequents are tautological, and complete if all tautological sequents
are provable. Note that soundness of a Gentzen system is equivalent to soundness
of each of its rules.
We shall also need the notion of a partial proof tree associated to a Gentzen
system U . Partial proof trees differ from (total) proof trees in two ways:
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- first, they are not required to be finite, but may be infinite;
- second, they are not required to have their leaves given by trees with empty
lists of predecessors.
Technically, the indexed set of partial proof trees for U with conclusion C
(for each sequent C) can be defined as the greatest fixed point of the following
monotonic operator F on families of sets (JC)C sequent (where + is the direct
sum (disjoint union) on sets):
(F (J ))C = {∗} + {N [C][P1, . . . , Pn]. K rule in U , ((C1, . . . , Cn), C) ∈ K,
P1 ∈ JC1 , . . . , Pn ∈ JCn}
Thus a partial proof tree with conclusion C is, coinductively:
- either empty (the {∗} case in the sum), meaning that the goal C is simply
abandoned;
- or further composed of partial proof trees Pi with conclusions Ci where the
Ci’s are obtained from C by the backwards application of a rule N , meaning
that the goal is expanded;
Note that some goals, even though unfinished and potentially expandable,
may not be expanded, while on the other hand we may have infinite traces of
goals such that each has generated its successor in the sequence: goal D0 yielding
(among other things) a goal D1, which yields a goal D2, and so on, indefinitely.
(Total) proof trees can be regarded as particular cases of finite partial proof
trees.
F.4 Proofs of completeness for TGL and TGL with equality
The proofs of this subsection employ the concepts from Appendix F.3.
Theorem 2. G is sound and complete for TGL.
Proof. Soundness: We need to check that the rules are sound. We only consider
the quantifier rules, since the soundness of the others follows standardly. (For
the quantifier rules the argument is also rather standard, but we need to show
that it can be given entirely in terms of our abstract axioms for substitution and
model valuation.) Let A be a model. For soundness of (∀Left), it suffices that
A∀x.ϕ ⊆ Aϕ[T/x], which is true because of the following: ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ is equivalent
to ρ[x← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, which implies ρ[x← AT (ρ)] ∈ Aϕ, which in turn
is equivalent, by Proposition 4.(2), to ρ ∈ Aϕ[T/x].
For (∀Right), we shall tacitly use Proposition 4.(1,2) several times. Assume⋂
χ∈Γ Aχ ⊆
⋃





ψ∈∆Aψ ∪ A∀x.ϕ. For this, let ρ ∈
⋂
χ∈Γ Aχ such that
ρ 6∈ ⋃ψ∈∆Aψ, and let us show that ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ, i.e., that ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ for all
a ∈ A. Let a ∈ A. Because ρ[y ← a]FV (χ)= ρFV (χ) for each χ ∈ Γ ∪∆ (since
y 6∈ FV (χ)), we have ρ[y ← a] ∈ ⋂χ∈Γ Aχ and ρ[y ← a] 6∈ ⋃ψ∈∆Aψ. Thus
ρ[y ← a] ∈ Aϕ[y/x], i.e., ρ[y ← a][x← Aρ[y←a](y)] ∈ Aϕ, i.e., ρ[y ← a][x← a] ∈
Aϕ. If y = x, we get ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ, as desired. On the other hand if y 6= x,
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then ρ[y ← a][x ← a] = ρ[x ← a][y ← a], hence ρ[x ← a][y ← a] ∈ Aϕ; and
since ρ[x← a][y ← a]FV (ϕ)= ρ[x← a]FV (ϕ), we get ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ, again as
desired.
Completeness: The proof mainly follows a classical line (see [12]). Its only
slightly specific part will be the one of constructing a model from a Hintikka
signed set (sets Hleft and Hright below).
Assume that Γ . ∆ is a tautological sequent. Call a sequent Γ . ∆:
- solved, if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ (so that a single use of the rule (Ax) would prove it);
- hopeless, if it is not solved and no rule can be applied backwards to it. Note
that a hopeless sequent Γ ′ . ∆′ is one such that Γ ′ ∩∆′ = ∅ and Γ ′,∆′ consist
of atomic formulae; such a sequent is falsifiable, as shown below: let ρ be the
identity valuation 1Var in a Herbrand model that defines its relations as to make
all formulae in Γ ′ true and all formulae in ∆′ false; this is possible precisely
because Γ ′ and ∆′ are disjoint sets of atomic formulae.
As in [12], we construct backwards from Γ . ∆ a possibly infinite partial
proof tree, roughly by keeping on expanding its goals (i.e., sequents) that are
neither solved nor hopeless via a fair application of rules to sequents. Special care
needs to be taken when considering the (∀Left) rule, since when the turn of this
rule comes according to the considered fair scheduler,10 a counter n associated
to the corresponding formula in Γ needs to be increased, and the rule needs
to be applied for each of the first n terms (w.r.t., say, the lexicographic order).
Moreover, dovetailing needs to be applied to the elements of Γ and ∆, provided
these sets are infinite: fix an order on the set, and first consider the first element,
then the first two elements etc. The (rather tedious) details are provided in [12]
- the important thing is that these details are all independent of the concrete
syntax of terms.
If the obtained partial proof tree is finite and all its leaves are solved, we
have an actual (total) proof tree, hence a proof of Γ . ∆, as desired. If the tree
is finite and there is a hopeless leaf, say falsifiable by some valuation ρ in a
model M , then by the way rules in G were defined (to hold in an “iff” form), it
follows that Γ . ∆ itself is falsifiable by ρ in M . It remains to consider the case
of an infinite tree. If we prove that Γ . ∆ is falsifiable, then we are done. Let
(Γi . ∆i)i∈IN be an arbitrarily chosen infinite path in the tree, with Γ0 = Γ and
∆0 = ∆; by the construction of the tree, none of these sequents is solved. If we
set Hleft =
⋃
i∈IN Γi and Hright =
⋃
i∈IN ∆i, we get the following properties by
the fair way in which rules were applied backwards in the construction of the
tree:
– ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Hleft implies ϕ ∈ Hleft and ψ ∈ Hleft ;
– ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Hright implies ϕ ∈ Hright or ψ ∈ Hright ;
– ϕ⇒ ψ ∈ Hleft implies ϕ ∈ Hright or ψ ∈ Hleft ;
10 It is essential for the proper behavior of this fair scheduler that the rule (Right∀) be
continuously enabled backwards for universally quantified formulae in succedents –
this is where the assumption of the succedents ∆ having finite support is essential;
the antecedents Γ also need to have finite support, since they “feed” the succedents
via backwards applications of the (Left⇒) rule.
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– ϕ⇒ ψ ∈ Hright implies ϕ ∈ Hleft and ψ ∈ Hright ;
– ∀x.ϕ ∈ Hleft implies for all T ∈ Term, ϕ[T/x] ∈ Hleft ;
– ∀x.ϕ ∈ Hright implies there exists y ∈ Var with ϕ[y/x] ∈ Hright (in particu-
lar, there exists T ∈ Term with ϕ[T/x] ∈ Hright).
Moreover, because the considered infinite path does not have solved se-
quents and because the families (Γi ∩ {ϕ. ϕ atomic formula})i∈IN and (∆i ∩
{ϕ. ϕ atomic formula})i∈IN are chains w.r.t. set inclusion, it holds that Hleft ∩
Hright ∩Atomic Formulae = ∅.
In order to falsify Γ . ∆, it suffices to falsify Hleft . Hright . We define a Her-
brand model A by letting (T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Api iff pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hleft , and take
the valuation ρ : Var → A to be again 1Var . We prove by structural induc-
tion on ϕ the following statement: [ϕ ∈ Hleft implies A |=ρ ϕ] and [ϕ ∈ Hright
implies A 6|=ρ ϕ]. If ϕ has the form pi(T1, . . . , Tn), then by the definition of A,
A |=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn) iff pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hleft . In particular, pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hleft
implies A |=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn). Moreover, since pi(T1, . . . , Tn) is atomic and because
of Hleft ∩Hright ∩Atomic Formulae = ∅, it cannot happen that pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈
Hright and A |=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn), thus pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hright implies A 6|=ρ
pi(T1, . . . , Tn). The case of the logical connectives is straightforward. Assume
now ϕ has the form ∀x.ψ. From ∀x.ψ ∈ Hleft we infer that ψ[T/x] ∈ H left for
each term T (i.e., for each element T of A), and furthermore, by the induc-
tion hypotheses, that A |=ρ ψ[T/x], i.e., ρ ∈ Aψ[T/x], i.e., by Proposition 4.(2),
ρ[x← Aρ(T )] ∈ Aψ, i.e., ρ[x← T ] ∈ Aϕ, for each T ∈ A; thus A |=ρ ∀x.ψ. That
∀x.ψ ∈ Hright implies A 6|=ρ ∀x.ψ can be proved similarly.
Thus Γ . ∆ is falsifiable and the proof is finished. uunionsq
Theorem 2= G= is sound and complete for TGL with equality.
Proof. Soundness: The soundness of all the rules except (Sbs) is completely
obvious.
Let A and ρ such that AT1(ρ) = AT2(ρ). Then, by point (c).(ii) in the defi-
nition of models, we obtain
AT [T1/x](ρ) = AT (ρ[x← AT1(ρ)]) = AT (ρ[x← AT2(ρ)]) = AT [T2/x](ρ).
This immediately implies the soundness of (Sbs).
Completeness: One can readily see that the effect of adding the equality
rules amounts to adding the equality axioms Eql (listed in Section A.2) in the
antecedent of sequents. Thus Γ . ∆ is provable in G= iff Eql ∪Γ . ∆ is provable
in G.
Now, given any model A in the language without equality (i.e., in the lan-
guage that contains “=”, but treats this symbol as just an ordinary binary
relation symbol) that satisfies Eql , one defines the relation ≡ by a ≡ b iff
A |=ρ x = y for some ρ with ρ(x) = a and ρ(y) = b. Due to satisfaction of
Eql by A, ≡ is an equivalence compatible with the relations Api and with the
substitution, the latter in the sense that whenever AT1(ρ) = AT2(ρ), it holds
that AT [T1/x](ρ) = AT [T2/x](ρ). Thus we can speak about a quotient model A/≡
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and define, for each ρ : Var → A, ρ′ : Var → A/≡ by ρ′(x) = ρ(x)/≡. Then a
simple induction on ϕ shows that A/≡ |=ρ′ ϕ iff A |=ρ ϕ. It follows that Γ . ∆
is tautological in the logic with equality iff Γ ′∪Γ . ∆ is tautological in the logic
without equality.
Completeness of G= now follows from completeness of G. uunionsq
F.5 Proofs concerning the Horn2 Gentzen systems
The proofs of this subsection employ the concepts from Appendix F.3.
Lemma 5. `G (E ∪ Γ ) . ∆ iff `G′E Γ . ∆ for all generalized Horn sequents
Γ . ∆.
Proof. First, we note that the TGL “general purpose” Gentzen system G pre-
serves its proof power if we restrict its rule (Ax) by requiring Γ and ∆ to have
a common atomic formula (rather than a common arbitrary one). Indeed, given
any leaf Γϕ . ∆ϕ of a proof tree in G such that ϕ is a compound formula, one
can expand this leaf by decomposing ϕ via the left and right rules for its top
connective or quantifier, obtaining a larger proof tree such that the (one or two)
leaves obtained by the expansion have the forms Γ ′ϕ′ . ∆′ϕ′ with ϕ′ a proper
subformula of ϕ. Iterating this process, we obtain a proof tree where all leaves
have the desired form. So let G′ denote this slightly modified equally powerful
Gentzen system.
Now, let P be a proof tree for (E∪Γ ) . ∆ in G′ where Γ and ∆ are finite sets
of atomic formulae. Because leaves consider only atomic formula matching, the
only way to make use in P of a formula in e ∈ E is to decompose it according to
the sequence of rules (Left∀), (Left⇒), (Right∀), (Right⇒), n times (Left∧) (in
this fixed order!), which is the same as expanding (E ∪ Γ ) . ∆ on a backwards
proof into the following n + 1 nodes: (E ∪ Γ ∪ {ai(z, T )}) . (∆ ∪ {bi(z, T )})
for i = 1, n and (E ∪ Γ ∪ {c(T )}) . ∆ (for some choices of the term tuple T
and the fresh variable tuple z). And since these 4-step processes of expanding
the proof tree while decomposing the formulae in E are orthogonal for distinct
formulae e, e′ ∈ E, we may assume, without losing provability, that they are
performed as atomic steps. Moreover, if we do not show the elements of E from
the antecedents, keeping them “on the background” instead, we obtain precisely
the proof rule (Inst’-e).
We have thus shown that (Inst’-e) is necessary and sufficient for employing
elements of E in proofs of (E ∪ Γ ) . ∆, or, in other words, in proofs of Γ . ∆
using E. It remains to notice that, since ∆ and Γ consist of atomic formulae, the
only way to use them in proofs is matching them according to the rule (Ax) in
G′. Therefore, (Axiom) and (Inst’-e) are (necessary and) sufficient for deducing
generalized Horn sequents which are consequences of E according to G′ (hence
according to G). uunionsq
Lemma 6. `G′E Γ . ∆ iff `G0E Γ . ∆ for all generalized Horn sequents Γ . ∆.
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Proof. It suffices to show that (Inst’-e) has the same deductive power as the
combination of (Inst-e) and (Cut). (Inst’-e) can be simulated by (Inst-e) and
(Cut) as follows:
Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆, bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
Γ . ∆, c(T )
(Inst-e) Γ, c(T ) . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Cut)
Conversely, by Lemma 5 and the completeness of G we obtain that G′E is complete
for deducing E-tautological generalized Horn sequents. And since the rules of G0E
are clearly sound, it follows that G′E is at least as strong deductively as G0E . uunionsq
Lemma 7. `GE Γ . ∆ iff `G1E Γ . ∆ for all generalized Horn sequents Γ . ∆
(i.e., (Simple-Cut) can be eliminated from G1E).
Proof. Let us denote, for any finite set of atomic formulae A:
- by gA, the function in PtrG1E → PtrG1E adjoining A to all the antecedents of
the sequents in its argument.
- by hA, the function in PtrG1E → PtrG1E adjoining A to all the succedents of the
sequents in its argument.
Clearly size(gA(P )) = size(hA(P )) = size(P ), and, moreover, conc(gA(P )) =
(Γ ∪A) . ∆ and conc(hA(P )) = Γ . (∆ ∪A) whenever conc(P ) = Γ . ∆.
Let Ptr1G1E be the set of proof trees in G
1
E which employ the rule (Simple-Cut)
only once, at the root. It suffices to show that for any element of Ptr1G1E there
exists a proof tree in GE with the same conclusion. We do this constructively by
defining a conclusion-preserving function f : Ptr1G1E → PtrGE .
The definition, together with the proof that f preserves conclusions, is done




Γ, d . ∆
Γ . ∆
(Simple-Cut)
We distinguish 2 cases:
- If P2 has no immediate subtrees, then necessarily (Γ ∪ {d}) ∩∆ 6= ∅. Here we
have two subcases:
— If Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅, then f(P ) := (Axiom)[Γ . ∆][.].
— If d ∈ ∆, then f(P ) := h∆(P1).
- Otherwise, P2 has necessarily a rule (Inst-e) at its root, i.e., ∆ = ∆′, c(T ) and
P2 has the form  P ′i...
Γ, d, ai(z, T ) . ∆′, bi(z, T )

i∈{1,...,n}
Γ, d . ∆′, c(T )
(Inst-e)
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For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Qi be
g{ai(z,T )}(P1)...
Γ, ai(z, T ) . d
P ′i...
Γ, ai(z, T ), d . ∆′, bi(z, T )
Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆′, bi(z, T )
(Simple-Cut)
Note that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, 1 + size(P ′i ) ≤ size(P2), hence size(P ′i ) <
size(P2), hence
size(Qi) = 1 + size(P1) + size(P ′i ) < 1 + size(P1) + size(P2) = size(P ) ,
and therefore we may legitimately call f recursively forQi, and assume conc(f(Qi)) =
conc(Qi). We now define f(P ) to be the following tree: f(Qi)...
Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆′, bi(z, T )

i∈{1,...,n}
Γ . ∆′, c(T )
(Inst-e)
(The idea above was pushing the application of (Cut) one level upwards in the
tree, by “rotating” it with (Inst)-e.) uunionsq
Lemma 8. Assume that (Drop) is admissible in GE and let Γ,∆1,∆2 be finite
sets of atomic formulae. If `GE Γ . (∆1 ∪∆2), then either `GE Γ . ∆1 or `GE
Γ . ∆2.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on the size of a minimal-size proof
tree P for Γ . ∆1 ∪∆2.
- If P does not have any immediate subtrees, then Γ ∩ (∆1 ∪∆2) 6= ∅,
hence Γ ∩∆1 6= ∅ or Γ ∩∆1 6= ∅,
hence `GE Γ . ∆1 or `GE Γ . ∆2,
as desired.
- Otherwise, P has a rule (Inst-e) at the root and we may assume, w.l.g., that
∆2 = ∆′2 ∪ {c(T )} and P has the form(
Pi







By the induction hypothesis, for each i, either `GE Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆1, or `GE
Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆′2, bi(x, T ). If the former is the case for at least one i, then since
(Drop) is admissible in GE , we obtain `GE Γ . ∆1. Otherwise `GE Γ, ai(z, T ) . ∆′2, bi(x, T )
for all i, hence, by the (Inst-e) rule, `GE Γ . ∆′2, c(T ), i.e., `GE Γ . ∆2. uunionsq
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Lemma 9. (Drop) admissible in GE implies (Cut) admissible in GE. (In other
words, (Drop) admissible in GE implies GE (deductively) equivalent to G0E.)
Proof. Let Ptr1G0E be the set of proof trees in G
0
E which employ the rule (Cut)
only once, at the root. Notice that it suffices to show that for any element of
Ptr1G0E there exists a proof tree in GE with the same conclusion. We do this by
defining a conclusion-preserving function f : Ptr1G0E → PtrGE .
Let P ∈ Ptr1G0E with conclusion Γ . ∆. Then P has the form
P1...
Γ . ∆, d
P2
Γ, d . ∆
Γ . ∆
(Cut)
Since P1 and P2 do not use (Cut), they are in fact proof trees in GE , hence
`GE Γ . ∆, d and `GE Γ, d . ∆. By Lemma 8, either `GE Γ . ∆ or `GE Γ . d.
The former case is precisely what we need to prove; in the latter case, from
`GE Γ . d and `GE Γ . ∆, d, by Lemma 7, we again obtain `GE Γ . ∆. uunionsq
Lemma 10. `GI (E ∪ Γ ) . d iff `K′′E Γ . d for all Horn sequents Γ ` d.
Proof. The proof is extremely similar (almost identical) to the one of Lemma 5
that states a similar fact about G′E w.r.t. classic deduction of generalized Horn
sentences.
First, we note that the ITGL “general purpose” Gentzen system GI preserves
its proof power if we restrict its rule (Ax) by requiring χ to be an atomic formula
(rather than an arbitrary one). Indeed, given any leaf Γχ . χ of a proof tree in
G such that χ is a compound formula, one can expand this leaf by decomposing
χ via the left and right rules for its top connective or quantifier, obtaining a
larger proof tree such that the (one or two) leaves obtained by the expansion
have the forms Γ ′χ′ . χ′ with χ′ a proper subformula of χ. Iterating this process,
we obtain a proof tree where all leaves have the desired form. So let GI ′ denote
this slightly modified equally powerful Gentzen system.
Now, let P be a proof tree for (E ∪ Γ ) . d in G′ where Γ ∪ {d} is a finite set
of atomic formulae. Because leaves consider only atomic formula matching, the
only way to make use in P of a formula e ∈ E is to decompose it according to the
sequence of rules (Left∀), (Left⇒), (Right∀), (Right⇒), n times (Left∧) (in this
fixed order), which is the same as expanding (E ∪ Γ ) . d on a backwards proof
into the following n + 1 nodes: (E ∪ Γ ∪ {ai(z, T )}) . bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n and
(E∪Γ ∪{c(T )}) . d (for some choices of the term tuple T and the fresh variable
tuple z). And since these 4-step processes of expanding the proof tree while
decomposing the formulae in E are orthogonal for distinct formulae e, e′ ∈ E,
we may assume, without losing provability, that they are performed as atomic
steps. Moreover, if we do not show the elements of E from the antecedents,
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keeping them “on the background” instead, we obtain precisely the proof rule
(Inst”-e).
We have thus shown that (Inst”-e) is necessary and sufficient for employing
elements of E in proofs of (E ∪ Γ ) . d, or, in other words, in proofs of Γ . d
using E. It remains to notice that, since Γ ∪{d} consists of atomic formulae, the
only way to use them in proofs is matching them according to the rule (Ax) of
GI ′. Therefore, (Axiom) and (Inst”-e) are necessary and sufficient for deducing
generalized Horn sequents which are consequences of E according to GI ′ (hence
according to GI). uunionsq
Lemma 11. Let Γ . d be a Horn sequent. Then:
(a) `K′′E Γ . d implies `K1E Γ . d.
(b) `K1E Γ . d implies `KE Γ . d.
Proof. (a): (Inst”-e) can be simulated by (Inst-e) and (Simple-Cut) as follows:
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
Γ . c(T )
(Inst-e) Γ, c(T ) . d
Γ . d
(Cut)
(b): (Inst-e) can be simulated by (Inst”-e) and (Axiom) as follows:
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
·
Γ, c(T ) . c(T )
(Axiom)
Γ . c(T )
(Inst”-e)
uunionsq
Lemma 12. `KE Γ . d iff `K1E Γ . d for all Horn sequents Γ . d (i.e., (Simple-
Cut) can be eliminated from K1E).
Proof. The proof is quite similar to the one of Lemma 7 which states a similar
fact about the systems GE and G1E .
For any finite set of atomic formulae A, we let gA denote the function in
PtrK1E → PtrK1E adjoining A to all the antecedents of the sequents in its argu-
ment. Clearly size(gA(P )) = size(P ), and, moreover, conc(gA(P )) = (Γ ∪A) . d
whenever conc(P ) = Γ . d.
Let Ptr1K1E be the set of proof trees in K
1
E which employ the rule (Simple-Cut)
only once, at the root. It suffices to show that for any element of Ptr1K1E there
exists a proof tree in KE with the same conclusion. We do this constructively
by defining a conclusion-preserving function f : Ptr1K1E → PtrKE .
The definition, together with the proof that f preserves conclusions, is done








We distinguish 2 cases:
- If P2 has no immediate subtrees, then necessarily c′ ∈ Γ ∪ {d}. Here we have
two subcases:
— If c′ ∈ Γ , then f(P ) := (Axiom)[Γ . c′][.].
— If c′ = d, then f(P ) := P1.
- Otherwise, P2 has necessarily a rule (Inst-e) at its root, i.e., c′ has the form
c(T ) and P2 has the form P ′i...
Γ, d, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T )

i∈{1,...,n}
Γ, d . c(T )
(Inst-e)
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Qi be
g{ai(z,T )}(P1)...
Γ, ai(z, T ) . d
P ′i...
Γ, ai(z, T ), d . bi(z, T )
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T )
(Simple-Cut)
Note that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, 1 + size(P ′i ) ≤ size(P2), hence size(P ′i ) <
size(P2), hence
size(Qi) = 1 + size(P1) + size(P ′i ) < 1 + size(P1) + size(P2) = size(P ) ,
and therefore we may legitimately call f recursively forQi, and assume conc(f(Qi)) =
conc(Qi). We now define f(P ) to be the following tree: f(Qi)...
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T )

i∈{1,...,n}
Γ . c(T )
(Inst-e)
uunionsq
Theorem 3. `GI (E ∪ Γ ) . d iff `KE Γ . d for all Horn sequents Γ ` d.
Proof. KE and K′′E are equivalent by Lemmas 11 and 12, and now the desired
fact follows from Lemma 10. uunionsq
Lemma 13. (Drop) admissible in KE implies (Drop) admissible in GE.
Proof. Let∆,Γ, a(z, T ) as in the classic (Drop) rule, and assume `GE Γ, a(z, T ) . ∆
by a GE proof tree P . We need to show that `GE Γ . ∆.
Since in P the backwards applications of the rules (Inst-e) are triggered by
single elements of the succedents and proceed independently of each other, we
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obtain the following situation by disentangling P according to the “thin” trees
that each element of ∆ creates in P : There exist c1, . . . , cm (not necessarily dis-
tinct) such that ∆ = {c1, . . . , cm} and the families:
- (pj)j∈1,n of numbers,
- (Γ kj )j∈1,m,k∈1,pj of finite sets of formulae,
- (Pj)j∈1,m of partial proof trees in KE ,
such that:
–(I) For all j ∈ 1,m, the conclusion of Pj is Γ a(z, T ) . cj , Pj consists of appli-
cations of the (Inst)-e rules only (thus no (Axiom) rules) and has a pj number of
leaves, (Γ ∪ {a(z, T )} ∪ Γ kj ) . bkj )k∈1,pj .
–(II) For all σ ∈∏j∈1,n 1, pj ,
{bσ(1)1 , . . . , bσ(m)m } ⊆ Γ ∪ {a(z, T )} ∪ Γσ
where Γσ = Γ
σ(1)
1 ∪ . . . ∪ Γ σ(m)m .
Fix σ ∈∏j∈1,n 1, pj and j ∈ 1,m. By (II), we obtain a KE (total) proof tree
Qσ,j , with conclusion (Γ ∪{a(z, T )}∪Γσ) . cj by adjoining Γσ to the antecedents
of all sequents in Pj . By our hypothesis, since z is fresh for cj , we get `KE
(Γ ∪ Γσ) . cj , i.e., `KE (Γ ∪ Γσ) . cj has a (total) proof tree Q′σ,j in KE .
We can now create the desired GE proof tree for Γ . ∆, that is, for Γ . {c1, . . . , cn},
as follows:
- First apply backwards, for each j ∈ 1, n, all the rules of the KE partial proof
trees Pj without deleting the trigger formulae c(z, T ) – we obtain a partial proof
tree in GE with leaves of the form Γ ′ . ∆′, where:
- c1, . . . , cm ∈ ∆′;
- there exists σ ∈∏j∈1,n 1, pj such that Γ ∪ Γσ ⊆ Γ ′.
Such a leaf Γ ′ . ∆′ is now provable in GE via the GE proof tree obtained
from Q′σ,j by adjoining Γ
′ \ (Γ ∪ Γσ) to the antecedents and ∆′ \ {c1, . . . , cn} to
the succedents of all its sequents. uunionsq
Lemma 14. Assume that, if ai is not >, then Vars(x) ∩ FV(ai) 6= ∅, for all
formulae e ∈ E of the form (∗) and all i ∈ 1, n. Then `KE Γ . d iff `GE Γ . d
for all Horn sequents Γ . d.
Proof. Clearly `KE Γ . d implies `GE Γ . d. For the converse implication, all we
need to handle is the case when a backwards application of the rule (Inst-e) in
GE to a Horn sequent Γ . d does not preserve the single-succedent status, i.e.,
matches d with c(z) and reduces it to n sequents (Γ, ai(z, T ) . d, bi(z, T ))i∈1,n.
(This is achieved by taking ∆ = {c(z)} rather than ∆ = ∅ in the (Inst-e) rule
application.) To see that this does not make Γ . d more likely to be provable
than reducing it to Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ), notice that we have two cases:
-(I) d ∈ Γ . Then Γ . d is anyway trivially provable by (Axiom).
-(II) d 6∈ Γ . Then d cannot coincide with ai(z, T ) because, by our hypotheses,
at least one free variable of ai(z, T ) is fresh for d. Hence d 6∈ Γ ∪ {ai(z, T )}. For
the same reason, d 6∈ Γ ′ for any antecedent Γ ′ of a sequent in a partial proof
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tree with conclusion Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ). In other words, d will never have the
chance to contribute to a (backwards) proof hereafter, hence its occurence in the
succedents may be deleted. uunionsq
Theorem 4. Assume that:
-(i) If ai is not >, then Vars(x)∩FV(ai) 6= ∅, for all formulae e ∈ E of the form
(∗) and all i ∈ 1, n.
-(ii) (Drop) admissible in KE.
Then the following are equivalent for all Horn sequents Γ . d:
(a) `KE Γ . d.
(b) `GE Γ . d.
(c) E |= (Γ . d).
(d) `GI (E ∪ Γ ) . d.
(e) `G (E ∪ Γ ) . d.
Proof. (a) iff (b): This is Lemma 14.
(b) iff (e): By Lemma 13, (Drop) is admissible in GE , hence, by Lemmas 6, 7
and 9, the systems G′E , G0E , G1E and GE are all equivalent. By Lemma 5, G′E
proves Γ . d iff G proves (E ∪ Γ ) . d. Putting these pieces together, the desired
equivalence follows.
(a) iff (d): This is Theorem 3.
(c) iff (e): Follows from the completeness Theorem 2. uunionsq
Theorem 5. Assume that all formulae e in E of the form (∗) have the following
properties for all i ∈ 1, n:
-(i) If ai is not >, then Vars(x) ∩ FV(ai) 6= ∅.
-(ii) Vars(y) ∩ FV(bi) ⊆ FV(c).
Then (Drop) is admissible in KE, hence the conclusion of Theorem 4 holds.
Many-sorted version of Theorem 5. Let G be the set of all sorts s for which
there exists e ∈ E of the form (∗) such that x contains a variable of sort s, and
let VarG denote the set of all variables having the sort in G. Assume that all
formulae e in E of the form (∗) have the following properties for all i ∈ 1, n:
-(i) If ai is not >, then Vars(x) ∩ FV(ai) 6= ∅.
-(ii) FV(bi) ∩Vars(y) ∩VarG ⊆ FV(c).
Then (Drop) is admissible in GE, hence the conclusion of Theorem 4 holds.
Proof. We first prove the unsorted version of Theorem 5. In a (Drop) rule, if
ai is >, then there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, by hypothesis (i) and the
freshness of z, ai(z, T ) will contain at least one free variable u which is fresh
for d. Therefore, it suffices to prove that `KE Γ, a . d implies `KE Γ . d for all
sets of atomic formulae Γ , and atomic formulae a, d such that a contains a free
variable u fresh for d. We do this by induction on the structure of KE proof trees
P having Γ, a . d as conclusion.
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We distinguish 2 cases:
- If P has no immediate subtrees, then necessarily d ∈ Γ ∪ {a} and, since
u ∈ FV (a) is fresh for d, d cannot be a. Hence d ∈ Γ , hence `GE Γ . ∆.
- Otherwise, P has necessarily a rule (Inst-e) at its root, i.e., d has the form c(T )
and P has the form P ′i...
Γ, a, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T )

i∈{1,...,n}
Γ, a . c(T )
(Inst-e)
Fix i ∈ 1, n. Write the tuple the tuple y from c(y) as (y1, . . . , yk), and let
(yj1 , . . . , yjp) be its subtuple containing only variables which actually occur freely
in bi(x, y), in other words, that belong to Vars(y) ∩ FV (bi). By hypothesis (ii),
we have that yj1 , . . . , yjp also occur freely in c, and, since u is fresh for c(T ), we
obtain that u is fresh for Tj1 , . . . , Tjp . Moreover, since Vars(z) ∪
⋃p
k=1 FV (Tjk)
are all the free variables of bi(z, T ) and z is fresh for everything (including u),
we obtain that u is fresh for bi(z, T ). By the induction hypothesis, we obtain
`KE Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ).
It remains to apply (Inst-e) to obtain `KE . d, as desired.
The many-sorted version of the theorem has the same proof, except that we
assume the above variable u to have its sort in G. uunionsq
Theorem 4=. Assume that:
-(i) If ai is not >, then Vars(x)∩FV(ai) 6= ∅, for all formulae e ∈ E of the form
(∗) and all i ∈ 1, n.
-(ii) (Drop) is admissible in K=E.
Then the following are equivalent for all Horn sequents Γ . d:
(a) `K=E Γ . d.
(b) `G=E Γ . d.
(c) E |== (Γ . d) (I.e., Γ . d is E-tautological for TGL with equality.)
(d) `GI= (E ∪ Γ ) . d.
(e) `G= (E ∪ Γ ) . d.
Proof. The equality rules from the system G= are precisely the “primed” in-
stances of (i.e., the (Inst’) rules associated to) the Horn theory Eql of equality
axioms (listed in Section A.2). Moreover, the equality rules from the system I=
are precisely the instances of (i.e., the (Inst) rules associated to) the theory Eql .
This means that we can equivalently express statements (a)-(e) of the theorem in
a language without equality but with an ordinary binary relation symbol called
“=”:
(a) `KE (Γ ∪ Eql) . d;
(b) `GE (Γ ∪ Eql) . d;
(c) Γ . d is E ∪ Eql -tautological.
(d) `GI (E ∪ Γ ∪ Eql) . d.
(e) `G (E ∪ Γ ∪ Eql) . d.
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And, also given that the equality axioms satisfy hypothesis (i), it follows that
these latter facts are equivalent by Theorem 4. uunionsq
F.6 Proofs regarding System F’s adequate representation
Proposition 1. Let x1, . . . , xn be distinct data variables, X a data term and
T, T1, . . . , Tn type terms. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) `TSF x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn . X : T .
(b) `GT SF x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn . X : T .
(c) `GI T SF . (x1 : T1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn : Tn ⇒ X : T ).
Proof. (a) iff (b): TSF and GT SF are the same ( namely, referring to the notations
of Section 3: (SF-InVar) is (Axiom), (SF-Abs) is (Inst-Abs), (SF-T-Abs) is (Inst-
T-Abs), (SF-App) is (Inst-App), and (SF-T-App) is (Inst-App))), except for the
fact that GT SF allows its antecedents Γ to consist of arbitrary atomic formulae
X : T , while TSF requires these X’s to be variables and to not be repeated in Γ .
However, this distinction is immaterial in backwards proofs of sequents having Γ
in TSF form, since backwards applications of the rules in GT SF obviously keep
the antecedents in TSF form.
(b) iff (c): This is an instance of Theorem 3. uunionsq
Lemma 1. T SF satisfies the many-sorted version of strong syntax-amenability
(i.e., satisfies the hypotheses of the many-sorted version of Theorem 5).
Proof. Even though the proof is merely a simple check of some syntactic prop-
erties, we perform it in detail to clarify any potential confusion coming from
notation.
The only proper Horn2 sentences of T SF (i.e., sentences which are not
extensional or Horn) are the members of the axiom-scheme (Abs), and therefore,
referring to the notation (∗) for Horn2 formulae, the only case of an ai(x, y)
being distinct from > is x : t, where x is x (a variable of sort data) and y is
t (a variable of sort type). Hence hypothesis (i) of the many-sorted version of
Theorem 5 holds, and, moreover, the set G of sorts from that theorem is {data}.
We are left to check hypothesis (ii) of the same theorem – below, the lefthand
sides of the identifications that we make (i.e., the lefthand side of “is”) refer to
the notations in the mentioned theorem, while the righthand sides refer to the
notations used in the axioms of T SF :
– For (a sentence in) (Abs):
• n is 1.
• a1, i.e., a1(x, y), is x : t.
• b1, i.e., b1(x, y), is X : t′.
• c, i.e., c(y), is (λx : t.X) : (t→ t′).
• x is the singleton tuple x.
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• y is such that FV (b1) ∩ Vars(y) ⊆ FV (b1) \ {x} (because x 6∈ Vars(y),
the latter since x and y should be disjoint tuples).
Then the desired property, namely FV (b1) ∩Vars(y) ∩VarG ⊆ FV (c), is
(FV (X) \ {x} ∪ {t, t′}) ∩Vardata ⊆ FV ((λx : t.X) : (t→ t′)), i.e.,
(FV (X) \ {x}) ∩Vardata ⊆ FV (X) \ {x} ∪ {t, t′},
which is clearly true.
– For (App):
• n is 2.
• a1, i.e., a1(x, y), is >.
• b1, i.e., b1(x, y), is x : (t→ t′).
• a2, i.e., a2(x, y), is >.
• b2, i.e., b2(x, y), is y : t.
• c, i.e., c(y), is (x y) : t′.
• x is the empty tuple.
• y is such that FV (b1) ⊆ Vars(y) and FV (b2) ⊆ Vars(y).
The desired properties, namely FV (b1) ∩ Vars(y) ∩ VarG ⊆ FV (c) and
FV (b2) ∩ Vars(y) ∩ VarG ⊆ FV (c), are then reducible to {x} ⊆ {x, y} and
{y} ⊆ {x, y}, which are clearly true.
– For (a sentence in) (T-Abs):
• n is 1.
• a1, i.e., a1(x, y), is >.
• b1, i.e., b1(x, y), is X : T .
• c, i.e., c(y), is (λt.X) : (Πt. T ).
• x is the singleton tuple t.
• y is such that FV (b1) ∩ Vars(y) ⊆ FV (b1) \ {t} (because t 6∈ Vars(y),
the latter since x and y should be disjoint tuples).
Then the desired property, namely FV (b1) ∩Vars(y) ∩VarG ⊆ FV (c), is
(FV (X : T ) \ {t}) ∩Vardata ⊆ FV ((λt.X) : (Πt. T )), i.e.,
FV (X) ∩Vardata ⊆ FV (X),
which is clearly true.
– For (a sentence in) (T-App):
• n is 1.
• a1, i.e., a1(x, y), is >.
• b1, i.e., b1(x, y), is x : (Πt. T ).
• c, i.e., c(y), is (x t) : T .
• x is the empty tuple.
• y is such that FV (b1) ⊆ Vars(y)
Then the desired property, namely FV (b1) ∩Vars(y) ∩VarG ⊆ FV (c), is
FV (x : (Πt. T )) ∩Vardata ⊆ FV ((x t) : T ), i.e.,
{x} ⊆ {x, t} ∪ FV (T ),
which is clearly true. uunionsq
Proposition 2. Let x1, . . . , xn be distinct data variables, X data term and
T, T1, . . . , Tn type terms. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) `TSF x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn . X : T .
(b) T SF |= (x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn . X : T ).
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Proof. Immediate from Lemma 1 and Theorems 4 and 2. uunionsq
Proposition 3. Let X and Y be data terms. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) `RSF X  Y .
(b) `GI RSF . X  Y .
(c) RSF |= X  Y in classic TGL.
Proof. (a) iff (b): RSF is an extensional theory, and therefore the system KRSF
does not modify antecedents Γ on backwards applications of the rules (in (Inst-e),
ai is always >, hence omitted according to our conventions). This means that
the restriction of KRSF to sequents with empty antecedents is conservative.
Moreover, this restricted system is precisely RSF.
(b) iff (c): Immediate from Theorems 4 and 2. uunionsq
F.7 Proofs concerning the comparison between ad hoc and TGL
models
For the untyped λ-calculus.
Lemma 15. The forgetful mapping (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ(A)) to (A,
〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ) is a bijection, preserving satisfaction and each of the properties
(P5),(P6), between pre-structures verifying (P1)-(P4) and (P7) and simple pre-
structures verifying (P1)-(P4).
Proof. The inverse of the forgetful function maps simple pre-structures (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ)
verifying (P1)-(P4) to (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ(A)), where for each term T in Λ, se-
quence of elements a1, . . . , an in A and sequence of distinct variables x1, . . . , xn,
AT [a1/x1,...,an/xn](ρ) is, by definition, AT (ρ[x1 ← a1, . . . , xn ← an]). This defini-
tion is correct, because any term in Λ(A) has the form T [a1/x1, . . . , an/xn] for
some T , and AT (ρ[x1 ← a1, . . . , xn ← an]) does not depend on the choice of T . A
simple induction on the structure of Λ(A) terms shows that AT [a1/x1,...,an/xn](ρ)
is indeed equal to AT (ρ[x1 ← a1, . . . , xn ← an]) in any pre-structure, and thus
the two mappings are mutually inverse.
These mappings preserve satisfaction, since satisfaction is basically the same
in each two structures related by these mappings - note also that in pre-structures
only satisfaction of Λ-term equalities is defined. As for properties (P5) and (P6),
one needs another induction to prove that in a pre-structure, verifying these
properties w.r.t. Λ-terms is sufficient for them to hold w.r.t. Λ(A)-terms; here
one uses again the equality AT [a1/x1,...,an/xn](ρ) = AT (ρ[x1 ← a1, . . . , xn ← an]).
uunionsq
Lemma 16. Each of the schemes of formulae (β), (η), (ext) is semantically
equivalent in TGL to its primed variant.
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Proof. Since (β′), (η′) and (ext) are instances of the schemes (β), (η) and (ext),
all we need to show is that the latter follow from the former; and this simply
holds because in our logic it is sound to infer ϕ(T ) from ∀y.ϕ(y), and by the
way substitution in formulae was defined. uunionsq
Proposition 4. The above two mappings are well defined and mutually inverse.
Moreover, they preserve satisfaction and they can be restricted and corestricted
to:
(a) λ-models versus TGL models satisfying (ξ), (β);
(b) extensional λ-models versus TGL models satisfying (ξ), (β), (η).
Proof. We show that L# is a TGL model. Two of the TGL model axioms, (c).(i)
and (c).(iii), are precisely (P1) and (P3). The remaining axiom, (c).(ii), can be
written as AT [T1/x1,...,Tn/xn](ρ) = AT (ρ[x1 ← AT1(x1), . . . , ATn(xn)]). We check
this by lexicographic induction on two criteria: the depth of T , and then the
number n. The cases with T variable and T of the form T ′ T ′′ are simple, and
they use (P1) and (P2). Assume now that T has the form λx.T ′. Since we work
modulo α-equivalence, we can assume that x is not free in any of T1, . . . , Tn.
– If x 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, then T [T/x] = λx.(T ′[T/x]). Thus we need to check
A
λx.(T ′[T /x])
(ρ) = Aλx.T ′(ρ[x← AT (ρ)]). By (P4), it is sufficient to consider
a ∈ A and prove A
T ′[T /x]
(ρ[x ← a]) = Aλx.T ′(ρ[x ← AT (ρ), x ← a]), i.e.,
A
T ′[T /x]
(ρ[x ← a]) = Aλx.T ′(ρ[x ← a][x ← AT (ρ)]), which is true by the
induction hypothesis applied to T ′ and ρ[x← a].
– If x ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, say x = x1, then T [T/x] = T [T2/x2, . . . , Tn/xn] and by
the induction hypothesis (second criterion),
T [T2/x2, . . . , Tn/xn] = AT (ρ[x2 ← AT2(x1), . . . , xn ← ATn(xn)]. Finally,
because x 6∈ FV (T ), the valuations ρ1 = ρ[x ← AT (ρ)] and ρ2 = ρ[x2 ←
AT2(x1), . . . , xn ← ATn(xn)] coincide on FV (T ), hence, by (P3), AT (ρ1) =
AT (ρ2) and we are done.
(Above, we used the obvious tuple notations x for (x1, . . . , xn), T for (T1, . . . , Tn)
etc.) L# satisfies (ξ) because (P4) is nothing else but a semantic statement of
(ξ).
We show that M$ is a λ-model. Properties (P1) and (P3) are required for
generic models as well, hence they hold. (P2) holds as an instance of the ax-
iom (c).(ii) of TGL models: AT1 T2(ρ) = Ax1x2[T1/x1,T2/x2](ρ) = Ax1x2([ρ[x1 ←
AT1(ρ), x2 ← AT2(ρ)]) = AT1(ρ)〈AT2(ρ)〉. (We also used the definition of 〈 〉.)
Again, (P4) holds in M$ because M satisfies (ξ).
That # and $ are mutually inverse follows from the fact that a〈b〉 = Axy(ρ),
with ρ mapping x to a and y to b, holds in any pre-structure verifying (P1)-(P4).
In order to see that the pre-structure is a λ-model (i.e., it also verifies (P5)
iff the corresponding TGL model satisfies (β), note that (P5) is just a semantic
statement of (β′), which is equivalent to (β) by Lemma 16. Similarly, extensional
λ-models correspond to (β) ∪ (η)-TGL models because of the following:
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– under the (β), (ξ) assumptions, (η) is equivalent to (ext);
– (ext) is equivalent to (ext ′) by Lemma 16;
– (ext ′) is just a semantic statement of (P6).
Finally, both # and $ preserve satisfaction since it has the same definition
for equations in pre-structures and generic models. uunionsq
For System F.
Proposition 5. For all typing judgements Γ . X : T , it holds that
`SF Γ . X : T iff SF |= (Γ# . typeOf(X,T )).
Proof. By Proposition 2, it holds that `SF Γ . X : T iff T SF |= (Γ# . typeOf (X,T ))
Moreover, notice that the axioms of SF others than those of T SF have equa-
tional conclusions, hence do not affect typing, i.e., T SF `=TL Γ# ⇒ typeOf (X,T )
iff SF `TL Γ# ⇒ typeOf (X,T ). The desired conclusion now follows. uunionsq
Lemma 17. Henkin and 1-Henkin models are equivalent, in that there exists a
satisfaction- preserving and reflecting surjection &1 between the class of Henkin
models and that of 1-Henkin models. That is to say: for all Henkin models H
and well-typed equation Γ . X = Y : T ,
H |= Γ . X = Y : T iff H&1 |= Γ . X = Y : T.
Proof. The mapping &1 makes disjoint copies of the Domσ’s whenever necessary,
curries the functions Appσ,τ and Appf , and deletes from F all functions that do
not come from terms. &1 preserves and reflects satisfaction because satisfaction
only considers functions in F that come from terms, and hence it relays on the
same structure for H as for H&1 . &1 is a surjection because any Henkin model
with disjoint domains Domσ and all functions coming from terms yields a 1-
Henkin model by uncurring. uunionsq
Lemma 18. 1-Henkin and 2-Henkin models are equivalent, in that there exist
two satisfaction- preserving and reflecting mappings &12 and &
2
1 between the two
classes of models.
Proof. &12 maps a 1-Henkin model to a 2-Henkin model by forgetting F and
Π and by defining AppHΠt.T (γ) to be Appτ 7→HT (γ[τ←t]); the definition is correct
by property (6) in the definition of 1-Henkin models. Conversely, &21 maps a 2-
Henkin model to a 1-Henkin model by defining F as at point (c) in the definition
of 1-Henkin models, and Appf by AppHΠt.T (γ) if f has the form τ 7→ HT (γ[t←
τ ]). Satisfaction is seen to be precisely the same in corresponding 1-Henkin and
2-Henkin models. uunionsq
Lemma 19. 2-Henkin and 3-Henkin models are equivalent, in that there exist
two satisfaction- preserving and reflecting mappings &23 and &
3
2 between the two
classes of models.
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Proof. Let H be a 2-Henkin model. The 3-Henkin model &23(H) is defined as
follows: D = ⋃Dom. App(d, d′) = Appτ,σ(d, d′) if there exist τ, σ such that d ∈
Domτ and d′ ∈ Domσ and App(d, d′) arbitrary otherwise; the definition is correct
because, thanks to disjointness of the Domτ ’s and injectivity of →, there can
be at most one pair (τ, σ) as above. Similarly, TApp(d, τ) = AppHΠt.T (γ)(d, τ)
if there exist t, T, γ such that d ∈ DomHΠt.T (γ). The relation typeOf is the
following: typeOf (d, τ) iff d ∈ Domτ . Everything else remains the same.
Conversely, let H be a 3-Henkin model. The 2-Henkin model &32(H) is de-
fined as follows: Domσ = {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)}. Appτ,σ is the restriction and
corestriction of App to Domτ→σ ×Domτ → Domσ; the correctness of this defi-
nition is ensured by property (2) in the definition of 3-Henkin models. Similarly,
TAppHΠt.T (γ) is the restriction and corestriction of TApp toDomHΠt.T (γ)×T → D, with correctness ensured by property (3) in the definition
of 3-Henkin models. Everything else remains the same.
Note that &32◦α23 is the identity mapping, thus 2-Henkin models are somehow
more “concise” than 3-Henkin models. Again, there is nothing to prove about
preservation an reflection of satisfaction, since again the satisfaction relation is
the same in two corresponding models. uunionsq
Lemma 20. Let H be a 3-Henkin model, γ : TVar → T and δ : DVar → D.
Then there for any two pairs (Γ, T ) and (Γ ′, T ′) such that ` Γ . X : T and
` Γ ′ . X : T ′ such that HΓ . X:T and HΓ ′ . X:T ′ are defined on (γ, δ), it holds
that HΓ . X:T (γ, δ) = HΓ ′ . X:T ′(γ, δ).
Proof. Easy induction on the derivation of typing judgements; the idea is that
all the information needed for interpreting X is already in the valuation (γ, δ),
and Γ and T can only “confirm” this information. uunionsq
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